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ABSTRACT 
 
The diplomatic relations between the United States (USA) and South Africa (SA) had its birth 
in 1799 with the establishing of a consulate in Cape Town. Over the next two centuries the 
political dealings between the two countries were at times limited to almost merely 
acknowledgement of the other’s existence, while at other times there was very close 
cooperation on almost all levels of state. Diplomatic ties were strengthened during the 
Second World War, the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War when Americans and South 
Africans shared the same dugouts, flew in the same air missions, and opposed the same 
enemy on both the tactical as well as ideological fronts.   
 
During the Cold War, SA aligned itself with the Western world in the hope of being seen as 
staunchly anti-communist in order to fit in with the Cold War rhetoric of the West.  
Washington was delighted to have an ally in Southern Africa who would ensure, or so 
Washington hoped, that communism did not get a foothold in this strategically placed part of 
the globe.  Unfortunately for the USA, South Africa’s apartheid policies went against 
everything that the USA proclaimed to stand for – freedom and democracy.  The USA 
eventually found itself in a precarious position of having to choose between its own national 
interest and moral obligations.  From 1960-1990 the USA-SA relationship oscillated as 
various personalities (presidents, politicians etc) and world events (e.g. Sharpeville 
massacre, Vietnam War, Watergate etc) impacted on it to various degrees.  The USA-SA 
alliance consisted of political, economic and military relations (including nuclear weapons 
technology) which at times had to be clandestine in order for the USA to not lose its 
international prestige as leader of the free world.  With SA however forging ahead with its 
policies of segregation and destabilisation the USA had to increasingly act under a cloak of 
plausible deniability in all spheres of its relationship with SA. 
 
The Soviet Union (USSR) and its allies (mainly Cuba) conducted military operations in 
Southern Africa and provided training to African liberation movements with the intention of 
helping them to achieve freedom from the apartheid regime or to protect themselves from 
Pretoria’s aggression, as was the case with Angola. Soviet support for the liberation 
movements in SA and the rest of Southern Africa was a mutual concern for both SA and the 
USA. Consequently the USA supported South African adventurism into its neighbouring 
countries under the auspices of preventing the communist forces from achieving world 
domination.  By the end of the Cold War, the USA could no longer turn a blind eye to SA’s 
occupation of Namibia or the incursions into Angola.    With assistance from the USA and 
other Western allies Pretoria was able to, in the greatest of secrecy and to the amazement of 
the world, built several nuclear weapons.  SA’s nuclear programme never really reached a 
level where it could threaten the larger nuclear powers but it was troublesome enough to 
move the USA to action. By means of coercion and diplomatic pressure the USA managed to 
convince Pretoria to abandon its quest for a nuclear arsenal. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) en Suid-Afrika (SA) het al vanaf 1799 ŉ 
diplomatieke verhouding gehad met die vestiging van n konsulaat in Kaapstad.  Tydens die 
daaropvolgende twee honderd jaar het die verhouding gewissel van kwalike erkenning van 
die ander se bestaan tot intense samewerking op byna alle gebiede. Die verhouding was 
versterk tydens die Tweede Wêreld-Oorlog, die Berlynse Lugbrug en die Koreaanse Oorlog 
toe Amerikaners en Suid-Afrikaners aan dieselfde kant geveg, gewerk en dieselfde vyandige 
ideologie teengestaan het.   
 
Tydens die Koue Oorlog het die apartheid regering van SA aan die kant van die Weste 
geskaar en hulself as uiters anti-kommunisties bemark om sodoende in te pas by die Koue 
Oorlog retoriek van die Weste.  Washington was verheug om ǹ vriend te hê in Suider Afrika 
wat kon verhoed dat die kommuniste ǹ greep op dié strategiese deel van die wêreld kon kry.  
Ongelukkig vir die VSA het die Suid–Afrikaanse beleid van apartheid teenstrydig gestaan 
met die waardes van vryheid en demokrasie wat deur the VSA nagestreef word.  Die VSA 
moes besluit of moraliteit of nasionale belang van die staat die belangrikste was.  Vanaf 
1960-1990 was die VSA-SA verhouding op ǹ wipplank rit wat bepaal was deur 
persoonlikhede (presidente, politici ens) en wêreldgebeure (bv. Sharpeville, die Viëtnam 
Oorlog, die Watergate Skandaal ens).  Die VSA-SA alliansie het bestaan uit politieke-, 
ekonomiese- en militêre verhoudings (wat ook kernwapens en tegnologie ingesluit het) wat 
by tye in geheimhouding moes plaasvind om sodoende nie die Amerikaners se beeld as die 
leier van die vrye wêreld te skend nie.  Die VSA moes gereeld op talle vlakke ontken dat 
hulle in ǹ alliansie met SA was. 
 
Die Sowjet-Unie en sy geallieerdes (hoofsaaklik Kuba) het militêre operasies uitgevoer in 
Suider Afrika en Afrika se vryheidsvegters opgelei met die doel om dié lande te help om 
onafhanklikheid te kry van die apartheid regering of om hulle te beskerm teen SA. Sowjet 
ondersteuning aan die Suid-Afrikaanse vryheidsvegters en die ander vryheidsvegters van 
Suider Afrika was ǹ bron van kommer vir beide die VSA en SA.  Gevolglik het die VSA die 
Suid-Afrikaanse regering aangemoedig en ondersteun om buurlande aan te val onder die 
voorwendsel om die kommuniste te verhoed om wêreld dominansie te verkry.  Teen die 
einde van die Koue Oorlog kon die VSA nie meer voorhou dat SA regmatiglik in beheer was 
van Namibië nie en nog minder kon hulle SA se aanvalle op Angola regverdig nie. Ironies 
genoeg het die VSA toe die rol van mediator vervul om sodoende die konflik in Suider Afrika 
tot ǹ einde te bring nadat die VSA vir jare lank die konflik aangehits het. Met behulp van die 
VSA kon SA daarin slaag om n hoeveelheid kernwapens te vervaardig. Onder die grootste 
geheimhouding natuurlik. Alhoewel SA se paar kernwapens nooit n bedreiging vir die groter 
moonthede sou wees nie, het die bestaan daarvan die VSA to aksie aangespoor.   Deur 
middle van politieke druk kon die VSA daarin slaag om SA te laat afsien van sy kernprogram.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America (USA) has had diplomatic representation in South Africa (SA) 
since 1799, when the first American consulate opened in Cape Town.1  Since then the USA 
has built a good relationship with SA, a relationship that lasted throughout the 19th century 
and both world wars, although it was unclear whether it would hold through the Cold War era, 
because of SA’s apartheid policies.   
Apartheid laws were enacted in SA after the National Party victory in 1948.  These laws were 
created to ensure white-minority rule in SA by social engineered rule over people of colour.  
Racial segregation guaranteed white economic and political rule and in cases of resistance 
was fiercely enforced by the government security forces.  International condemnation of 
human rights abuses in SA soon followed. The USA publicly opposed SA’s apartheid laws.  
However, simultaneously the USA did not want to lose a potential strategic ally such as SA 
during the Cold War.2 
In 1963, as a result of international and domestic pressure against the apartheid regime, the 
USA announced an arms embargo against SA. This firstly prohibited new sales of military 
equipment to SA and, secondly the selling of equipment that SA might use to build new 
weapons.3  From 1963 through to 1994, Washington initiated and supported a number of 
embargoes against SA to demonstrate their disagreement with the apartheid policies.  Even 
though the American government condemned apartheid throughout the Cold War, they 
generally opposed the economic sanctions that were placed against SA by the United 
Nations (UN).4   
The USA maintained good relations with SA during the Cold War, because SA was an 
important ally in an unstable region where communism was seen to expand rapidly from the 
viewpoint of the American political elite.5  As criticism against apartheid increased during the 
early 1960s, the South African government made the case with some success that all black 
activists in SA were supported and even manipulated by the communists in general and from 
Soviet Russia in particular.6  The notion of a “Total Onslaught” against SA by the communist 
forces – especially forces manipulated by the USSR - became a central part of the South 
African government discourse and propaganda.  Resultantly the government successfully 
                                                 
1
  US Department of State.  2006.  US Consulate General Cape Town celebrates July 4th for the first time at 
new location.  http://southafrica.usembassy.gov/news060704.html (accessed 18 January 2010). 
2
  R. Goldstone.  2005.  Ambiguity and America:  South Africa and US Foreign Policy.  Social Research, Vol 
72, Nr 4. p.813. 
3
  Study Commission on US Policy toward Southern Africa.  1981.  South Africa:  Time running out.  Los 
Angeles, California:  University of California Press. p. 413. 
4
  N.D. Howland.  1995.  Foreign Relations of the United States: 1961-1963, Vol XXI, Africa. Washington:  
Department of State. p.623. 
5
  US Library of Congress.  1996.  South Africa:  Relations with non-African states.  http://www.country- 
data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12187.html  (accessed 14 January 2010). 
6
  W. Walker.  1978.  The Bear at the Back Door:  The Soviet threat to the West’s lifeline in Africa.  Sandton:  
Valiant Publishers. p. 9. 
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portrayed itself as a defender of Western values because they were fighting the “red danger” 
on the African continent on behalf of the West.7 
Within this context the USA maintained diplomatic relations with SA throughout the Cold 
War, despite Pretoria’s apartheid policies.  Militarily the two countries remained close allies.  
The apartheid military relied on the USA for assistance throughout the Cold War and the 
USA was willing to assist SA even if covertly or under the cloak of plausible deniability 
because the South Africans were playing a role in the USA’s fight against Communism.8  
Initially the USA did not hesitate to supply SA with conventional weapons as well as some of 
the nuclear technology and skills to build atom bombs.9  In view of international opinion such 
a close relationship in due time saw some permutations.10 
1.2 RESEARCH STATEMENT 
The USA was pressured both domestically and internationally to break diplomatic ties with 
SA during the Cold War.11 However, the American government resisted breaking all ties with 
SA.  Over the years the USA’s relationship with SA became increasingly covert as a result of 
the domestic and international pressures on successive American governments.   
From a literature search, it seems that the broad USA-SA relationship, from 1960-1990, has 
not yet been documented substantially in dedicated studies and there remains a gap in the 
literature on USA-SA foreign policy in the Cold War era. The research project here poses the 
question: Were the relationships between the USA and SA ambiguous for public 
consumption or were these realistic strains that could not be resolved because of the Cold 
War mythology? 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
This study intends to analyse the relationship between SA and the USA during the Cold War 
with the aim of explaining why the USA continued to covertly support SA.  In order to answer 
the research question, the research objectives are: 
a. To study the USA-SA relationship in alignment with their Cold War national interests.  
 
                                                 
7
  C.  Alden. 1998.  Apartheid Last Stand:  The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State.  New York: St  
Martin’s Press. pp. 37-41.  A.  Urnov, 1982.  South Africa Against Africa. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
p.131. 
8
  N.  Barnard.  2015.  Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers.  p.  
133.  Howland, op cit. p.649. 
9
  A.  Van Wyk.  2007.  Ally or critic? The United States’s response to South Africa’s Nuclear Development  
1949-1980, in Cold War History, Volume 7, No 2, May 2007.  p. 197.  
10
  A. J. Venter.  2008.  How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs and then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons  
Program.  Kyalami Estate:  Ashanti Publishing.  D.   Albright.  1994. South Africa and the Affordable Bomb. 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994. p. 38.   
11
  F.N.  Nesbitt.  2004.  Race for Sanctions:  African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994.  Indiana:  
Indiana University Press.  p. 36. E.  Rhoodie. 1983.  The Real Information Scandal.  Pretoria: Orbis SA. pp. 
28-29.  A. Thomson.  2008.  U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994: Conflict of 
Interests. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.   p. 31. 
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b. To scrutinise USA-SA military relations during the Cold War and its political 
consequences. 
 
c. To investigate through the available data whether the USA supported SA’s 
occupation of South West Africa and SA’s military interventions in Angola. 
1.4 PURPOSE AND SIGNFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The number of studies on USA-SA relations is limited and there is space for enlarging the 
current literature on the topic.  The study will explore the nature and content of near constant 
diplomatic interaction between Washington and Pretoria during the Cold War, even at times 
when the USA publicly both denounced SA and discouraged other states to have ties with 
SA.  Conversely diplomatic contact between Washington and Pretoria seemingly remained 
constant even though the rest of the world condemned the USA-SA relationships.     
This study covers thirty years of USA-SA contact and aims to be a supplement to the 
available literature on USA-SA relations which may be of use for historians, diplomats, 
political scientists, expert practitioners, think tanks and other parties interested in Cold War 
diplomacy, foreign policy and security studies.  
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A thorough review of scholarly literature plays an important role in the research process.  
Berg argues that it is important to examine how other scholars have thought and researched 
the chosen topic.12  Researchers should organise their search for literature around the key 
concepts that they wish to study.13 Therefore a wide reading is relevant and important to this 
study. 
Cold War Studies is a new and expanding field that deserves more research.  The Cold War 
History journal helps to fill the void in Cold War Studies by publishing research on the origins 
and development of the Cold War, its impact on nations, alliances, regions and in areas such 
as diplomacy, security, economy, intelligence, the military and society pertaining to the Cold 
War. There are many books that deal with the Cold War in broad, but South African related 
studies during the Cold War need more attention.   Dockril and Hopkins in The Cold War 
1945-9114 provide a broad explanation of the Cold War.  They deal with issues such as the 
emergence of the Cold War, the historical debate on the Cold War as well as the legacy of 
the Cold War.  This book is just one of many15 that give an overview of the Cold War.  Sue 
                                                 
12
  B.L.  Berg.  2009.  Qualitative Research Methods:  For the Social Sciences (7th edition).  Boston:  Allyn & 
Bacon. p. 27. 
13
   E.  Babbie.  2010.  The Practice of Social Research (12th edition).  Belmont:  Wadsworth, p. 506. W.L. 
Neuman.  1997. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (3rd edition). Boston:  
Allyn & Bacon. p. 490. 
14
  M.  Dockril and M.F. Hopkins.  2006.  The Cold War 1945-91.  London:  Palgrave Macmillan. 
15
  M.P.  Leffler and O.A. Westad (Eds).  2010.  The Cambridge History of the Cold War.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.  M.  Thomas.  2009.  The Cold War: A Beginners Guide.  Oxford:  Oneworld.  
B. Frankel.  1992.  The Cold War: 1945-1991.  Detroit, Michigan:  Gale Research. 
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Onslow in Cold War in Southern Africa:  White power, black liberation16 provides important 
literature on Southern Africa during the Cold War.  Her book, an edited collection, draws on 
the expertise of a number of leading scholars who did research on the topic of Southern 
Africa during the Cold War in countries such as Russia, Cuba, the United States, Britain and 
SA. 
There are some recent studies on South African foreign relations with other countries that 
might provide insight with regards to methodology.  Victor Moukambi completed an 
interesting doctoral study on the military relationship between SA and France from 1960 to 
1990.17  Another important study on the topic of foreign relations during the Cold War is Piero 
Gleijeses’s Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976, which focuses 
on the relationships between Pretoria, Havana and Washington.18   
In 1973 John Barber produced the first book on SA’s foreign policy. This covered the period 
from 1945 through to 1970 and contains interesting information on USA-SA relations during 
the early Cold War.19   In 1990 this was updated in collaboration with John Barrat as South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy:  The search for status and security 1945-1988.20  This is a vital 
source on South African foreign policy during the Cold War.  It addresses the internal and 
external factors that influenced SA’s foreign policy during the Cold War and is a 
comprehensive and authoritative account of SA’s foreign policy from the end of the Second 
World War through to 1988. The Diplomacy of Isolation:  South African Foreign Policy 
Making21 by Deon Geldenhuys is another important source of South African foreign policy 
making during the Cold War.  In this book Geldenhuys deals with the setting and formulation 
of South African foreign policy.  The most important contributions to the literature is that 
Geldenhuys explores the role that personalities of the presidents played in South African 
foreign policy making as well as the  influence of public opinion on foreign policy. 
There is a vast amount of literature on American foreign policy during the Cold War, although 
little has specific focus on SA.  Kegley and Wittkopf provide a good insight into the 
formulation of American foreign policy with their book American Foreign Policy:  Pattern and 
Process.22  In this work they explore how American foreign policy evolved from 1945 through 
to 1986, while Noam Chomsky provides a fact based criticism of US foreign policy with his 
book American Power and the New Mandarins.23  Another good piece of literature on 
                                                 
16
   S.  Onslow (Ed).  2009.  Cold War in Southern Africa:  White power, black liberation.  London:  Routledge. 
17
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Books. 
19
   J.  Barber.  1973.  South Africa’s Foreign Policy:  1945-1970.  London:  Oxford University Press. 
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1988.  New York:  Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. 
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Macmillan Publishers. 
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York: St Martin’s Press. 
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American foreign policy is Hastedt’s American Foreign Policy:  Past, Present, Future.24 Cerf 
and Pozen’s Strategy for the 60’s25 is another good source on American foreign policy during 
the early stage of the Cold War.  The book is especially valuable in painting a picture of how 
the perceived threat of communism influenced American foreign policy.   
South Africa and the United States: The declassified history26 edited by Kenneth Mokoena 
and Loosing the Bonds:  The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid years27 by 
Robert Massie both follow USA-SA relations from the 1960s through to 1990.  These books 
were key sources for this research, as they cover a variety of topics that are discussed in this 
thesis.  The most significant aspect of Mokoena’s book is that it contains copies of 
declassified CIA and other government documents that provide the reader with previously 
secret information on USA-SA relations.  Massie on the other hand focuses more on how the 
USA placed sanctions on SA, but in the process also touches upon matters such as the 
USA-SA nuclear relationship. Another book that further covers USA-SA relations during the 
Cold War is Thomson’s U.S. Foreign policy towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994: 
Conflict of Interests.28 This book does well to discuss each American president from Truman 
through to Clinton’s foreign policy towards SA and addresses contradictions in USA foreign 
policy towards SA.  Lulat’s United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview 
from the Colonial Period to the Present29  does the same by treating each USA president 
separately and analysing how they approached foreign policy with SA.  The controversial 
Wikileaks was also browsed for more secret information on USA-SA relations.   
South Africa:  Time running out30 is another essential source.  The book was essentially a 
report by the study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa.  The commission 
was ordered to do exhaustive fact gathering and analysis on SA.  In their report the 
commission discusses issues such as US interest in Southern Africa, apartheid and the 
influence of communism on SA.  South Africa and the United States: The erosion of an 
influence relationship31, by Bissel, also describes USA-SA relations during the period from 
1960-1980.  This book manages to explain in detail how the USA and SA interacted on 
political, military, economic, nuclear and socio-cultural issues. 
One of the strengths of the study is that the author succeeded to access material from 
American archives via the American Embassy. During the twentieth century the US 
Department of State compiled and presented in book form a large number of telegrams and 
                                                 
24
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memorandums from a variety of diplomatic actors from all over the world.  These volumes 
are all entitled:  Foreign Relations of the United States.  The collection is divided into 
chronological annual editions and each of these year groupings is again divided 
geographically to form different volumes.  The volumes of the books that will be used for this 
project relate to Africa.  Each of these volumes contains a number of telegrams and 
memorandums, which was obtained from various archives in the USA, between diplomatic 
actors in SA and the USA.  These sources provided a fuller perspective and insights by 
tapping information on the eras under discussion from previously classified sources. They 
are valuable primary sources to the study.32  These books are accessible at the US Embassy 
in Pretoria. 
Morris Price’s The Nixon years (1961-1974): Duplicity in United States policies toward 
Southern Africa33 provides a good understanding of US foreign policy during the Nixon 
presidency.  The focus of the book is to highlight how the Nixon administration made public 
statements which condemned apartheid, but at the same time strove to maintain white rule in 
SA.  The book also discusses how the USA preferred white governments in Angola, 
Mozambique and Rhodesia.  Southern Africa and the United States34 by William Hance (Ed) 
also attends to USA-SA relations during the 1960s.  The most important contribution by this 
book to the existing corpus of material is the chapter in which Hance investigates the case 
for and against US disengagement from SA.  
With regards to President Carter’s foreign policy toward SA, Martin Spring’s book 
Confrontation:  The approaching crisis between the United States and South Africa35 is 
definitely an important source.  Spring predicts what Carter’s foreign policy towards SA would 
be.  He describes issues such as why SA was such an important ally to the USA at the time 
and what Carter might have done to better relations with SA. 
Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement towards SA was a controversial topic with 
authors who praised the policy and others who criticised the policy.  Chester Crocker, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan administration and architect of 
the constructive engagement policy is an authoritative source on the thinking behind 
constructive engagement.  Crocker lays out the logic of the policy in an article published in 
the Foreign Affairs in 198136, in which he expounds on what the US objectives and interests 
in Southern Africa were during the 1980s.  He also explains the reasons why the USA 
                                                 
32
  H. D.  Schwar and A.V. La Fantasie (Eds).  1992.  Foreign Relations of the United States: 1958-1960. Vol 
XIV. Africa. Washington:  Department of State.  N.D. Howland.  1995.  Foreign Relations of the United 
States: 1961-63. Vol XXI. Africa. Washington:  Department of State.  N.D. Howland.  1999.  Foreign Relation 
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PhD dissertation, St John University.  Ann Arbor:  University Microfilm International. 
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decided on the policy of constructive engagement towards SA.  Davies, Ungar and Vale37 are 
some of the authors who criticise constructive engagement and argue that the policy was a 
failure.  They are all of the opinion that Ronald Reagan’s policy towards SA did not try to 
abolish apartheid, but rather accepted apartheid as long as American interests in SA were 
not endangered.  Manzo published an article in the Policy Studies Review (1986) in which 
she severely criticises constructive engagement and argues that the majority of the American 
people were totally against the policy and she highlights instances of popular opposition to 
constructive engagement.38  Coker’s book The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985:  
Constructive Engagement and its critics39 is also a good source that explains the criticism 
against constructive engagement.  The book not only focuses on constructive engagement, 
but also explains USA-SA relations in a more comprehensive sense. 
On the topic of America’s position on sanctions against SA, Anna-Mart Van Wyk can be 
regarded as an authoritative source.  The topic of her doctoral thesis was:  The 1977 United 
States arms embargo against South Africa: Institution and implementation to 1997.  She 
subsequently published numerous articles in academic journals.  Her articles regarding 
sanctions against SA, which are particularly relevant to this study, are: 
• ‘The Kennedy Administration and the institution of an arms embargo against South 
Africa, 1961-1963’ in Historia, 46, no 1 (May 2001), and  
• ‘The Carter Administration and the institution of the 1977 arms embargo against 
South Africa: Rhetoric or active action?’ in Historia, 51, no 1 (May 2006).   
Van Wyk’s thesis and her two articles examine how a succession of American presidents 
responded to the growing call for sanctions against SA.  It is evident from her work that some 
presidents were more willing to implement sanctions against SA, others not.  In July 1986, in 
a speech entitled ‘US economic relations with SA:  Apartheid, some solutions’40  President 
Reagan explained his administration’s reluctance to implement economic sanctions against 
SA. Eric Morgan in an article in Diplomacy and Statecraft41 has examined President Nixon’s 
approach to SA’s apartheid laws.  He discusses Nixon’s “Tar Baby” policy that condemned 
apartheid, but still continued to build ties with the apartheid government, because of 
American economic interests in SA.  His articles focus on American and South African 
opposition to Nixon’s foreign policy towards SA.  Race for sanctions:  African Americans 
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  J. E.  Davies.  2008.  South Africa and Constructive Engagement:  Lessons learned.  Journal of Southern 
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Studies Review, November 1986, Vol. 6, No. 2. pp. 212-220. 
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   C.  Coker.  1986.  The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985:  Constructive Engagement and its 
Critics.  Durham:  Duke University Press. 
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   R.  Reagan. 1986.  US Economic Relations with South Africa:  Apartheid, some solutions.  Vital Speeches of 
the Day, Vol LII, No 21, August 15, 1986. pp.  642-645. 
41
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against Apartheid, 1946-199442 is an excellent source on how a significant portion of 
American civil society condemned apartheid and how they appealed to their government to 
take a stance against SA’s apartheid policies. The focal point of the book is to explore how 
the anti-apartheid movement among African-Americans grew from being a small group of 
people to being an entity that influenced US foreign policy.  
Allan D. Cooper (1988) dedicated a chapter in his book Allies in Apartheid:  Western 
Capitalism in Occupied Namibia43 to America’s role in the independence of Namibia.  With 
this chapter Cooper explores the USA’s economic foreign policy towards South West Africa 
(SWA) now known as Namibia. The author touches on the style of different US presidents 
and how they approached the Namibian issue with regards to getting independence from SA 
and vested financial interests in Namibia. The chapter highlights how American foreign policy 
towards Namibia was directly related to the American foreign policy towards SA.  
The debate is taken forward by Piero Gleijeses in an article published in Diplomatic History44 
in which he investigates President Jimmy Carter’s actions on the issue of Namibia’s 
independence. This article encompasses most of the issues that surrounded the 
independence of Namibia during the 1970s.  An interesting article with regards to the USA’s 
support for SA in Namibia is Leo Grande’s article in the New York Times, in which he argues 
that the Reagan administration could have possibly allowed the South African government to 
not withdraw from Namibia because they were fighting communism in the form of the Cubans 
in Angola.45 Gleijeses’ book46 is another important piece of literature on the topics of 
Namibia’s independence and USA involvement in Angola. 
Military contact between SA and the USA was not a new phenomenon in the 1960s.  Even 
though this study will focus on the time from 1960 onwards, it is still important to have an 
understanding of the historical background of USA-SA military relations.  Neil Orpen with his 
book South African Forces World War II:  Victory in Italy47 tells the story of SA’s 6th armoured 
division that fought in Italy side by side with American forces during the Second World War.  
There are also a few sources that explain SA’s participation in the Korean War, where 2 
Squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF) formed part of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing 
                                                 
42
  F. J.  Nesbitt.  2004.  Race for Sanctions:  African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994.  Indianapolis:  
Indiana University Press. 
43
  A. D. Cooper. 1988.  Allies in Apartheid:  Western Capitalism in occupied Namibia.  London:  Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 
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  P.  Gleijeses.  2010.  A Test of Wills:  Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of Namibia.  
Diplomatic History, Vol.34, No.5, November 2010. pp. 853-891. 
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  W. M.  LeoGrande. 1982.  Cuba Issue blinds U.S. in Namibia.  The New York Times, July 29, 1982.  
http://american.edu/faculty/leogrande/cuba-namibia.htm (accessed 12 March 2011). 
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  P.  Gleijeses.  2002.  Conflicting Missions:  Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976.  North Carolina:  
University of North Carolina Press. 
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of the United States Air Force (USAF).48  Once again South Africans were fighting by the side 
of their American allies. 
Good research has been done on USA-SA military co-operation during the apartheid years.  
Stephen Talbot published a chapter in Dirty Work: The CIA in Africa49 where he explains how 
America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the South African government 
extensively since 1969 when SA’s Bureau of State Security (BOSS) was formed.  In this 
chapter Talbot discusses issues such as the Muldergate scandal and the Border War, where 
the CIA worked in close collaboration with the South African government.  Eschel Roodie 
was the Secretary of information during the Muldergate scandal and with his book The Real 
Information Scandal50 he gives the reader a behind the scenes look at what really happened 
with the Muldergate scandal according to Rhoodie’s account.  The Muldergate scandal is 
also discussed in Les de Villiers’s book Secret Information.51  Les de Villiers was the former 
Deputy Secretary of Information.  As a result of his post, he formed part of the inner circle of 
men who were in charge of SA’s secret propaganda offensive.  In this book he explains how 
the USA covertly assisted SA in their propaganda war.   
Chester Crocker with his book High Noon in Southern Africa:  Making Peace in a Rough 
Neighbourhood52 gives the reader insight into eight years of American participation in the war 
in Angola and Namibia.  Jannie Geldenhuys’s book A General’s Story: From an era of war 
and peace53 is a good supplement to Crocker’s book.  Where Crocker tells the story from an 
American point of view, Geldenhuys provides a South African perspective. A chapter of 
Geldenhuys’s book is dedicated to how the Americans participated and tried to broker peace 
during the Border War. General Magnus Malan’s autobiography54 and Pik Botha’s 
biography55 are both good supplements to the two previously mentioned books as they also 
touch the topic of the USA’s involvement in the Border War. 
South Africa’s nuclear build up during the Cold War has been a topic of discussion for a long 
time. As a result there is a reasonable body of work on the topic. Anna-Mart van Wyk is 
again indicative on this topic.  Her articles that will be used for this thesis on the topic of 
nuclear relations between SA and America are: 
• ‘Ally or critic? The United States’ response to South African nuclear development, 
1949-1980’. in Cold War History, 7,  no 2 (May 2007)  
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• ‘Sunset over Atomic Apartheid: US-South African nuclear relations, 1981-1993’ also 
in Cold War History, 10, 1 (January 2010)  
• ‘Apartheid’s Bomb: Cold War perspectives’, in South African Historical Journal 62, 1 
(April 2010).  
Van Wyk’s chapter in Cold War in southern Africa: white power, black liberation56 edited by 
Sue Onslow, will also be a vital source for the thesis.  The chapter in the book is entitled: 
‘The USA and Apartheid South Africa’s nuclear aspirations, 1949-1980’.  A.J. Venter’s book 
How South Africa Build Six Atom Bombs and Then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons 
Program57 is a very important source as it explains SA’s nuclear program during the 
apartheid years in detail.  Venter provides the reader with a wealth of inside information on 
SA’s nuclear weapons program.  Armament and Disarmament:  South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapons Experience58 by Steyn et al also gives the reader a broad overview of SA’s nuclear 
program.  The book is rather technical seeing that the three authors were involved with the 
building of SA’s nuclear bombs.  They focus more on the technical aspects than on the 
political dynamics of the time. David Allbright’s article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists59 
entitled “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb” gives a broad overview of SA’s nuclear 
weapons project.  The article does discuss a lot of technical details, but he does well to 
capture the history of the nuclear program.  Malan, who served as the Chief of the Army 
(1973) then Chief of the South African Defence Force (1976) and  finally as Minister of 
Defence (1980) also touches on the topic of USA-SA nuclear relations.60  A chapter of the 
book is dedicated to SA’s nuclear capabilities during the apartheid year and in this chapter 
he mentions a number of times how the USA was pressurised into placing sanctions on SA, 
but they still helped SA to obtain better nuclear capabilities.   Barbara Rogers’s chapter in 
Dirty Work:  the CIA in Africa61 is also a good supplement to the topic of SA’s nuclear 
weapon build up.  In her chapter entitled “South Africa Gets Nuclear Weapons – Thanks to 
the West” she focuses her attention on how SA was able to get the necessary components to 
build nuclear bombs with the help of Western countries. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
The study will investigate the relationship between SA and the USA during the Cold War.  
This will be an exploratory study with descriptive elements using largely a qualitative 
approach. It will take the form of a literature study and declassified documents from the 
military archive in SA to garner factual data.  A state-centric approach will be followed and 
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the units of analysis will be SA and the USA.  The variables to be studied will be the foreign 
policy of these states from approximately 1945 through to 1990. 
Primary material will be use from inter alia, the following archives: 
Military Archives (Documentation Centre, SANDF), Pretoria: 
• Minister of Defence – Erasmus and Fouché. 
• Minister of Defence – P.W. Botha. 
• Minister of Defence – Malan. 
• Chief of the SADF. 
• Defence Attaché – Washington. 
• Military Advisor – London. 
• Department of Military Intelligence 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The first chapter of the paper deals with the introduction of the research and includes a brief 
historical background of USA-SA relations covering the era before 1960.  The Berlin airlift (24 
June 1948 – 12 May 1949), the Korean War (25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953) and other 
relevant issues will be briefly discussed.  This chapter will also set out the research problem 
and the research question.  The aim, purpose and significance of the study will receive 
attention.   The methodology to be used during the research will be clarified.  The chapter will 
provide a basic explanation of the broad foreign policy of the USA toward SA as well as SA’s 
broad foreign policy towards the USA. The chapter will end with a brief conclusion. 
Chapter two will focus on the period from 1960 to 1974.  This period includes the earlier 
stages of sanctions against SA.  The USA’s decision to implement sanctions against SA will 
be discussed in detail.  The chapter will discuss why the USA was so reluctant to implement 
the sanctions and why the USA at times violated the sanctions in order to help SA.  The 
influence of the American civil society on the government’s decision to implement sanctions 
against SA will also be discussed in this chapter.  The three American presidents who held 
office during this period were:  J.F. Kennedy, L.B. Johnson and R.M. Nixon.  This chapter will 
therefore investigate their foreign policies toward SA. 
Chapter three will look at the period from 1975 to 1990.  This chapter will focus mainly on 
how President Carter’s stance towards SA differed from President Reagan’s later stance.  
The chapter will investigate whether Reagan was more supportive of the apartheid regime 
than Carter was.  In order to do this, Reagan’s constructive engagement policy will be closely 
scrutinised. This chapter will accommodate negative opinions about constructive 
engagement as well as positive opinions on the policy.  The Muldergate scandal also will be 
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briefly treated in this chapter seeing the USA was also involved in the operation. Lastly, the 
consequences of constructive engagement in Southern Africa will be addressed. 
Chapter four will scrutinize the USA’s support and involvement during the Namibia-Angola 
debacle.  The chapter will investigate how US foreign policy towards SA influenced the 
independence of Namibia.  Essentially the chapter will focus on the military co-operation 
between SA and the USA during the Border War.  This chapter will look at covert and overt 
military support by the USA to SA.  The USA’s covert support to the Angolan liberation 
movements will also be discussed. 
A fifth chapter will treat the USA-SA nuclear relationship.  It is firstly most important to know 
why SA desired and consciously developed nuclear capabilities.  The chapter will explore the 
reasons behind the development by SA of a nuclear programme and then investigate in 
detail how SA acquired the nuclear technology in a strict sanctions environment with the help 
of the USA and other allies. 
1.8 ETHICS AND LIMITATIONS 
There were no foreseeable ethical dilemmas. Only open sources were used.  In all cases 
where archival materials are used, they are openly sourced.  Classified material were only 
used after the appropriate processes of declassification took place or in cases where such 
sources have already been declassified. 
Financial resources were one of the main limitations to the study.  In order to do cutting edge 
research, it was important for the author to travel around SA, to Cuba and to the USA to do 
research in a variety of archives. In the course of the study the author was however 
privileged to visit Cuba and interact with some Cuban people with knowledge and experience 
of the politics of the time.   
Not being able to read French, Spanish, Hebrew and Russian are limitations to the study.  
This is because the French co-operated closely with the USA in providing SA with nuclear 
technology. The same applies to SA and Israeli cooperation in the military/security fields and 
the development of nuclear weapons. There might be sources that could shed light on the 
issue with some references to French-USA or USA-SA cooperation written in French.  
Moukambi’s thesis will be a great asset in this regard, as he used material in the French 
archives to complete his thesis.  It is also possible that numerous articles are published in 
Russian, Portuguese, Hebrew and Spanish on the topic of SA during the Cold War, but 
because the author cannot read any of the mentioned languages, these articles will not be 
accessible.  Consequently, most of the sources used for the study were from Anglo/American 
or African origin. 
The fact that some of the information that could greatly contribute to the study is still 
classified in the South African Military Archive is another limitation.  A number of files were 
requested at the archives and where possible were declassified. A marked limitation were 
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that some files that could not be declassified due to non-disclosure agreements that were 
signed by SA and other countries.  
Research is an ongoing process, and in the course of the study the search for, screening of 
and use of sources remained an integral and conscious part of the process. In this regard, 
where necessary application was made/authorisation requested to get access to files, once 
they are declassified on request of the researcher and supervisors. 
The researcher should strive to be balanced and aware of the need to consult, compare and 
cross-check the various sources (data obtained) when reporting his findings. While 
“objectivity” can never be fully realized the author remained aware of the need to keep a 
balance and to report findings as honestly as possible – in other words striving towards 
internal integrity for the final product. 
1.9 INTRODUCTION: USA-SA RELATIONS 1939-1960: A SHORT OVERVIEW 
In both the first and second world wars SA entered the conflict on the side of Britain. During 
the second part of both conflicts the belligerents were strengthened by the involvement of the 
USA on the side of the Allies. This brought about a co-operation born out of military necessity 
between SA and, among other nations, the USA. At the conclusion of the Second World War 
SA found itself opposing communism alongside the United Kingdom (UK), USA, and France 
– the so-called “West”. It was then without hesitation that SA contributed, albeit in a limited 
way as compared with other nations, to the conflict in Korea. It was here that SA continued 
its support to the West which began with the Berlin Airlift at the end of the war. In Korea, SA 
placed its 2nd SAAF Squadron under operational command of the USA instead of the British.     
1.9.1 The Second World War (1939-1945) 
The USA entered the Second World War on 7 December 1941 after the surprise attack on its 
naval base at Pearl Harbour. By the time Operation Torch62 was launched, Rommel had 
been checked at El-Alamein and was the South Africans heading back to the Union, thus 
missing out on closer co-operation with the Americans, in spite of being allies.63  The South 
African 6th Armour Division fought under the command of the US 5th Army in Italy for a major 
part of 1944-45.64  The 6th Armour Division was a composite division which comprised 
infantry and armour with all its support elements.65 Furthermore there were South African 
Artillery, logistical personnel, technical personnel and a Provost Company fighting in Italy 
with the Allied Forces. In total 20 273 South African soldiers participated in the liberation of 
Italy during the Italian campaign.66 
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The SAAF was heavily involved in bombing missions and reconnaissance flights during the 
Italian campaign.  The SAAF made a huge contribution to the success of the Allied war effort 
in Italy.67 By the end of the Italian campaign on 8 May 1945, 711 South Africans were killed, 
2 675 were wounded and 157 South Africans were unaccounted for.68 
On 12 March 1947, US President Truman proclaimed that a catastrophe awaits the world if 
the USA would not fight communism abroad.   He further said that if any enemy dared to 
attack an ally of the USA it would be regarded as an attack on the USA itself.69  The USA 
also expected its allies to help protect each other against the so called communist onslaught. 
It can be argued that with the initial backing of the USA, Pretoria intended to be the protector 
of the free world in Southern Africa. In reality this translated to being the defender of white 
privilege, a fact which would eventually drive the erstwhile allies from each other.  
1.9.2 The Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) 
During the last week of the Second World War, Berlin was captured by the Soviet Army.  
After negotiations the Western Powers took over their sectors of Berlin in July 1945. So 
Berlin was divided into East and West Berlin. After a disagreement about currency reforms 
(initiated by the Americans)70, the Soviets closed all routes into Berlin on 11 June 1948.71 
Newspaper correspondents were of the opinion that West Berliners were going to run out of 
food and other necessities by the end of July 1948. But because of the team work between 
the British Commonwealth, which included SA until 1961, and the USA, they overcame the 
blockade.72 
South Africa sent aircrews to help with the Berlin airlift.73   The SAAF provided 20 aircrews to 
fly as part of the Royal Air Force (RAF).  The South African crews flew 2500 sorties into 
Berlin during the airlift.  A total of 8 333 tons of humanitarian aid was delivered to Berlin by 
the South African crews.74  This showed SA’s commitment to the USA and the rest of the 
Western world to help in whichever way they could.  
George F. Kennan (1947-1989) a Foreign Service officer formulated the policy of 
“containment” in 1947 which became the basis of ideas on the USA’s dealings with the 
USSR. The essence of this policy was centred on a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies. In spite of being criticised for its defensive 
posture Kennan’s policy sought to counter any Soviet pressure against the free institutions of 
the Western world.75  South Africa eagerly bought into policy and when communist backed 
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North Korea invaded its southern neighbour, Pretoria wasted no time in aligning itself with 
the West. 
1.9.3 The Korean War (1950-1953) 
When North Korea invaded South Korea in a surprise attack on 25 June 195076  the UN 
demanded that North Korea cease its aggression.  The UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution to assist South Korea to repel the attack from its neighbour.77   During August 
1950, following direct requests from Washington, SA announced that it would make a 
squadron of the SAAF available to the United Nations Forces (UNF) in Korea.78 The USA 
provided the majority of the forces for the UNF and Washington also provided the high 
command.79  No 2 Squadron of the SAAF was selected and was detached to the 12th Fighter 
Wing of the USAF.80 Later in the war it was detached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.  In 
December 1952, 2 Squadron was re-equipped with American Sabres.  These were the 
SAAF’s first jet aircraft.81  
 
Illustration 1.1: Sabre Aircraft82 
During its three year stint in Korea, some 800 men of 2 Squadron served with the USAF.  
The “Flying Cheetahs”, as 2 Squadron became known, made a lasting impression on the 
USA.  In order to show their appreciation the following policy directive is was issued by the 
Officer Commanding of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing:  
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In memory of our gallant South African comrades, it is hereby established, as a new policy, 
that all Retreat Ceremonies held by this Wing, the playing of our National Anthem shall be 
preceded by playing the introductory bard of the South African Anthem, “Die Stem van Suid 
Afrika”.  All personnel of this Wing will render the same honours to this anthem as our own.83 
1. 10 THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE USA-SA RELATIONSHIP 
In order to understand why the USA and SA maintained a relationship throughout the Cold 
War, it is important to understand what national interest is and the influence that national 
interest have on the foreign policy of a country.   Hartmann contents that in the environment 
of national foreign policy there remains a tension between moral formulas and national 
interest.84  He refers to this tension where in almost all cases national interest became a 
greater priority in the case of the USA.  As examples he uses the American bias in the 
Ethiopian conflict of 1935 and during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 onwards. Cold War 
examples include the interaction with Communist China (1949 onwards), Korea and Asia 
especially the Vietnam War.85   
According to Papp a country’s “...interests are called the national interest, and the methods 
and actions it employs to attempt to achieve its national interests are called national policy.”86  
There are various different definitions for national interest but there are certain criteria that a 
state considers when defining its own national interest. 
Economic interest was one of the main criteria for the USA during the Cold War.  If a state 
follows a policy that seeks to enhance its economic standing then it can be seen to be in the 
national interest.87  The USA maintained a relationship with apartheid SA throughout the Cold 
War in pursuit of its own economic interest.  The world condemned SA for its apartheid 
policies, but the USA did not want to lose its economic benefits in SA. 88  The USA saw an 
opportunity in Southern Africa to replace Britain and the other imperialist European countries 
which had interests and “provinces” in Southern Africa.89 Ideological criteria played an 
important role in the national interests of the USA and SA during the Cold War. The US and 
South African national interests were both centred on the ideological criterion. Both the USA 
and SA used the ideology of anti-communism to justify their policies and their relationship.90  
Military security and/or advantage are further criteria that shaped the national interests of the 
USA and SA. The USA saw SA as a strategic military partner in Southern Africa.91  South 
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Africa on the other hand felt that if they have the military support of the USA, then communist 
forces would not be able to invade SA and SA would be able to maintain its white minority 
rule.92 
The national interest of a state changes constantly especially when new leadership takes 
power in a country.  Therefore national interest should be “viewed less as a constant set of 
national objectives than as a changing approximation of what the leaders of a country or 
other significant individuals or groups within a country view important.”93  Throughout the 
study it will be seen that the criteria forming the national interest of either the USA or SA 
changed, but there was always at least one criterion of national interest that the two 
countries had in common. As can be seen in this dissertation, moral formulae are despite the 
professed idealism thereof regularly replaced by actions aimed at the maintenance or 
expansion of interests. 
1.11 US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SA 
By 1960, the USSR had diplomatic missions in Libya, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Ghana.  The 
USSR was also busy to provide training on Marxist-Leninist theories in Moscow to more 
leaders from West Africa.94  The obvious next step for the Soviets would be to extend their 
influence to Southern Africa.  The USA predicted that Africa was going to play a much more 
important role in international politics from 1960 onwards.  The independence of most African 
states from the late 1940s through to the early 1960s meant that there was a whole new 
theatre where the US and the rest of the super powers could get resources to maintain their 
economies and militaries. The newly independent actors also acquired a growing voice in the 
UN.95  It was soon to become a global race to build relationships with the newly independent 
state in Africa as well as in Asia.  
These newly independent African states started many debates in the UN about human rights 
and racial equality which could not be ignored by the USA.  This new significance of Africa 
held implications for the USA domestically and with regards to its foreign policy, because the 
USA did not want to lose authority in the UN, but also did not want to lose SA as a strategic 
partner.96 Therefore the USA pledged to pursue a more energetic approach towards Africa 
than before 1960.  A study done by the Committee on Foreign Relations (CFR) of the United 
States Senate in 1959 recommended that the USA had a new responsibility towards the 
African continent and in order to meet the new found responsibility the USA had to do the 
following: 
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• The USA had to preach its own values of racial tolerance and self-determination to 
Africa. 
• The USA had to provide African countries with the necessary support in the 
economic, social, educational and any other spheres where they might need support.97 
The CFR study left a loophole in order to also sympathise with countries like SA who refused 
to adopt a democratic system.  The study stated that “The U.S can work with the new African 
states whether or not they develop democratic institutions which follow Western models.”98  
So the study actually recommended that the USA should have relations with all African 
countries. The USA mostly tried to base its foreign policies around doing everything possible 
to promote democracy and prevent crimes against humanity; but the South African case was 
much more complex. 99  There was one issue more important to US foreign policy than 
democracy and crimes against humanity – the fight against communism.  Already on 12 
March 1947, President Truman made a speech where he warned that “the world will face 
disaster unless the United States fought communism abroad.”100  The global containment of 
communism was the primary US foreign policy objective during the Cold War and SA 
masterly played in on this concern.101 
Sources differ on whether the USA was eager to have a diplomatic relationship with SA 
during the Cold War.  According to Barber the USA tended to take a hostile diplomatic stance 
against SA whenever possible and they never had a really close relationship.102   Barber 
argued that SA was initially on the low-priority list for the USA.  He further argues that SA 
was simply an annoyance, and one that embarrassed the USA in the General Assembly.103  
Most of the literature agrees that the USA-SA relationship was a healthy relationship that 
was pursued by both sides.  From the diplomatic cables that were sent between American 
diplomats, it is clear that they did not want to do anything that would turn SA against the 
USA, because SA was regarded as a valuable ally in their war against communism. 
Anti-communism in essence determined USA foreign policy toward SA during the Cold 
War.104  The Free World (of which SA was part) saw communist domination as one of the 
greatest threats to mankind.105  Leonid Brezhnev, a senior USSR leader from 1964 to 1982, 
acknowledged that one of the main objectives of the USSR was to take away Western 
control over the mineral wealth in central and Southern Africa.106  Consequently one of the 
major challenges that the USA faced from 1960 to 1990 was the perceived communist threat 
from the East.  The USA was prepared to fight the communist menace at all levels. In 1960, 
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Cerf and Pozen (like many other foreign policy experts) recommended to the USA 
government that the primary foreign policy goal of the USA should be to spread democracy 
and freedom in order to curb the spread of communism.107  In the case of SA, the USA was 
unable to strive for democracy and freedom for all because of apartheid.  Yet the USA 
maintained good relations with SA.  According to Thomson, “...whatever Washington DC  
thought of the racial policies of the South African government, it could not fault Pretoria in its 
commitment to prevent ‘communists’ from coming to power in the Republic, or anywhere else 
in the region.”108 
Racial issues were also certainly influential in constructing the USA foreign policy towards 
SA. The USA constantly had to make the difficult choice of whether to fight against 
communism or racism - communism mostly won. Levi explained this phenomenon when he 
wrote that “...national interest overpower morality.”109  
It is very important to consider the interconnectedness of the unholy three as SA, Rhodesia 
and Mozambique were known at the time when studying USA foreign policy towards SA 
during the Cold War. The unholy three were only interconnected until 1974.110  The 
Portuguese withdrawal from Africa in 1974 changed the situation in Southern Africa and will 
be discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
1.11.1 South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique – The Unholy Three 
South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique were important to the USA, in view of their ability to 
generate profits by using grossly underpaid black labourers.  The unholy three had similar 
interests and came to realise that an attack on one was an attack on all.111  These three 
Southern African countries stood together as far as possible.  The alliance was confirmed 
when South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster said in September 1968: 
South Africa and her friend Portugal understand each other very well and I need say no more 
on that subject.  No treaties are needed between friends: they know their duty when a 
neighbour’s house is on fire.112 
Washington in many cases regarded the three countries as one and the same when they 
developed their foreign policy. Namibia was also included as part of these three, because SA 
administered Namibia as one of its provinces at the time.  Therefore one will find that many 
books focusing on USA foreign policy during the era before 1974 do not describe US foreign 
policy towards the three countries separately, but rather describe it as US foreign policy 
towards Southern Africa.113 
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This study will focus only on US foreign policy toward SA, because only a limited amount of 
pages are allowed and if USA foreign policy towards Southern Africa had to be studied, the 
limit would easily be exceeded. 
1.11.2 Factors that Influenced US Foreign Policy towards SA 
There are many factors that influenced US foreign policy toward SA, but there were five main 
factors.  The first factor was the amount and type of investments that were made in SA.  
Many of the major companies in the USA had interests in SA.  Businesses which were 
involved in manufacturing and raw material procurement were especially interested in SA, 
because of the cheap black labour that could increase their profits tremendously.  The region 
is also very rich in valuable minerals such as gold, platinum and uranium, which were all very 
important commodities to the USA.114 
The second major factor was SA’s military-strategic importance to the USA.  After the closure 
of the Suez Canal, the sea route around SA increased in importance.115  In the next chapter it 
will also become clear how important it was for the USA to build a missile tracking station in 
SA.  Thomson concurs that SA’s geographical location on the African continent increased its 
value to the USA.116 
The third major factor that influenced USA foreign policy towards SA was the USA’s 
relationships with other African countries.  Whenever the USA showed any friendly signs 
towards SA, the rest of the African continent accused Washington of supporting the 
apartheid regime and everything it stood for.  For this reason the USA also supported black 
states like Zaire.  Resultantly the USA had to carefully balance their relationship between SA 
and the rest of the African continent.117 
The fourth major factor was the racial situation in the USA.  The African-American population 
in the USA had a big influence on US foreign policy toward apartheid SA.  The US politicians 
had to keep the votes of the African-American population in mind when they took decisions 
with regards to SA.118 It is important to remember that the USA also had a history of racial 
segregation and inequality in some parts of the USA until the early 1960s.119 So the anti-
racism sentiment was pertinent in the USA at the time. 
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Illustration 1.2: Racial segregation in the USA.120 
 
 
Illustration 1.3: Racial segregation in SA.121 
The fifth major factor was the attitude of the various bureaucracies within the USA.  Price 
names the Black Caucus, the Southern Bloc and the Commerce Department as just a few 
that influenced the USA’s foreign policy toward SA.122  Barber confirms this when he writes 
that the South African ministers found it difficult to distinguish which of the many 
bureaucracies influenced the formulation of US policy the most.123 
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1.12 SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE USA 
According to Barber and Barrat, the apartheid government’s foreign policy was based on 
three themes.  The first theme was the regional context of Southern Africa in Africa.  The 
second theme was SA’s relationship with the West and the third theme was SA within the 
broader world context including membership of international organisations.124   
Communism was rationalised as the main enemy by the apartheid regime.  They identified 
that the communist threat was internal and external, so they had to do anything possible to 
stop the so called red danger of communism.125  In Pretoria it was believed that everyone 
who did not support white minority rule in SA were communists and a threat to the country 
and the world.126  As a result of the open hostility towards the communist East, SA 
“...assumed a natural identity of interests with West.”127  Seeing the USA was the superpower 
of the West, it was inevitable that the SA would go out of its way to build and maintain good 
relations with the USA. 
The South African government recognised the vital importance of having the USA as an ally, 
but were at the same time unsure as to how the USA felt about SA.  According to Barber and 
Barrat, the USA had few ties with SA and Africa, so by the early 1960s the South Africans 
were uncertain whether the USA would be supportive of SA.128 
South Africa had a few problems with the USA that influenced its foreign policy towards the 
USA.  Firstly, the SA government did not appreciate it when the USA declared its abhorrence 
of apartheid and constantly criticised the apartheid regime.129  Even when the criticism came 
from other countries, SA expected the USA to stand up for them, but the USA rarely did so in 
public. Secondly, the SA government did not appreciate it when the USA and the rest of the 
West did not support SA within the context of international organisations, especially within 
the UN.  The USA was also at the time trying to build a multi-racial society where everyone 
was equal and that was another drawback for SA.130 In short the USA was attempting to 
“forget” their recent past of segregation – a form of collective forgetfulness that made it 
difficult to rationalise around apartheid and/or give it qualified support 
1.13 CONCLUSION 
SA and the USA have had many years of diplomatic interaction. SA had demonstrated her 
unwavering support for the USA and the West by providing forces during the Second World 
War, the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War. There is clear evidence that the USA government 
supported the SA government throughout apartheid.  The USA supported SA in all spheres.  
SA’s economic and strategic value to the USA should have resulted in a very strong 
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relationship between the two countries, but the international condemnation of apartheid did 
not allow the two countries to proclaim their relationship.  The USA supported the apartheid 
government overtly and covertly at various times.  At other times public statements 
contradicted positive/concrete support of the apartheid’s regimes’ actions.  The USA did 
during certain periods of the Cold War support apartheid and even helped to keep the 
apartheid government in power.  
As SA was an important ally during the Cold War, the USA hovered between public criticism 
and material assistance.  Instead of building its foreign policy towards SA around human 
rights and poverty, the foreign policy was instead dictated by the Cold War ideological 
struggle of anti-communism and the USA’s self interest.  South Africa’s controversial 
apartheid policies prevented the USA from announcing to the world that SA was an ally of 
the USA and the West while in reality it was at least seen as a strategic asset. 
South Africa’s apartheid leadership in turn was desperate to form part of the Western 
identity.  That is why SA was willing to maintain diplomatic relations with the USA even when 
the USA condemned the apartheid government.  This was also why SA committed military 
forces, to operate with UN forces, at a time when criticism of SA and the apartheid policies 
was becoming increasingly vocal, and especially at the UN.   Both the USA and SA had 
disagreements with each other, especially on racial issues, but they never totally broke 
diplomatic ties.  Both countries had too much to lose from such a break-up.  Their staunch 
dedication to the eradication of communism served as a glue to keep them together.  The 
rest of the world condemned the relationship, but they were able to uphold it throughout the 
Cold War. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: USA-SA RELATIONS FROM 1960-1974 
The period from 1960 to 1974 saw the climax of the Cold War as the USA was willing to try 
all avenues to contain the worldwide spread of communism.  The US government was 
deeply concerned that the African continent could come under influence of the USSR.  As 
Jesse Holmes, the Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State described the situation in 
Africa in 1958 “there will be plenty of troubled waters for Communist fishing.”131 Walker132 
was of the opinion that the USSR wanted to absorb Southern Africa to deprive the West from 
the valuable minerals in the region.133  The West also kept in mind that access to the Cape 
sea route would be of crucial importance if the Suez Canal should ever become unusable.134  
It was therefore important to the USA to maintain good relations with SA.135  South Africa 
was arguably the African country that received the most focus from the USA during the Cold 
War.136 
The USA had to publicly criticise apartheid as not to do so “would hurt long-term U.S. 
interests within the context of the Cold War.”137  Lulat describes the USA-SA relationship as:  
a story of the contradiction between, on one hand, the ideological dictates of historically-
rooted notions (of support for freedom and democracy and opposition to imperialism) that 
abound in a country that itself had once fought a war of liberation, and, on the other hand, the 
reality of the demands of waging a global ‘cold’ war with the former communist nations of 
Eastern Europe over the Western world’s  need to continue to preserve at all  costs the 
dominance of capitalism with the international economic  system-but set against the ideology 
of whiteness.138   
Coker, Cooper and Mokoena agree with Lulat.139  Thomson writes that USA foreign policy 
toward SA was a very difficult balancing act that the USA tried to master.140 The USA 
portrayed itself as a country that would assist any nation to free itself from its oppressors and 
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become a democracy.  Furthermore the USA vowed to do anything to stop the spread of 
communism.141  As a result the USA received two pleas for assistance from SA:   
• White South Africans requested assistance to fight communism although this would 
inevitably help to maintain white minority rule. 
• Black South Africans pleaded to the USA to help them in their struggle against what 
the disenfranchised saw as white oppression in their country of birth. 
The USA then chose to act in its own best interest by supporting the apartheid 
government.142  The South African government convinced the USA through its Cold War 
rhetoric of being staunchly anti-communist.  In the process, the USA undermined the struggle 
for the freedom and democracy of black South Africans (ironically the ideology that defined 
the USA during the Cold War) in order to preserve Western interests in Southern Africa.143  
From 1960 to 1974 three US presidents were responsible for either the maintenance or the 
cancellation of ties with SA. They were J.F. Kennedy (1961-1963), L. B. Johnson (1963-
1969) and R. Nixon (1969-1974).  Each had different views with regards to relations with SA. 
2.2 POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND SA 
By 1960, the USSR had diplomatic missions in Libya, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Ghana.  The 
USSR was influencing more leaders from West Africa by providing training in Moscow.144  
The obvious next step for the USSR would be to extent its influence to Southern Africa.  The 
banning of South African liberation movements in 1960 provided the communist powers with 
a potential new theatre.  The African National Congress (ANC), which decided to follow an 
armed struggle against the apartheid regime, and was in need of arms and military training, 
offered the perfect opportunity for the USSR to gain a foothold in Southern Africa.  The 
USSR never forced the ANC to use violence in their campaign, but the USSR did respect the 
ANC’s decision to embark on a violent liberation struggle.145  The USA concluded that in all 
probability a communist government would take over in SA should the apartheid government 
be overthrown by one of the liberation movements, especially if it was ANC and its ally, the 
South African Communist Party (SACP).146  According to the USA, the hand of Moscow was 
ready to interfere with the crucial interests of the USA in Africa, Asia and Latin America.147 
 
 
                                                 
141
  J. E.  Davies.  2007.  Constructive Engagement?  Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, 
Namibia & Angola 1981-8.  Johannesburg: Jacana Media. p. 6. 
142
  Lulat, op cit. p.157. 
143
  R. Goldstone.  2005.  Ambiguity and America:  South Africa and US Foreign Policy.  Social Research,   
Vol 72, Nr 4. p. 814.  Shubin, 2008, op cit. p. 63. 
144
  Schwar, H.D. & A.W. La Fantasie (Eds). op cit. p.8. 
145
  V.  Shubin.  2008. The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa. London:  Pluto Press.  p. 241. 
146
  A.  Urnov, 1988.  South Africa Against Africa. Moscow: Progress Publishers p. 215. Thomson, op cit. p.6.  
Shubin, 2008, op cit. p. 195. 
147
  Urnov, op cit. p. 215. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Bear148 
The USA recognised the importance of SA in the fight against communism but the practice of 
apartheid hampered relations between the two countries.  As apartheid became known to the 
international community, it became difficult for the world and especially the USA to ignore 
apartheid legislation and its practical outcomes.149  Special Assistant Holmes described 
apartheid as a dead-end policy.150  In response, Prime Minister Verwoerd told the US 
Ambassador that he did not think the USA understood the importance of SA in the defence 
against communism on the African continent.  The Ambassador responded that the USA 
wanted friendly relations with SA but that it would be difficult until SA changed its racial 
policy.151 
The USA agreed with other Western countries that SA was abusing the human rights of the 
black citizens.  The fact that the USA also had a history depriving African-American citizens 
of their human rights contributed to its negative stance towards SA’s apartheid policy.152  The 
USA realised that it was not possible, nor right, to suppress a group of people based on skin 
colour and wanted to convey this message to SA’s political leaders.  The USA was aware 
that by suppressing blacks, SA, under Prime Minister Verwoerd was driving blacks to seek 
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moral support and later material assistance from the communist world.153  In this context the 
USA found itself within the nexus of moral responsibilities or professed moral standpoints 
and the imperative to serve its national interests akin to earlier situations as pointed out by 
Hartmann.154 
In 1966 the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs, Mennen Williams, announced 
during a meeting with the House Subcommittee on Africa that “the broad aims of U.S. policy 
towards South Africa are essentially political.  We support freedom, equality, and justice for 
the people of South Africa... These political aims are paramount.”155 
2.2.1 Apartheid 
Apartheid posed a potential risk to the moral and political fibre as well as the international 
interests of the USA.156  By 1960, the USA’s attitude to SA was that it did not want the world 
to think that the USA supported apartheid and so publicly denounced the policy yet did 
whatever it could to protect SA from international criticism.  Here duplicity, ambiguity and 
double standards are apparent in the USA’s relations with the apartheid government from the 
outset - it was important for the USA to criticise apartheid whilst still maintaining cordial 
political, military and economic relations with SA.157   
On 21 March 1960, members of the South African Police (SAP) fired live ammunition on 
black people demonstrating against the Pass Laws in Sharpeville, a township, south of 
Johannesburg.  At least 65 people were killed and more than two hundred were wounded.158  
This event became known as the Sharpeville massacre and would play a significant role in 
the political history of SA and affect relations between the USA and SA which will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  In SA the massacre increased alienation and deepened 
tensions between those in favour of a one-person-one vote democracy and those who 
wished to uphold white minority rule, albeit with the promise of limited rights for black 
people.159  
After the Sharpeville massacre a number of American officials and broader public began to 
espouse their opinions on apartheid in the international media.160  Statements such as 
“apartheid is repugnant to us in the United States of America” and that apartheid is “a wrong-
headed policy fraught with dangers not alone to the people of South Africa but to 
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international peace and security” were frequently voiced by senior US officials.161  An US 
representative in the UN also noted in 1962 that “[w]e are unalterably and irrevocably 
opposed to apartheid in all its aspects.  Our traditions and our values allow no other 
position.”162   These statements were typical of what the USA promoted to the international 
community with regard to apartheid. 
The increase in Africa’s membership in the UN and SA’s disregard for UN resolutions 
regarding apartheid and its mandate over SWA led the UN Security Council to adopt a 
resolution in November 1962.  This demonstrated that the UN was determined to end 
apartheid. The Resolution requested UN member-states to “...break diplomatic relations, 
close ports to ships flying the South African flag, boycott South African goods, and refuse 
landing and passage facilities.  It also requested the Security Council to call for economic 
sanctions and an arms embargo.”163  The Kennedy administration voted against the 
Resolution, but it was adopted due to the overwhelming support of the rest of UN member-
states. 
Even though the USA publicly increased its criticism of SA, a number of officials in the 
Kennedy administration argued that the USA should not threaten SA openly but rather use 
discreet methods to persuade South African officials to change apartheid policies.164  During 
the early 1960s the USA assessed that “[o]rdered change would minimise violence, limit 
opportunities for Soviet encroachment, and protect U.S. material interest” in SA.165 
South Africa anticipated cordial relations with the Kennedy administration.  The Ambassador 
of SA to the USA, Dr W.C. Naudé, told the US First Secretary, A.G. Dunn, that SA regarded 
President Kennedy as being a very intellectual kind of leader. Resultantly SA expected that 
the USA would understand SA’s position with regards to apartheid under Kennedy’s rule.166 
During a meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SA, Mr Eric Louw, and USA 
Ambassador Satterthwaite on 30 June 1961 the US Ambassador reiterated the USA’s stand 
on apartheid.  Satterthwaite told Louw that the USA will not forget SA’s support during the 
First and Second World Wars, the Berlin blockade and its assistance in the fight against 
communism in Korea.  He then said that he wanted to be frank with the Minister that the USA 
is concerned about evidence of increasing racial tension in SA.  Satterthwaite said that he 
was concerned that increasing racial tension could eventually lead to the total isolation of SA 
from the international community.  The Ambassador then told the Minister; “the US would 
agree that there is much misunderstanding and misrepresentation in the world concerning 
South Africa’s racial problem, and an unwillingness to give credit for what is being done for 
the benefit of the Republic’s non-white population.”167  The Ambassador emphasised that the 
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USA was aware of the importance of the white population in SA to the future well-being of 
the country.  The conversation during this meeting indicates that the USA did not want to 
offend SA with its criticism of apartheid, but that it had to keep face with the rest of the world 
in condemning apartheid.168 
The swearing in of L.B. Johnson as US President after Kennedy’s death in 1963 witnessed a 
decline in relations between SA and the USA. Naudé the SA Ambassador in Washington 
was bluntly told that he should not try to convince Americans to accept apartheid because it 
was impossible to do so.  Naudé was told that President Johnson was a disciple of Franklin 
Roosevelt who was the first US President to abolish segregation in the USA.169  In 1968 the 
Johnson administration made the USA’s stance towards apartheid very clear to the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) when Vice President Hubert Humphrey addressed the 
organisation in Addis Ababa: 
Let us be clear where America stands. Segregation: we oppose it.  Discrimination: we oppose 
it.  Exploitation: we oppose it.  Social injustice: we oppose it.  Self-determination: we support it.  
Majority rule-one man, one vote: we support it.170 
2.2.2  The Sharpeville Massacre  
The Sharpeville massacre placed SA in the international spotlight.171  According to Thomson, 
the shooting at Sharpeville “...sealed the tone of the language that future U.S. 
administrations would use with respect to apartheid.”172  The Sharpeville massacre was the 
first time that the USA government verbally condemned apartheid.173  The American media 
also voiced its outrage at the atrocity,174 while the USA State Department released a press 
briefing the day after the massacre.  The briefing stated: 
The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South 
Africa will be able to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means.  While the 
United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of 
governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of 
life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa.175 
During the morning of 24 March 1960, a day after the press release, President Eisenhower 
met the US Secretary of State, Christian Herter.  Eisenhower was annoyed because he was 
unaware that a press briefing had been released regarding the massacre.  Secretary Herter 
said that the mistake had occurred as a result of miscommunication within the State 
Department.  Apparently the press office released the statement “without checking at the top 
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policy level, and without investigating the facts of the matter.”176  President Eisenhower 
phoned the South African Ambassador to inform him that the US government regretted the 
statement but remained concerned about the violence against protesters in SA.  President 
Eisenhower’s call to the SA Ambassador was kept secret to save the USA from criticism by 
other countries.  Eisenhower also asked that the Bureau Chief, who was responsible for the 
release of the press briefing be replaced.177 
The US Secretary of State for African Affairs, James Penfield, was also concerned by the 
Sharpeville press release.  In a telephone conversation with Secretary Herter, Penfield said 
that “we had jumped awfully fast on this one and made a real mistake” and that “we had 
clearly taken sides and might be accused of inciting a revolution.”178  The US Department of 
Defence also objected to the press release.179 However, a positive result of the press release 
was that the Afro-Asian group at the UN expressed its gratitude to the USA for criticising the 
SA government.  The liberal opposition in SA was also pleased about the press statement.180 
In a telegram from the US Embassy in SA to the Department of State on 25 March 1960, the 
US Ambassador to SA wrote that he believed that the Afrikaner people might feel that the 
USA had turned its back on them because of the criticism regarding the Sharpeville incident.  
He was further worried that the Pretoria government might cool its relations with the USA.  
The Ambassador was of the opinion that the members of the SAP in Sharpeville had no 
choice other than to shoot the protesters in self-defence.  He theorised that the US police 
may have been able to stop the protest with a smaller loss of life because it used different 
riot control techniques compared to their South African counterparts.181 
Even though the USA apologised to SA for the statement, the USA continued to criticise the 
Sharpeville massacre in the UN.  Henry Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador at the UN, 
proposed that the incident should be debated in the Security Council.  He said that the USA 
“deeply deplore[d] the loss of life which has taken place in South Africa.”182  He further 
argued that apartheid was responsible for the death of the Sharpeville victims.  As a result of 
the USA’s condemnation of apartheid, Security Council Resolution 134(1960) was drafted 
and passed on 1 April 1960.  Resolution 134(1960) called on SA to abandon its apartheid 
legislation and end racial discrimination.183  The USA voted in favour of the Resolution in 
spite of having apologised to SA a week earlier.  
During a visit by Minister Eric Louw to the USA in October 1960, he told Satterthwaite that 
SA was unhappy about the position the USA adopted with regard to the Sharpeville incident.  
According to Louw, a mob of more than 18 000 attacked a small police force and that teargas 
was ineffective because of the windy conditions.  As a result the police had to fire live 
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ammunition to protect them from the angry mob.  The Ambassador of SA to the UN, Cabot 
Lodge, supported Louw’s version that residents of Sharpeville had threatened the police who 
had no other choice than to shoot at them.184 
American public opinion of SA was heavily influenced by the Sharpeville incident and the US 
State Department subsequently adopted a hostile posture towards SA.  Rhoodie185 argues 
that after the Sharpeville incident “US policy towards South Africa eventually came to be 
predetermined by the attitude which the Organisation of African Unity and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted, not by what its own Congress believed.”186   
 
Illustration 2.2: The Sharpeville Massacre187 
2.2.3 US Public Opinion on Apartheid188 
With regards to the public opinion on apartheid, Lulat had the following to say:   
There was a significant body of opinion in the United States that was sufficiently strong to 
prevent an outright support of apartheid South Africa by the administration:  ranging from U.S. 
African Americans like Paul Robeson and Martin Luther King, Jr. To labour leaders like Walter 
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Reuther (president of the Congress of Industrial Organisations [CIO]; from church officials in 
organisations such as the Methodist Church Board of Mission to liberal Democrats such as 
Chester Bowles (former U.S. ambassador to India) and Adlai Stevenson (defeated Democratic 
candidate for the presidency in the 1952 elections); and from liberal senators such as John F. 
Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey to key opinion makers in the media such as John Gunther.189 
The American presidential election in 1960 was possibly influenced by US foreign policy 
towards SA as there was a definite growth in civil rights movements in the USA and many 
focused on the anti-apartheid struggle.  Nixon and Kennedy were the two main contenders 
for the presidency - Nixon supported Eisenhower’s sympathetic stance towards SA, whilst 
Kennedy focused on helping anti-apartheid movements and referred to development in Africa 
in almost every speech to win the votes of African-Americans and members of civil rights 
movements.190  It is possible that Kennedy’s stance on Africa may have won him crucial 
votes during the elections although he was later uncomfortable with the idea that he became 
president because of the black vote.191 Africans, African-Americans, members of civil rights 
movements and other liberals were optimistic about Kennedy’s win but were to be 
disappointed in due course.  Critics of the Kennedy administration argue that the Cold War 
kept Kennedy too busy to pay the necessary attention to apartheid.192   
Kennedy argued that the best way to counter communism was to support African and Asian 
countries that requested assistance from the USA193.  Kennedy also promised a harsher 
stance on colonial oppressors in Africa and especially in SA.194  A method that Kennedy used 
to satisfy civil rights movements and liberals was to have personal meetings with African 
leaders. He furthermore focused on anti-racism in the USA and SA in his earlier speeches.  
To emphasise that he was serious about anti-racism, President Kennedy appointed a 
number of prominent civil rights activists and anti-colonialist liberals in the State Department 
who dealt with foreign policy and also appointed ambassadors who were sympathetic to the 
cause of freedom for Africans. 195   
Few Americans were aware of the developments in SA and conflicts in the rest of Southern 
Africa.  According to Crocker, opposition to apartheid by US citizens was mostly confined to 
religious and academic pressure groups.  He further argues that neither the Sharpeville 
massacre nor the Rivonia trials made any significant impact on US mainstream opinion about 
SA.196 
Racial tension within the USA fuelled the US public’s opposition to apartheid legislation as 
racial violence was still widely present in some southern states of the USA during the 
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1960s.197  African-Americans who criticised the USA on its duplicity regarding apartheid were 
in constant danger of arrest - a famous case was when the actor Paul Robeson, who was 
harassed and punished after he criticised the US government.198   
The Sharpeville massacre reinvigorated the anti-apartheid movement in the USA.  Prominent 
American figures such as Martin Luther King Jr, Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Belafonte 
publically protested against the massacre.199  The American Committee on Africa organised 
a lecture tour by Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the ANC, during mid-960.  Tambo was 
also invited as key note speaker at the Emergency Action Conference on SA to be held in 
New York from 31 May to 1 June 1961.  However, the US government refused to grant 
Tambo a visa for the proposed visit to the USA. The Conference subsequently called on US 
consumers to boycott South African diamonds, lobster tails, wool, metal and furs in reaction 
and also called on US companies to divest from SA until the SA government ended 
apartheid.  The Conference furthermore appealed to US labour unions not to offload ships 
carrying South African goods.200 
According to Price, President Nixon won the election in 1968 due to his ability to satisfy the 
concerns of liberals and African-Americans on the one hand and the US business community 
on the other.  He did this by publically criticising apartheid to satisfy the former while covertly 
supporting white minority rule to meet the needs of the latter.201  Nixon’s policy was thus to 
criticise apartheid publicly, but at the same time maintain relations with SA to preserve US 
economic, strategic and scientific interest in SA.202 
In 1969 President Nixon requested that a study be done on the possible options his 
administration could take with regard to the USA’s relations with SA. The National Security 
Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, then the 
National Security Advisor, compiled a comprehensive review of US policy toward Southern 
Africa.  The objectives of the study were to “cover the history and the future of major area 
problems, US interests and options for strategy and policy.  The emphasis was to be on 
broadening the range of views and presenting alternatives.”203  The review, National Security 
Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39)204 was a secret document that provided Nixon with five 
different policy options that the USA could take towards Southern Africa.  President Nixon 
accepted Option 2205 which detailed US strategic and economic interest as paramount 
whereas Options 1, 4 and 5 provided “context and intellectual balance.”206  Option 1 held that 
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the USA was on the side of the white states of Southern Africa to protect and increase US 
economic and strategic interests while Option 4 proposed that the USA openly side with 
black states disregarding the economic and strategic benefits that this would entail.  Option 5 
proposed that the USA support no side at all, although potential inter-state, racial conflict 
could escalate.  Option 3 on the other hand was just a “codification of the policy inherited 
from the Kennedy and Johnson era.”207 
The US State Department was embarrassed when NSSM 39, a secret document, was 
leaked to the public and initially downplayed it as a preliminary study in order to convince the 
American public and the international community that USA policy had not changed in favour 
of apartheid.208  According to Price, “[d]eception of the American public and of the world was 
boldly advocated in NSSM 39 and secretly contrived by the Nixon administration.”209  By 
choosing Option 2, Nixon showed that he was in favour of a different approach toward SA 
compared to his two predecessors as Option 2 allowed his administration to “rebuild 
Washington’s friendship with SA that had become somewhat tarnished by the verbal 
denunciations of the apartheid system during the period of the Kennedy/Johnson 
administrations.”210  Nixon acknowledged that the white minority in SA was an integral part of 
the country and that is was impossible to ignore them.211  The only way to modify SA’s 
policies would have to be through the white-ruled government. This table indicates the pros 
and cons of option 2 of NSSM 39. 
 PROS CONS 
1. It might reduce tensions between the black and 
white states in Southern Africa. 
The relaxation in the USA’s 
stance might be interpreted 
by SA as a sign that the 
USA agreed with 
apartheid. 
2. US economic, scientific and strategic interests 
will be preserved. 
Pro-Western leaders of 
black states might turn to 
the communist bloc for 
support. 
3. A section of white society might start to form 
friendships with the rest of black Africa. 
SA would probably not 
change its racial policies. 
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4. Communism will be curbed because of US aid to 
black states. 
Extensive economic and 
diplomatic relations had to 
be cemented before SA 
could consider changing its 
policies. 
5. The increase in US aid to black states would 
give the USA leverage to influence decisions to 
attack SA. 
Additional aid to black 
states might not convince 
them to support US policy. 
Table 2.1: Pros and Cons of Option 2 of NSSM 39212 
The 1970s saw a resurgence of US public criticism against apartheid.  The South African 
Defence Attaché in Washington wrote in his June 1970 report that the media campaign 
against SA was increasing in the USA.  He attributed the increase in criticism to US 
newspapers seeking to impress the UK government, that apartheid was deplorable and that 
the UK should reconsider selling military equipment to SA.213 The New York Times and the 
Washington Post wrote more negative articles about SA than about human rights violations 
in Cuba, North Korea, Cambodia, Uganda combined.214 
In 1972 the American Committee on Africa, which had been organising anti-apartheid 
campaigns since the early 1950s, joined a number of US church groups to establish the 
Washington Office on Africa “a development that provided the U.S. anti-apartheid movement 
with [a] permanent institutional capacity with the capital.”215 On the anniversary of African 
Liberation Day in May 1972 several thousand anti-apartheid supporters protested in front of 
the State Department in support of the Southern African nationalist movements216 and were 
indicative that the average American was more aware of the atrocities that were happening 
in Southern Africa.  The USA’s involvement in Southern Africa divided its people, but national 
interest was more important than morality and not even public opinion would change 
Washington’s foreign policy towards SA.217 
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2.3    USA-SA ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
“We have a clear and compelling interest in the natural resources and markets of Africa on 
terms consistent with Africa’s independence.  We need energy fuels and minerals.  We get 
little credit for our contributions to the multi-national organisations.” David Newsom.218 
2.3.1 The USA’s Ambivalent Economic Relations with SA 
The USA took advantage of SA’s pro-capitalist attitude towards foreign investment.219  By 
1960, the USA was SA’s second largest trading partner and exports to the USA amounted to 
more than US $3 billion per annum.  Imports from the USA were just a little less than the 
amount of exports.220  While the USA and SA tried to keep their economic relations as quiet 
as possible, US investments in SA were criticised throughout the 1960s.221  The USA did not 
want to be seen as a country that enabled SA to flourish economically even though 
international economic sanctions were placed on SA and for its part SA did not want to 
publicise its economic relations with the USA out of concern that USA could be forced to 
disinvest if it did. 222 
On 22 March 1961, McGeorge Bundy wrote to the Secretary of State that the action by the 
Union of South Africa to withdraw from the British Commonwealth required a review of US 
policy towards SA.  Bundy viewed SA’s withdrawal as an opportunity for the USA to seek 
investment outlets in SA in order to support the South African economy.223  As SA was 
regarded as favourable for USA companies to invest in, its political stability, cheap labour 
and booming economy drew the attention of many US firms, through the 1960s.224 
Scholars like Thomson argue that the Kennedy administration did not really want to promote 
economic trade and investment with SA and advised its officials involved in building 
economic relations not to engage in long-term trade and investment, because of the unstable 
political situation in SA.  In essence the USA neither encouraged nor discouraged economic 
relations with SA, a phrase frequently used by subsequent US administrations during the 
apartheid era.225 
From 1960 to 1970, US companies which invested in the South African economy posted 
average profits of around 16 percent per year compared to an average of 9,4 percent profits 
for the same period in the rest of the world.226  Exports from the USA to SA increased from 
US$ 288 million in 1960 to US$ 563 million by the end of 1969.227  On 18 January 1967 the 
US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, John McNaughton, 
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wrote a memorandum to US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, wherein he explained 
how extended economic sanctions against SA would negatively impact on the USA.  
McNaughton argued that the USA would lose about US$ 250 to US$ 300 million per annum if 
extended economic sanctions were imposed on SA.228  It would not be economically 
profitable for the USA to place further economic sanctions against SA. 
NSSM 39 as discussed earlier in the chapter is a pertinent example of how Nixon favoured 
US economic and strategic interests in SA to the detriment of the ideals of democracy and 
human rights.229 The Nixon administration disposed of Johnson’s neutral economic policy 
towards SA in favour of a more aggressive investment approach and trade restrictions were 
lifted to make it easier for US companies to invest in SA.230  According to NSSM 39, an 
increase in US business in SA “would permit the United States to undermine the apartheid 
system through enlightened business practices.”231  The USA thus tried to rationalise its 
increasing interest in SA’s economy as a means to undermine apartheid, but in practice 
strengthen apartheid. This policy was nicknamed ‘Tar Baby’ from the “famous Joel Chandler 
Harris fable in which Brer Rabbit becomes stuck in Brer Fox’s sticky trap, and from the 
beginning the doublespeak flourished.”232 
During March 1973, David Newsom, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said 
that US investments in SA accounted for 16 percent of all foreign investment in SA and that 
the USA only invested one quarter of its total African investments in SA.233  By 1973 US 
investment in SA totalled US$ 1,240 million.234  Based on these figures he argued that the 
USA would not go to extreme measures to protect its investments in SA, because it totalled 
so small an amount.  He noted that “[t]he US government neither encourages nor 
discourages investment in South Africa.”235 
2.3.2. The Effect of the Sharpeville Massacre on Economic Relations 
SA experienced a significant loss of foreign investment directly after the Sharpeville 
massacre.  From March 1960 to June 1961, R248 million left SA, while gold and foreign 
exchange reserves fell from R315 million in January 1960 to R142 million by January 
1961.236  It was obvious that foreign investors had lost confidence in SA and that its economy 
would crumble.  However, the USA helped revive SA’s economy at this critical stage in its 
history. 
The Sharpeville incident did not have a negative effect on economic relations between the 
USA and SA.  While other countries withdrew their investments from SA after 21 March 
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1960, American “businesses increased their direct investments by $23 million, and U.S. 
banks provided SA with $85 million in emergency loans.”237  South Africa’s economy could 
have experienced a heavy recession in the aftermath of Sharpeville was it not for the 
financial support of the USA.  
A group of American investors prevented an economic recession in SA and Chris W. 
Engelhard in particular played a significant role in saving the South African economy from a 
recession.  Engelhard had investments in SA before Sharpeville and to protect his interests 
arranged with other associates a private loan of US$ 150 million.  Engelhard, who was also a 
major donor to the Democratic Party in the USA, was able to convince the Kennedy 
administration to allow SA to withdraw US$ 18, 8 million from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  The personal loan from Engelhard and associates, the money from the IMF and 
another loan of US$ 25 million from the World Bank was able to rescue SA’s economy during 
the early 1960s and restore investor confidence in SA.238 
It was probably difficult for Kennedy to decide whether to cut diplomatic ties with SA after 
Sharpeville as he had to choose between reality and morality.  As Marcum puts it: 
To expect American business firms voluntarily to abandon the high profits of the South African 
economy to foreign competitors because of moral principle is, of course, to expect the 
improbable.239 
2.3.3 The USA’s Contribution to the Growth of the South African Economy 
According to Lulat, US businesses contributed to the growth of SA’s economy and the 
industrialisation of SA in three important ways: “by providing capital at economically critical 
times; by investing in economically strategic sectors, such as heavy industry and defence 
and by exporting crucial high-level technology and machinery to South Africa”240. 
The American banking sector also played a crucial role in the growth of the SA economy.  
The First National City Bank of New York provided the South African Industrial Development 
Corporation with US$ 5 million of revolving credit.  Chase, First National and Dillon, Read 
and Co., provided SA with another US$ 40 million during the early 1960s.241 Not only the 
American banking sector supported the SA economy, as the petroleum industry also played 
a major role. Robinson argues that US companies supplied up to 40 percent of SA’s oil.242 
Caltex, Mobil and Exxon controlled almost half of SA’s petroleum market and SA allowed 
these companies to operate on condition that a large portion of their earnings be used to 
develop SA’s petroleum industry.243  
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General Motors, Ford and Chrysler were the major US automotive corporations with interests 
in SA.  These companies controlled at least a third of SA’s automotive industry between 
1960 and 1980 and their investment in SA rose from US$ 19 million in 1960 to US$ 200 
million in 1970.244  John Deere, Kodak, Kimberley Clark, General Electric, Goodyear, 
Motorola, Caterpillar and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) all provided South 
Africans with a variety of intermediate capital goods.  Some of these companies were also 
involved in providing SA with military equipment and technology.245   
In the information technology sector, companies like International Business Machines (IBM), 
Hewlett-Packard and Mohawk Data Sciences made large investments in the South African 
economy.  The technology provided by these and other American technology companies 
allowed SA to run its apartheid bureaucracy successfully.  American IT technology was also 
used by the SA Army, the BOSS and the SAP.246 
By the end of the 1970s, more than half of the Fortune 500 companies had direct 
investments in SA.247  There were numerous other American businesses in SA at the time.  
President Kennedy received complaints from US business owners that even verbal attacks 
on SA could damage their business interests in the country.  On 4 July 1963 USA 
businessmen in SA boycotted an Independence Day function held at the US Embassy in SA. 
This function, which was to be multi-racial as ordered by Washington, blatantly juxtaposed 
South African racial policies of the time.248 The businessmen feared that this function could 
anger the apartheid government and consequently then influence their businesses. 
John Grimond, a British journalist, wrote that “American firms behave neither better nor 
worse, in general, than other foreign investors, they benefit from wage costs kept low by the 
restrictions on black labour unions and collective bargaining. “249  American companies were 
thus not really concerned about the atrocities of apartheid, as long as they had access to 
cheap labour to make larger profits.250 As a result of the American investments in the South 
African economy, SA was regarded economically as the most powerful country on the 
African continent.251 
2.3.4 Economic Sanctions against SA 
Economic sanctions are potent means to coerce a country to change its policies. Sanctions 
can be defined as “The denial of customary interactions (strategic, economic, social); they 
are intended to promote social, political or economic changes [or all three simultaneously] in 
the target state; imposition of sanctions communicates the threat of more sanctions [or the] 
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release of the embargo if the target state meets certain conditions.”252  Those in the USA 
who supported economic sanctions against SA argued that sanctions would send a clear 
message to SA on how the USA felt over apartheid and persuade SA to abandon its 
apartheid policies.253  Economic sanctions were also raised concerning the status of 
Namibia.254 
However, the Kennedy administration was reluctant to implement economic sanctions 
against SA and several possible reasons are given as to why Kennedy refused to withdraw 
investments and trade with SA: 
• The USA would lose an export market for its goods; 
• The USA would lose income from investments in SA; 
• Economic sanctions won’t work; and 
• Black people of South Africa would also be disadvantaged by economic sanctions.255 
A more ominous reason for not implementing economic sanctions against SA was the 
military-strategic fall-out that sanctions could cause.  A study by a Charles St. Thomas Group 
in 1969 found that only 10 percent of US businessmen with interests in SA felt that apartheid 
was immoral.256 
President Johnson was just as reluctant to impose economic sanctions on SA as he was of 
the opinion that sanctions would be to the detriment of everyone.257  His only attempt to 
impose economic sanctions against SA was given in the National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM) 295. NSAM 295 was a series of measures put in place by the USA to 
make contingencies for its strategic and economic interests258 in SA if the country was to be 
placed under severe sanctions by the UN for the violation of human rights in Namibia.  
NSAM 295 stated that “[e]xisting policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be 
continued.”259  With regards to the submarine deal that was initiated under the Kennedy 
administration260, NSAM 295 recommended that the deal be postponed in order to give the 
USA chance to evaluate the developments in SA before making any further choices.  
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According to NSAM 295, the US government would also suspend applications for loans or 
investments from SA for the time being, but “[n]o policy of warning private investors not to 
invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments.”261  
President Johnson was criticised by factions in his administration with the issuing of NSAM 
295. The Joint Chiefs of Staff for example regarded NSAM 295 as counter-productive to US 
interests and asked that the document should be revised.  In order to show his real desire to 
at least restrain apartheid, Johnson ignored the criticism and continued with NSAM 295.262 
 The official stance of the Johnson administration regarding economic relations with SA was 
that the USA “neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa.”263  The 
reasons for not implementing economic sanctions were outlined by US Assistant Secretary 
Williams: 
• “The problems of the legal basis of such actions” (the USA did not regard apartheid 
as a threat to international peace); 
• “The problem of economic effectiveness” (the USA thought that the SA economy was 
too strong to feel the effect of economic embargoes, so it would be useless); 
• “The problem of psychological effectiveness” (economic sanctions would harm the 
good relations between the USA and SA so the USA would have less influence on SA to 
change its apartheid laws); 
• It would be very expensive to enforce economic sanctions against SA.264 
President Nixon was also not in favour of economic sanctions against SA.  His opinion was 
that “...we do not believe that isolating them from the influence of the rest of the world is an 
effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation and to accommodate 
change”265  The Nixon administration however supported the notion that SA’s mandate over 
Namibia should be regarded as ‘illegal occupation’ and to show its support for the 
independence of Namibia, the USA discouraged businesses from investing there.266  In sum, 
all the US administrations relevant to the period were aware that any form of reprimand 
against SA could influence US economic interests in SA.267   
The next section of the chapter will explain in more detail why SA was an important strategic 
and military ally to the USA from 1960 to 1974.  It will also show how the USA circumvented 
the arms embargo which it officially implemented against SA. 
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2.4. US MILITARY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
The USA was concerned that an outbreak of violence in SA would lead to a full blown 
interracial war.  The USA was even more concerned that if racial violence broke out in SA, 
African-Americans could follow the example of their African counterparts in the areas of the 
USA where racial tensions were still strong.  When the CIA learned that Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(the military wing of the ANC, also known as MK) was being supported by communist 
countries the implication was clear.268  This, together with the possibility of communism 
gaining a foothold in Southern Africa, persuaded US decision makers to support SA 
militarily.269   
American policy makers came to the conclusion that “[t]he defence of the free world required 
both continued military cooperation with South Africa and the appeasement of the new 
African nations’ anger about apartheid.”270  The USA decided to cooperate militarily with SA 
on condition that SA’s security forces be used only to combat communism and not against 
SA’s freedom fighters.271 
During mid-1963 Kennedy was pressed to make a difficult decision regarding to SA, namely 
whether or not to support an arms embargo against SA as laid out in UN Security Council 
Resolution 181.272  On the one hand Kennedy had the support of the Pentagon to oppose the 
Resolution because of SA’s military-strategic value, especially SA’s agreement to have a 
missile tracking station in SA.  The Pentagon felt that the tracking station was of such military 
importance to the USA that it had no other choice but to support SA as far as possible.273  
The USA State Department also advised him to decline to vote on the Resolution and USA 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was also cautious about announcing an arms embargo 
against SA.  He acknowledged that SA was not respecting the human rights of black people 
in SA, but that Kennedy should not forget that far worse human rights violation were taking 
place in some communist countries or in countries with authoritarian rule with which the USA 
has friendly relations.274   
2.4.1 The 1963 Arms Embargo 
The Sharpeville massacre brought the violent nature of apartheid to the attention of the 
international community.  Afro-Asian member countries of the UN consequently demanded 
an arms embargo against SA to avoid any further loss of life.  At first the USA was not keen 
to support an arms embargo against SA and used its veto to avoid the embargo against SA 
but by November 1961 the USA came to the conclusion that by supporting SA militarily, it 
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was creating a gap between the USA and the rest of the world.  Pressure even came from 
the American public to break military ties with SA.275 
The SA government made it clear that the USA would not be able to build and use a missile 
tracking station in SA if it did not help to establish SA’s arms industry. This left American 
decision makers with a difficult choice regarding the imposition of an arms embargo against 
SA.  If it was not for the tracking station, the USA would not have participated in naval 
exercises with the SA Navy during late 1961 or would not have considered SA’s request for 
licenses for Lockheed aircraft.276   
The US State Department released a memorandum in May 1962 which laid out American 
economic and military interests in SA, namely that the USA should continue to supply SA 
with military equipment that could oppose the communist agenda.277  SA had the USA 
exactly in the position it wanted because SA portrayed itself as the opponent of communism 
in Africa and used the missile tracking station as leverage to continue obtaining military 
supplies from the USA.278 
However, the international community and the US public became more and more persistent 
in their advocacy of an arms embargo against SA.  The Guardian newspaper published in 
the UK for example made a case for the institution of an arms embargo while African leaders 
like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana criticised the USA for its duplicity in criticising apartheid yet 
provided SA with weapons to implement apartheid.279  The USA did not feel it could 
implement an arms embargo against SA without hurting its economic and military interests in 
the region, and as a corollary economic and military sanction would not be the best way to 
force SA to end apartheid.  Furthermore, the US government was of the opinion that 
sanctions would hurt black South Africans more than the whites.  However, by November 
1962 the USA realised it could no longer protect SA from international sanctions and 
embargoes. 280 
In November 1962 “the General Assembly by a huge majority recommended that member 
states take effective measures against South Africa, including the imposition of an arms 
embargo.”281  The USA again vetoed the resolution but by June 1963 was under increasing 
pressure to implement an arms embargo against SA.  Even though Kennedy did not support 
an arms embargo, he realised that he would have to take a stand on apartheid if he wanted 
to maintain relations with the newly independent African countries that formed the OAU in 
May 1963.282  The American Under Secretary of State, Mennen Williams, felt that “the time 
had come for a review of the United States’ arms supply policy towards South Africa, as the 
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partial arms embargo policy was equivocal, not an effective measure against South Africa 
and considered as inadequate by the African countries.”283  He thought that an arms 
embargo would be the only way to demonstrate to the world that the USA disapproved of the 
apartheid government. 
Not everybody in the Kennedy administration supported an arms embargo against SA.  
Alexis Johnson, the US Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, argued that the USA 
should remember that SA continued to support the USA in a number of military affairs and 
that a total arms embargo against SA could force Pretoria to develop ties with the communist 
world.  He furthermore argued that the USA should only consider a total arms embargo if the 
all other arms suppliers agreed to the embargo, otherwise it would be a waste of time. 284 
From mid-1963 reports were circulating that the USA was considering an arms embargo 
against SA.  On 3 July 1963, a South African newspaper, Die Burger, reported that the USA 
was considering a total arms embargo on SA.285  At the same time the US Department of 
Defence undertook a study on the potential impact of an arms embargo on SA that 
concluded that it would severely harm relations between the USA and SA and could place 
US interests in SA at risk.286 
However, on 17 July 1963 Kennedy decided that the tracking station and SA’s ports were not 
as important as democracy and freedom in SA and approved the recommendation that no 
arms would be sold to SA after 31 December 1963.287  The announcement of the arms 
embargo was to be kept secret until Kennedy saw an appropriate time to inform the UN on 
his decision. 
Pretoria accused the USA of taking sides with Afro-Asian countries after it heard that the 
USA intended to ban the sale of arms to SA.  The SA Ambassador to the USA, Willem 
Naudé, was of the opinion that “it was ironical that the United States and South Africa were 
fighting side by side during the Second World War, and now the latter would be refused the 
supply of arms against a common enemy.”288  The SA government also speculated that the 
reason why the USA was willing to impose an arms embargo was because other African 
countries that hosted US military bases had threatened to expel the USA if it kept supporting 
SA.  Kennedy’s response was that the embargo was to ensure that communism will not gain 
a foothold in Africa by keeping potential targets for communism happy. 
On 7 August 1963 Washington announced that American companies were no longer 
permitted to sell military equipment to SA.289  However the USA would still honour 
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agreements on the sale of military equipment such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes made 
before the arms embargo.  The USA also stated that the embargo would be lifted 
immediately if SA was required for a combined defence effort.290  The aim of the arms 
embargo was to force SA to re-evaluate its apartheid policies.  The arms embargo was also 
implemented to demonstrate the USA’s seriousness about ending apartheid to the Afro-
Asian bloc in the UN.  Soapy Williams confirmed this when he wrote to Dean Rusk that “[a] 
complete arms embargo is the least the U.S. can do to maintain our position of influence with 
the Africans.”291  Thus the implementation of the arms embargo portrayed the USA as the 
international leader in taking a stance against apartheid.  According to Van Wyk and Grobler, 
“the United States embargo on the shipment of arms and military equipment to South Africa 
was not the product of an arms control objective, but rather an expression of United States 
anti-apartheid sentiment.”292 
During August 1970, the South African Defence Attaché in Washington wrote in his report to 
the Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) that there was a possible slackening in 
the application of the arms embargo.  According to the Attaché, three of his sources close to 
the US administration had mentioned that the USA was prepared to sell VIP transport aircraft 
to SA.  But one of his sources noted that the USA’s willingness to sell the aircraft to SA was 
not a sign that the USA supported apartheid.293  In his report in June 1970, the Attaché wrote 
that an official of the US Department of Commerce had mentioned that SA could bypass the 
restrictions of the arms embargo by getting a private firm like SA Airways to buy the aircraft 
and then the SADF could lease the jets from the private firm.294   
Morgan argues that Nixon was willing to sell the aircraft to SA because Lear Jets, the 
manufacturer of the proposed aircraft, was in financial difficulty.  If Lear Jets did not secure 
the South African contract it risked retrenching more of its employees.  As Nixon was 
sympathetic towards jobless middle-class Americans he was adamant that the jets should be 
sold to SA to stave off further unemployment.295 
 2.4.2  American Long-range Missile Tracking Facilities in SA 
The issue surrounding tracking stations is an indication of the extent to which the USA was 
willing to break military ties with SA.296  In August 1960 the US State Department agreed to a 
Department of Defence (DOD) proposal regarding the building of an American missile and 
satellite tracking station in SA.  The American DOD regarded the establishment of such a 
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missile and space vehicle tracking station essential to the security of the USA.297  The US 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Raymond Hare, informed the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Hayden Williams, that the 
USA would not change its policy towards SA to secure the deal with SA.  If SA insisted that 
the USA changed its policy, then the USA would abandon its plan to build the site in SA.298  
The USA wanted an agreement from Pretoria before 1 July 1961.299 
Hare reiterated that the negotiations over the proposed missile site in SA should be kept 
secret from the public although he knew that the existence of the site would become public 
knowledge at some point and that the proposed building of the site would be criticised by the 
public.  He recommended that a public information policy be implemented in case the public 
found out about the site.  He insisted that the public information policy should be based on 
the following points: 
(a) “the purpose of the facility is research and development related to military purposes; 
(b) it is in no sense a military  operational installation; and 
(c) a civilian contractor manages the facility which is maintained an operated by civilian 
personnel.”300 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Eric Louw, raised three questions regarding the proposed site during 
a visit to the USA in October 1960.  His first question was whether the facilities would be 
handed over and become South African property after the USA finished its research and 
operations at the site?301  Secondly, Louw wanted to know if the facilities would be operated 
by South Africans and, lastly whether the USA intended to train South Africans to operate the 
facilities?302  Louw moreover indicated that SA was wary to permit an American missile 
facility in SA because it would influence SA’s neutrality in the war between the USA and the 
USSR.  Louw made it clear that SA would only take that risk if the USA gives the assurance 
that the facilities will be handed over to SA once US operations were finished.303 
In early 1961 the USA began negotiations with the South African government over the 
establishment of the missile and space vehicle tracking station nearby Pretoria.304 In a letter 
written on 16 March 1961, from the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gilpatrick, to the Under 
Secretary of State, Bowles, Gilpatrick contended that it would be inexorable to establish a 
missile and space vehicle tracking station in SA.305  The facility would be critical to test US 
missiles that had a range in excess of 8050 kilometres.  The site would furthermore be 
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critical for tracking test satellite launchings.306  The American satellite operations that were 
dependant on the station in SA included Midas (which was of very high national priority), 
Advent, Ranger, Vela Hotel307 and Saint.308   
The other option that the USA considered was to use instrumentation vessels as an 
alternative to missile sites, although the vessels could not provide as reliable and precise 
readings as the land sites could.  Furthermore, the vessels would not be able to “...support 
the specially equipped aircraft whose participation is also essential in the long-range missile 
tests.”309  It would take the USA three years to deliver the necessary equipment if it chose a 
maritime option, a delay which was unacceptable.  The vessel option would cost the USA an 
additional US$ 75 to US$ 100 million in expenses.310 
 
Illustration 2.3: The Vela-Hotel Satellite311 
Although the USA considered building the missile facility either in Zanzibar, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, SA was the only country able to satisfy all the requirements related to building the 
missile site.  Most of the other countries would have required greater logistic operations than 
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in the case of building the site in SA.  The US DOD thus did not have any viable alternative 
than to build the site in SA even if the USA differed on its racial policies.312   
South Africa frequently used the missile tracking station as leverage when it needed support 
or aid from the USA.313  On 16 September 1961, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for International Security Affairs, Williams, wrote in a memorandum to Gilpatric, that 
SA was pressurising the USA to co-operate on two matters or it may decide against the USA 
to build the missile tracking station.  The first matter was the possibility that SA might need 
more funds from the IMF than originally expected.  The USA initially agreed that SA could 
borrow US$ 37, 5 million, but SA requested a further US$ 37, 5 million.314  Louw argued that 
SA needed more money to improve the economy and the welfare of South African blacks. It 
is important to remember that at this point, many countries disinvested from SA, because of 
the Sharpeville incident. Louw mentioned that he had heard a rumour that the USA would 
oppose the request and if that was the case SA would regard it as detrimental to their good 
relations.  The second matter concerned SA’s request to buy seven C-130 aircraft from the 
American company, Lockheed.  According to Ambassador Satterthwaite, if the USA refused 
to sell the aircraft, it could influence negotiations on the missile tracking station negatively.315  
According to Bowles, the US public would assume that the aircraft would be used by SA to 
suppress internal disorder although the USA could not afford to lose the tracking station.316   
The USA also felt compelled to participate in naval exercises with the SA Navy because it 
would openly publicise SA as an ally of the USA.  However, if it were not for the leverage of 
the tracking station, the USA would not even consider the exercises.317  South Africa also 
used the tracking station as leverage to gain American support for them to become a 
member of the UN Outer Space Committee.  The USA realised that even with all its 
influence, it was impossible for SA to be elected as part of the Committee, yet the USA felt 
that if it did not support the SA in this regard it might jeopardise the tracking station.318   
On April 24 1964, Washington distributed NSAM 295319 to a number of state entities, 
including the administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  
NSAM 295 provided the USA with alternative plans if SA reacted to the 1963 arms embargo.  
NSAM 295 ordered NASA and the DOD to start the planning and construction phases for an 
alternative missile tracking station immediately if the facilities in SA be evacuated at short 
notice.  NSAM 295 further stated that the DOD give priority to “accomplishing required site 
surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land 
acquisition recommended by the DOD and NASA.”320  NSAM 295 urged that the negotiations 
and possible construction of a new site be kept secret from the American public for as long 
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as possible.  When NSSM 39 was released in 1969 the USA still regarded the tracking 
station as vital for future US planetary missions.321  
By 1971 NASA had tracking stations in SA, but the US Congress pressurised NASA to 
withdraw from SA.  Most of the pressure came from the Congressional Black Caucus after 
one of its co-founders, Charles Diggs, was appointed Chair of the House Subcommittee on 
Africa.  Diggs organised a number of public debates on the USA’s relationship with SA 
including topics on American business interest in SA and the implementation of the arms 
embargo against SA.  These debates forced US government officials to explain American 
foreign policy towards SA in public.  Another member of the Congressional Black Caucus, 
Charles Rangel, who also had a seat in the House Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space 
Technology, organised a public hearing where NASA was requested to explain its ongoing 
use of the facilities in SA even though the SA government was suppressing the majority of its 
population.  Although the Congressional Black Caucus generated public support for the anti-
apartheid movement, it failed to force NASA to close the tracking station in SA as the 
required legislation did not garner enough support in the US Senate.322 
2.4.3 The Use of South African Military Facilities 
The USA was dependent on the use of South African infrastructure like airfields, harbours, 
communication, transportation and logistical facilities.  In a message from Gilpatric to Bowles 
he said that: 
[W]e must preserve the good will of the Union to assure the availability of its airfields and ports 
for the aircraft and ships which must operate in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans if long 
range missile tests are to be conducted effectively.323 
On 7 June 1961 Bundy wrote a memorandum to Gilpatric to explain how important SA was to 
US naval and maritime interests.  Bundy explained that SA had some of the best equipped 
harbours in the world and that SA ports would be able to accommodate up to 250 vessels if 
necessary.  These harbours would be important to the USA if repair work needed to be done 
to damaged American vessels in the area.  He reiterated that SA ports would be extremely 
valuable to the USA if the Suez Canal should ever be closed.324  This was proved true when 
the Suez Canal was closed for American use from 1967 to 1975.325 The ports would 
furthermore be able to support anti-submarine forces when necessary and for general navy 
operations by the US Indian Ocean Fleet.326  Apparently SA also allowed the US Navy to 
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conduct secret military operations at the naval base in Simon’s Town.327  South Africa’s port 
facilities were thus important to the USA’s Cold War strategy.328 
Until 1967 USA used the port of Cape Town extensively during the Vietnam War as it 
became an important stop-off point for US Navy vessels that could not traverse the Suez 
Canal en-route to South East Asia.329  Cape Town’s port facilities saved American aircraft 
expensive at-sea refuelling when on the way to Vietnam. 
The majority of the West’s oil was also transported around the Cape of Good Hope.  In 1972 
Air Vice-Marshall S.W.B. Menaul advocated that NATO forces should make use of the ports 
at Simon’s Town and Durban to enhance the security of the sea lanes around SA.  A number 
of senior US Navy staff agreed that the ports of Simon’s Town and Durban were crucial to 
protect the sea lanes.330 
The use of SA’s naval facilities was not without diplomatic controversy between the USA and 
SA.  In 1965 the US State Department requested assurance from SA that the crew of the 
USS Independence, a US Navy aircraft carrier, would not be subject to apartheid laws when 
the vessel docked in Cape Town.  After negotiations SA approved to provide multiracial 
entertainment to the crew but could not guarantee the USA that airports would be able to 
accommodate the needs of the black pilots aboard the aircraft carrier.  The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Muller, subtly suggested that the USA use only white air crews.  The USA 
was reconsidering the visit when Muller said that in future “where groups of Americans 
wished to use SA facilities they would be required to observe SA rules...” The USA cancelled 
the visit of the USS Independence.331  The USA made it clear that the incident had negatively 
influenced the relations between SA and the USA. 
In 1967, SA convinced the USA that the USS Independence incident was in retaliation to the 
USA’s decision to impose the arms embargo on SA in 1963 and that such an incident would 
not happen again.  The USA accepted the explanation in good faith and scheduled the USS 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to dock in Cape Town in February 1967.  On 1 April 1966 the 
Ambassador of SA to the USA elucidated in a top secret letter to the US Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs that the visit by the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt would be extremely valuable to 
strengthen ties with the USA.332  The American News Digest reported in February 1967 that 
SA placed no racial conditions on the visit of the vessel to Cape Town.  The article stated 
that all crew members would be able to go ashore.333 
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However, this developed into a diplomatic incident that drew widespread international 
interest once the vessel docked on 4 February 1967.  South African officials explained that 
“the extent of the multiracial entertainment permitted by the South African government 
amounted only to a bus tour of Cape Town.  American sailors would be subject to apartheid 
legislation at all other times.”334  The USA negated the shore leave of the entire crew for the 
duration of the tour in SA and the incident ended all US naval visits to SA for the rest of the 
apartheid era. 
2.4.4 Military Equipment Provided by the USA 
The 1960s saw a great expansion in the size and power of the SADF and military 
expenditure multiplied more than six times during the 1960s.335  During June 1961, the 
Minister of Defence of SA, J.J. Fouché, gave three reasons why the SADF should be 
expanded: 
• The SADF had to ensure the internal security of SA;  
• A larger SADF would be a better ally to the West in its fight against communism; and 
• A bigger defence force would be able to guard SA from any external invasion.336 
To expand the SADF, SA needed a substantial amount of additional military hardware and it 
started to build up a competitive military-industrial complex that could deliver the required 
material.337  However, SA still had to import weapons to protect SA from an external threat. 
During June 1962, the USA approved to provide SA with military equipment to counter the 
looming communist threat and the USA promised to consider other requests for military 
equipment.  This was in exchange for SA’s permission to permit the USA to keep its deep-
space tracking facility in SA.338 
During March 1963, SA probed the possibility of purchasing submarines from the USA when 
the Chief of Naval Staff of the SA Navy requested the US Naval Attaché in Pretoria to ask 
the Kennedy administration about selling two to three attack submarines to SA.  Ambassador 
Satterthwaite recommended that the submarines should be sold to SA if the USA had them 
available.339  However, the deal eventually fell through when Kennedy was assassinated and 
his more liberal advisors were substituted while the arms embargo in December 1963 ended 
any hope for SA to purchase the submarines. 
American corporations played a crucial role in providing SA with military materiel.  Narmic 
wrote that “Pretoria is indebted to U.S. multinationals for much of its military prowess.  The 
South African government today presides over a flourishing military-industrial complex that 
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has been built and is being expanded with an array of hardware and know-how provided by 
U.S high-tech corporations.”340  Lockheed, an American company also provided the SADF 
with Hercules aircraft whilst the embargo was in place341 under the guise that they were civil 
aircraft.342 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler were involved in the manufacturing of “arms, such as 
rifles and artillery, jet engines for military aircraft, and tanks and armoured military trucks.”343  
General Electric produced a variety of armaments ranging from machine guns to missiles 
while American Information Technology (IT) companies provided SA with leading edge 
technology.  IT systems were described as civilian equipment and so avoided the arms 
embargo.344  
On 13 November 1969, the Chief of the SADF wrote to the South African Minister of Defence 
about a newspaper article published in Washington that the USA had sold military equipment 
to SA in total disregard of the arms embargo.  The article stated that from 1962 to 1968 the 
USA had sold US$ 35, 5 million in equipment to SA and US$ 3, 1 million in 1969 alone.  The 
Chief of the SADF pointed out that the precise figures of US military equipment sales to SA 
for 1962 to 1968 was US$ 48,5 million for the SAAF and US$ 663 193 for the SA Army while 
the correct figure for 1969 was US$ 6.8 million.  The equipment included C-130 aircrafts and 
equipment and spares for Dakota, Sabre, DC-4 and Harvard aircrafts.  The USA also sold 
radio equipment and 200 Sidewinder missiles to SA during this period.345 
The announcement by the Nixon administration in 1970 that the USA was willing to accept 
licence applications for the sale of VIP jets to SA signalled that the USA was more flexible on 
the arms embargo.346  The VIP jets, which were small unarmed civil aircraft, could be 
modified to military specifications347 and could be used in a reconnaissance role or even be 
used as light bombers if fitted with the necessary modifications.348  In 1971 the USA agreed 
that the SADF could purchase light US aircraft for reconnaissance and training purposes, 
regardless of the embargo against SA.  When the news became public, the US government 
issued a denial and David Newsom explained to the American public that the USA had not 
changed its policy with regard to the arms embargo.  According to Newsom, the aircraft 
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would be used by SA for non-military purposes and not strengthen SA’s military capacity.349  
Table 2.2 shows the number of aircraft that the USA sold to SA. 
1965 235 1969 284 
1966 208 1970 180 
1967 333 1971 135 
1968 300 1972 144 
Table 2.2: US Aircraft Sales to SA, 1965 – 1972.350 
It is clear that American companies were not excessively concerned about the arms embargo 
against SA as they provided the SADF with military equipment and technology under false 
pretences or plausible denial as it was known.351  Table 2.3 depicts some of the major 
weapon systems delivered to SA by the USA after 1970 in violation of the UN arms embargo. 
Item                     Approximate date of delivery 
Lockheed F-104 G/Interceptor 1973 
Lockheed L-100 transport post 1971 
Augusta Bell 205A helicopter post 1970 
M-47 Patton I Tank 1971 
M-113AI armoured personnel carrier 1973-74 
V-150/200 Commando personnel 
carrier post 1971 
M-109 155mm self-propelled gun 1972-73 
Table 2.3: Major US weapon systems delivered to SA after 1970.352  
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2.4.5 Intelligence Exchange between SA and the USA 
The USA and SA were on good terms concerning intelligence sharing from 1960 to 1974 as 
the USA regarded this as an imperative part of its strategic collaboration with SA.  After SA 
withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961, the USA observed a decline in the quality of 
intelligence on Southern Africa that they received from the UK.  To remedy the situation the 
USA decided to increase its intelligence collection effort in Southern Africa and began to 
monitor events and individuals in Southern Africa which it deemed important to the national 
security of the USA.  As a result American and South African intelligence agencies formed a 
close bond to the extent that Ambassador Naudé noted that in 1961 SA had many friends 
within the CIA.  There was also speculation that a CIA operative had played an important role 
in arresting Nelson Mandela.353 
In 1970 Project Advokaat was started at Silvermine in Cape Town “which was essentially a 
data collection centre, with sensor hook-ups, for monitoring traffic around the coasts of South 
Africa.”354  Project Advokaat was initiated to construct a military communications network that 
“...covers the Cape sea route and also the African continent and the oceans west to South 
America and east to Bangladesh.”355  There is evidence that the USA delivered military 
equipment to SA in support of Project Advokaat though the USA supported the arms 
embargo against SA at the time.  Siemens and Telefunken were the two main companies 
that provided equipment as part of the project.  The equipment provided by the two 
companies included short-wave transmitters, relay stations, telephones, telex stations and 
computers that could analyse collected data.356  Project Advokaat was exceedingly important 
to the USA intelligence services because it could monitor all the movements of the Soviet 
Navy around the Cape as the Suez Canal was closed at the time.357  Project Advokaat were 
not just used for naval purpose but was also used to identify and monitor the movements of 
the black population of SA.  It was basically an early warning system.358  “The Advokaat 
military communications system was inaugurated in March 1973.”359  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The Kennedy administration collaborated with SA as far as it was politically possible and 
although the arms embargo implemented by the Kennedy administration was a setback to 
SA it merely confirmed that the USA wanted to demonstrate its opposition to apartheid.  The 
Kennedy administration followed a dual strategy with regard to SA: the USA tried not to 
assist SA in enforcing apartheid and to voice its condemnation of apartheid, although it still 
needed SA as a strategic and economic partner.  Kennedy’s intention to sell the submarines 
to SA even though SA was under an arms embargo is evidence to this.  The Kennedy 
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administration tried to balance its relationship with SA by voicing its abhorrence of apartheid 
yet cooperated with SA on economic, strategic and military issues whenever it thought that 
they would be beneficial to the USA. 
Although Johnson did not make many changes to Kennedy’s foreign policy towards SA he 
was more consistent in his policies to protect the human rights of Africans in SA.  Strategic 
interests were sacrificed to demonstrate that the USA was serious about human rights 
violations in SA and Johnson made a more concerted effort than Kennedy to end apartheid 
especially with his introduction of NSAM 295. 
The USA changed its policy from advocating a pro-black government in SA to supporting the 
apartheid government covertly during three successive American presidential terms.  In 
particular, the Nixon administration deceived the American public about USA foreign policy 
towards SA.  NSSM 39 shaped Nixon’s policy toward SA which recognised that whites were 
to stay in power in SA.  In short, the Nixon administration went out of its way to protect USA 
interests in SA and ignored human rights violations against the black population of SA.  
Nixon’s official foreign policy of non-violence was hypocritical and was a ruse to placate the 
rest of the world about USA involvement in SA.  Under Nixon the USA “recognized the 
violence inherent in apartheid, but it would not support the violence necessary to end it.”360   
American companies provided the apartheid government with the necessary IT technology 
for computers for nuclear research as well as to monitor the black population of SA. 
American banks provided SA with the necessary loans and finances to support the economy 
of the apartheid government while US vehicle manufacturers assisted South Africa’s security 
forces with the means to oppress the majority of its inhabitants.  American transnational 
corporations also helped to maintain the SA’s military-industrial complex.  The profits that 
American businesses made in SA also played an important role in influencing USA foreign 
policy towards SA.  As a result, the USA remained cautious when the international 
community called for economic sanctions against SA.   
During this period the USA favoured good relations with SA as economic considerations 
were more important than political and moral considerations.  As the USA viewed the 
apartheid debate through the lens of the Cold War SA’s “racial policies were not so much 
morally reprehensible as they were strategically inconvenient.”361 
From the South African perspective the arms embargo was a mixed blessing.  The ban on 
the import of weapons allowed SA to become self-sufficient in arms as the arms embargo 
spurred SA to develop its own production capacity.  The result was that the arms embargo 
prompted SA to develop a world-class military capacity in a short period of time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 INTRODUCTION:  USA-SA RELATIONS FROM 1975-1989 
The Cold War between the superpowers had reached its climax by 1975 and US foreign 
policy toward SA was largely formulated in the context of the Cold War.362 Cuba’s military 
presence in Angola further increased concerns of a communist takeover in Southern Africa.  
Bissel argues that for the USA ‘the concerns about the future of South Africa remained 
largely as they were in the 1960s:  racial conflict leading to instability, the security of the 
South African contribution to Western economic strength and continuing puzzlement over the 
real geostrategic value of South Africa in the East-West contest.’363 
The Watergate scandal and Nixon’s subsequent resignation from office, combined with 
Portugal’s withdrawal from its colonies in Africa signalled a new era in US foreign policy 
toward SA.  The Democratic Party in the USA expected to win the 1976 elections, and then 
prepared to implement a new policy for SA after the elections.  One of the most prominent 
Democrats, Anthony Lake, who would be given the post of Head of the Policy Planning Staff 
in the State Department in 1977, had the following view on USA foreign policy towards SA:   
Kissinger’s  implementation of NSSM-39 had failed dismally; South Africa was becoming more 
‘enlightened’, with promises of loosening the reins of apartheid, but those promises had 
nothing to do with U.S. policy, rather the threat of increased pressure on Rhodesia and South 
Africa from black-ruled Mozambique has been the key to these changes in southern Africa; 
the United States cannot force change in South Africa and should simply “set clear limits on 
the scope of our relations with South Africa” until blacks obtain full rights; and in the meantime, 
U.S. policy should respond to the views of concerned blacks in America.364 
American foreign policy toward SA was expected to change, but Washington was also 
concerned about what their electorate and potential voters would think about the USA’s 
relations with SA.  The opinion of the American public especially the African-American 
groups and individuals like Jessie Jackson, had to be considered more carefully when 
deciding on a policy towards SA.  There were indications that the USA was going to side with 
black South Africans in an increasing fashion. South Africa’s perception on its relations with 
the USA from 1975 to 1990 was influenced by the USA media’s increasingly negative stance 
on SA.  Although SA wanted to change this perception, Pretoria did not want to alter 
apartheid policies to counter the negative publicity in the USA.  By the end of 1977 the USA-
SA relations became more strained as a result of the Carter administration’s foreign policy 
approach towards SA and Vorster and Botha began to rebuke the USA for this change.365   
                                                 
362
  J.L.  Gaddis.   2005.  The Cold War.  London:  Allan Lane.   p. 14.  F.A. Guimarães.  1998. The Origins of  
The Angolan Civil War:  Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict.  New York: St Martin’s Press. 
pp. 122-123.   
363
  R. E.  Bissel.  1982.  South Africa and the United States:  The Erosion of an Influence Relationship.   
New York:  Praeger Publishers. p. 15. 
364
  Ibid, p.  12. 
365
  Bissel, op cit. p.  36. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
 
 
 
Relations between Pretoria and Washington were relatively cold during the 1980s. The USA 
initially supported SA to counter the communist threat in Angola, but left SA on its own.  The 
USA withdrew from Angola after the US Congress accepted the Clark Amendment in terms 
of which the USA would end assistance to UNITA against the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA).366 USA-SA military relations from 1974 to 1990 centred on the 
conflict in Angola.  This chapter will show how the USA intervened in Angola although the 
Border War as such will not be discussed in detail. The focus will instead be on more general 
USA-SA political, economic and military relations over this period and the USA’s involvement 
in SA’s nuclear development which will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 
3.2 POLITICAL RELATIONS 
‘Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we’ve ever fought, a 
country that strategically is essential to the free world...?’  (Ronald Reagan)367 
Nixon’s foreign policy toward SA was based on Option 2 of NSSM 39 and remained the 
same when Ford took over the presidency in 1974, as Henry Kissinger continued to pursue 
the policy as USA Secretary of State.  President Ford did not immediately focus a lot 
attention to the situation in Southern Africa as he had to restore confidence in the Presidency 
in the after math of the after the Watergate scandal.  However, by the end of 1974, the Ford 
administration came to the conclusion that its policy on Southern Africa could no longer be 
based on NSSM 39 as the situation in Southern Africa had changed with the withdrawal of 
Portugal from its colonials in Southern Africa.368  The withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and 
Mozambique left SA surrounded by black-ruled countries and as the USA expected that SA 
and Rhodesia would be attacked from Angola and Mozambique, NSSM 39 could no longer 
be used as a guideline to determine USA foreign policy towards Southern Africa.369 
It became clear in June 1975 that the Ford administration would maintain the sympathetic 
stance towards SA which Nixon initiated when the USA together with the UK and France 
vetoed a decision in the Security Council to impose a mandatory arms embargo on SA.  The 
aim of the embargo was to force SA to grant independence to SWA.370  The US Ambassador 
to the UN explained that the reason why the USA vetoed the arms embargo was because 
the USA believed that mandatory sanctions should only be placed on countries which are a 
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serious threat to peace.  He explained that while the USA did not agree with everything that 
SA did in SWA he was of the opinion that SA was not yet a critical threat to peace.371  
The election of Jimmy Carter as President of the USA in late 1976 was a turning point in 
American foreign policy towards SA especially regarding black South Africans.372 Several 
factors suggested that Carter would support the black community in SA’ namely: 
•   The black community in the USA played an important role in his election victory; 
•   He was regarded as an advocate of human rights; 
•   During his election campaign carter maintained that he would apply open diplomacy; 
•   Carter was a religious fundamentalist.373 
Pretoria was concerned that Carter was not serious about countering communism in 
Southern Africa.  As a result SA focused its foreign policy on other countries which also felt 
rejected by Carter’s foreign policy and also feared communist expansion, in particular Israel, 
Argentina, Chile, Taiwan and Paraguay.374 During April 1977, the Minister of Information of 
SA, Connie Mulder, hinted in Parliament that SA was looking for new friends, especially 
those that were anti-Marxist and anti-American.375 
In May 1977 the Carter administration proposed that SA adopt a ‘one man-one-vote’ 
definition of democracy that would inevitably lead to black majority rule in SA.  Carter had 
made it clear from the beginning that he supported majority rule in SA376 and SA under 
majority rule would be less prone to Soviet adventurism than a white-ruled SA.377  However, 
many South Africans were of the opinion that the Afrikaners would rather risk the destruction 
of Afrikanerdom than accept black majority rule in SA.378  American Vice President, Walter 
Mondale, informed the South Africans that they should know the three issues of Rhodesia, 
Namibia and apartheid are linked.  Vorster would have to cooperate on all three issues at the 
same time and could no longer expect the USA to ignore what he was doing in SA in return 
for cooperation on SWA or Rhodesia.379 
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To convince the American public that he was serious about racial equality, Carter appointed 
vocal advocates of racial equality in SA to senior posts within the US State Department 
including Andrew Young as US Ambassador to the UN, Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State380 
and Anthony Lake as Director of Policy and Planning.381  To show his commitment to 
eradicate racial and social injustices in SA, the Carter administration outlined the following 
points that SA should follow if it wanted friendly relations with the USA: 
• “Take timely steps to eliminate the policy and practice of apartheid and grant to all 
elements of the population equal rights including a full and free voice in their destiny. 
• Terminate all systems and plans under whatever name which forcibly separate 
elements of the population on the basis of race whether within a unitary state or in the form 
of separate political units. 
• Bring its illegal occupation of Namibia to a speedy conclusion. 
• Facilitate the holding in Namibia on a territory-wide basis of free elections under the 
aegis of the U.N and refrain from any steps inconsistent therewith. 
• Comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions on the questions of Namibia 
and Rhodesia.”382 
By August 1977, it was evident that Vorster was no longer going to cooperate with the USA 
on various issues such as SWA and Rhodesia and used various forums to criticise the USA 
especially during his re-election campaign  The Carter administration took the following 
measures to maintain pressure on SA: 
• The USA withdrew its Naval attaché from SA; 
• The USA  recalled its commercial officer in SA; 
• All exports of spares and the maintenance of past military equipment were barred; 
• All exports of grey area military equipment were banned. 
• Bank loans and credit to SA were withdrawn.383 
Even though Carter took these steps against SA, he still maintained that any African 
sponsored resolutions that were harsher than the above would be vetoed by the USA.384 
While Pretoria was not pleased with the measures that the Carter administration announced 
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it was also not unduly perturbed.  The measures simply forced SA to buy military equipment 
from Israel and France or from clandestine sources. By the end of 1977, it appeared that any 
type of relationship in the remaining three years of Carter’s presidency would be fragile at 
least.385  
However, the Carter administration’s relations with SA were not without surprises.  In one 
instance it was revealed “that South African sugar interests had been passing favours and 
money to a number of U.S. congressmen in charge of establishing import quotas for sugar 
into the United States.”386  The Sugar Association provided some Congressmen with free air 
tickets and also made contributions to some of their election campaigns a scandal that 
almost drew as much attention as that of Watergate. Urnov accurately described Carter’s 
relationship with SA as “...a family quarrel whose participants never for a moment forgot their 
deep mutual interest in each other.”387 
3.2.1 The Information Scandal:  The Secret War of Words388 
From late 1978 to mid-1979 revelations of how the South African Department of Information 
used propaganda to change SA’s image domestically and internationally came to light.  It 
was to be known as the Information Scandal or Muldergate; the Department of Information 
funded 134 secret projects that were supposed to change SA’s image in the international 
community.  Newspapers such as the Washington Star389, the Rand Daily Mail and the 
Citizen were financed to portray a positive image of SA,390 while other projects that formed 
part of the ‘Information Scandal’ were the funding of “...church organisations in South Africa, 
the United States, Britain and Germany; two major front organisations in Britain and the US 
each with more than 30 000 members...”391 
The aim of the information operation was to penetrate the internal political process of the 
USA in order to change USA foreign policy toward SA through domestic channels.392  This 
type of ‘illegal diplomacy’ was motivated because President Carter had closed the normal 
channels of diplomatic bargaining indirect forms of influence were viewed by SA as the only 
way to change USA foreign policy toward SA.393  Vorster defended the scandal by arguing 
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that as SA’s enemies used unconventional methods against SA, the only way to counter-
attack was to use similar means.394  
During the mid-1960s Eschel Rhoodie (later to be the South African Secretary of Information) 
was a diplomat in the USA and became close friends with an ex-CIA agent known as Mr 
Brown.395  Rhoodie explained to Brown that SA would only survive if Pretoria launched an 
aggressive propaganda effort.  Brown convinced Rhoodie that SA should “use government 
resources to secretly finance anti-apartheid groups and radical student movements and then 
infiltrate them.”396  Brown further told Rhoodie that a propaganda campaign could only be 
successful if the media, or some of the most senior people in the media, were controlled by 
the government.  The scandal was uncovered as a result of investigations on how the 
Rhoodie, could afford his standard of living on his civil service salary.   Internal investigations 
found that he received major funds with which he enriched himself.   
During early 1973, Rhoodie and Connie Mulder (Information Minister) sought to purchase 
various publications, publishing houses and film studios that could be used to portray SA in a 
positive light to the broad public.  They also helped finance the political campaigns of some 
USA politicians who would be able to replace anti-apartheid Democrat Party members in the 
American Congress.397  In January 1974 Mulder and Les De Villiers (one of Rhoodie’s 
deputies) met Ronald Reagan (who was Governor of California at the time) Vice President 
Gerald Ford and the editorial board of the New York Times.398  Between 1973 and 1978 
Rhoodie and Mulder spent round about R85 million in their propaganda effort.399   
When Rhoodie was confronted with the evidence against him, he implicated Mulder.  
Rhoodie fled to France to avoid prosecution and left Mulder to deal with the scandal.400  
Rhoodie was later apprehended on the French Riviera and extradited to SA where he was 
sentenced to six years in prison.  He appealed, won the appeal case and moved to the 
USA.401 An ex-BOSS official was of the opinion that Rhoodie was allowed to immigrate to the 
USA, because he was involved with the CIA for many years.402 Les de Villiers also 
immigrated to the USA.  
Mulder was supposed to take over the leadership of the National Party but his involvement in 
the scandal tarnished the National Party which was renowned for the honesty of its 
members. Mulder consequently lost his position as Minister of Information and resigned from 
Parliament.  Further investigations implicated the Head of the BOSS, Hendrik van den Bergh, 
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and the President of SA, J.B. Vorster.403  Vorster resigned on 4 June 1979 as a result.404  
According to Rhoodie, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SA P.W. Botha, was well aware of 
the propaganda war, but was found not guilty.405 
While many countries embark on propaganda operations to portray a positive image to the 
world when the scandal broke, the world’s attention was focused on the USA and SA at a 
time when the USA would have preferred to maintain a low profile in its relation with 
Pretoria.406 
3.2.2 The Reagan Era (1980s) 
The South Africans viewed the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the USA in 
November 1980 as a ray of hope that USA-SA relations would be restored.  Reagan was 
regarded to have a “pro-white” understanding of the South African situation.407 During his 
election campaign Reagan often hinted that relations with SA would be high on his priority 
list.408  In general, Reagan was determined that the USA should be in alliance with all 
countries opposed to communist expansionism.409    
 According to Thomson, Reagan’s main foreign policy objective was ‘to rid the United States 
of its “Vietnam Syndrome” even if this meant resumption with the confrontation of the Soviet 
Union.’410  While his administration would still oppose apartheid411 Reagan was not afraid to 
admit in public that he intended to support SA in its war against communism.412  The Reagan 
administration constantly proclaimed that the USSR was inflaming the conflicts in Southern 
Africa and that the liberation movements were attacking Namibia and SA. Instead of 
admitting that the racist government of SA was preventing the Namibian people from gaining 
independence as well as oppressing the black people of SA.413  Though Reagan 
acknowledged the importance of destroying apartheid and granting SWA independence, his 
main goal was to curb Soviet influence in Southern Africa.414 
As a result of the hostility between the USA and SA over the previous years under the Carter 
administration, the ‘first six months of relations between a reform-orientated government in 
Pretoria and the new conservative establishment in Washington was a pattern of 
                                                 
403
  M.  Rees and C. Day.  1980.  Muldergate : The Story of the Info Scandal.   Johannesburg : Macmillan 
Publishers. p. 1.  Sanders, op cit. p. 96. 
404
  Bissel, op cit. p.  40. 
405
  Rhoodie, op cit. p. 26. 
406
  Sanders, op cit. p. 101. 
407
  Urnov, op cit. p. 7. Rhoodie, op cit. p. 25. 
408
  Y. G-M.  Lulat.  2008. United States Relations with South Africa:  A Critical Overview from the Colonial 
Period to the Present.  New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. p. 74. 
409
  Davies, op cit. p. 30. Urnov, op cit. p. 216. K.M. Campbell. Soviet Policy in Southern Africa: Angola and  
Mozambique in R.J. Bloomfield (Ed). 1988. Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique.  
Michigan:  Reference Publications. p. 90. 
410
  Thomson, op cit. p.  114. 
411
  Bissel, op cit. pp. 42-43. 
412
  Massie, op cit. p. 485.  W. Minter. USA/SA in the Reagan Era in P. Johnson and D. Martin (Eds). 1986. 
Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War.  Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. p. 282. 
413
  Urnov, op cit. p. 217. 
414
  Davies, op cit. p. 30. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
 
 
negotiations reflecting remarkably equal status between the parties.”415  The first foreign 
policy objective of the USA was to regain the trust lost during the Carter administration.416  To 
regain this trust, Reagan invited Botha to Washington and informed the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of SA that his administration will include some constitutional guarantees for whites in 
SWA and that they will rethink the UN’s plan for SWA.  They also agreed to send back the 
attachés expelled from both countries after the spy plane incident.417  Reagan’s view on 
relations with SA was “that even though the two governments may continue to differ on 
apartheid, the U.S. can cooperate with a society undergoing constructive change.”418    
Reagan placed emphasis on economic engagement in his foreign policy toward SA.  As with 
the Carter administration, Reagan was also of the opinion that economic sanctions would do 
more damage than good in the South African situation.419 Hence he implemented the policy 
of “Constructive Engagement”, providing the SA leadership and military with space for 
adventures in Angola and elsewhere.  In the section dealing with USA-SA economic relations 
it can clearly be seen that there was a surge in trade after Reagan became president.  
The Reagan administration did little to meet with black leaders in SA and while Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Crocker, often travelled to SA he seldom met with 
representatives of the black community.  The US Ambassador to SA, Herman Nickel, also 
showed that he preferred to meet with white South Africans instead of black South Africans 
and in rare instances when he met black representatives he never built any relationship with 
them.  Crocker’s office defended this by arguing that the USA’s focus was on whites so that 
the USA could influence them to reform SA.  Nickel viewed it more important to keep the 
white government pleased than it was to build relations with blacks.420  Crocker confirmed 
that Reagan supported the white minority in SA when Crocker told a South African reporter 
that ... “[a]ll Reagan knows about southern Africa is that he’s on the side of the whites.”421 
3.2.3 Constructive Engagement 
The Africa Bureau of the USA State Department headed by Chester Crocker introduced the 
policy of Constructive Engagement towards SA.  The aim of this policy was to offer “the 
South African government positive sanctions in an attempt to enhance the ambitions of 
reforms already underway...”422 The USA intended to convince Pretoria to accelerate reforms 
by increasing positive diplomatic relations between the two countries.423 Constructive 
Engagement was supposed to give Pretoria ample time and space to reform society and 
consequently extended the war in Angola. 
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South Africa and the USA’s shared commitment to the containment of communism “made 
strategic contacts between the United States and South Africa an ideal focus for Constructive 
Engagement.”424  The Reagan administration considered that Constructive Engagement 
would allow the USA to pursue its Cold War objectives, while at the same time persuading 
SA to change its apartheid policies.  Constructive Engagement would thus provide the USA 
with a win-win situation.  The USA accordingly portrayed itself as a broker between the 
warring factions in Southern Africa.425   
Even though Constructive Engagement focused on positive relations with SA, Reagan 
remained opposed to apartheid but public criticism of apartheid was much less than during 
the Carter administration.  The USA no longer tried to force SA to adopt the one man ‘one 
vote policy’ and maintained that under Constructive Engagement the USA would support any 
reform in SA that would contribute to progressive change.  The USA commended SA for 
introducing its tri-cameral parliamentary system while the white opposition party, the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP), argued that the tri-cameral parliament merely cemented 
apartheid more than the 1910 Union Ac.  The PFP held that the tri-cameral reform amounted 
to sham-reform and the centralisation of power.426  The apartheid government claimed that 
the tri-cameral reform would mean political participation for all without any domination.  It was 
in fact just cosmetic reform and gave the apartheid government a “moral” justification to 
prosecute those who were against the “reform” for so called peace and stability in SA.427  The 
reason why the USA praised SA for the creation of the tri-cameral parliament was to scam 
the world into believing that Pretoria was making positive reforms which in turn allowed the 
USA to provide the apartheid government with more aid for its “transformation” process.428 
According to Constructive Engagement, SA needed to be given space to reform and the USA 
had to provide SA with diplomatic protection.429   To do this the Reagan administration 
vetoed numerous demands for sanctions against SA in the UN Security Council while the 
international community demanded sanctions against SA for its illegal occupation of SWA 
and military operations in Angola.  Throughout the early 1980s the USA stood steadfast 
behind SA whenever the rest of the world called for sanctions.430 
The policy makers behind Constructive Engagement were of the opinion that “the expansion 
of capitalism and the development of a free market would hasten an end to total racial 
discrimination in the Republic.”431  However, SA was sceptical of Constructive Engagement.  
After a meeting with the USA Secretary of State, Al Haig, in May 1981 the Minister of Foreign 
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Affairs of SA, Pik Botha, informed the Reagan administration SA’s conditions for cooperation.  
Washington did not acknowledge Botha’s correspondence since SA constantly tried to 
“bypass the official channels of engagement established by the State Department.”432 
Critics argue that Constructive Engagement failed and was a waste of time and money and 
that even though the USA loosened sanctions on Pretoria there were no measures by SA to 
change its racist policies.  Constructive Engagement allowed SA to accumulate whatever it 
needed from the USA without really cooperating in ending apartheid.433  The SA Ambassador 
to the USA, Donald Sole, confirmed that SA also regarded Constructive Engagement as a 
failure when he wrote that: 
I am convinced that with somewhat more finesse and imagination on our part, Constructive 
Engagement could have been made to work to the advantage of both South Africa and the 
United States.  But because we ourselves had not sown the seed, we failed to nurture this 
tender plant and in the crucial first two years of its existence, it was unable to root itself 
sufficiently firmly.434 
Although the USA offered SA positive sanctions in return for reforms, SA constantly failed to 
initiate reform while the USA should have linked a specific, positive sanction with a specific 
reform but the USA made no specific demands.  SA thus exploited the USA policy without 
feeling compelled to implement reforms. In order to justify Constructive Engagement the USA 
made “optimistic noises about the scraps of progress that the Republic did produce.” 435  
Critics argue that Constructive Engagement was served to preserve the status quo in SA 
instead of bringing about reform.  In this view Constructive Engagement gave SA ample 
military and political manoeuvring space to try and destroy its enemies and defend apartheid 
policies and white minority rule.436  By the mid-1980s a consensus had developed outside the 
Reagan administration that considered Constructive Engagement a failure.437 
By 1984, members of the Democratic Party in the USA Congress were disenchanted with 
Crocker’s Constructive Engagement policy while some Republican Party members doubted 
that Constructive Engagement was fruitful.  The township uprisings in South Africa in 1984 
split the Republicans even further and criticism of Constructive Engagement increased.438  
As the security situation in SA worsened the American public’s attention focused on the 
ineffectiveness of Constructive Engagement. 
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During the first few years of the 1980s Washington tried to keep the policy of Constructive 
Engagement as vague as possible to the public as it was regarded as quiet diplomacy but by 
the mid-1980s Crocker decided to focus more on the public’s awareness of Constructive 
Engagement.  His intention was to provide the public with a positive picture of Constructive 
Engagement to change their perceptions of the policy as Crocker was of the opinion that the 
American public did not correctly understand the goals of Constructive Engagement.  As a 
result, an ad hoc working group on SA was established in order to portray a positive image of 
Constructive Engagement to the American public.439    
3.2.4 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 
After recognising that Constructive Engagement was faltering, the US Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in October 1986 even though Reagan tried to 
veto it.  This was regarded as one of Reagan’s worst foreign policy defeats.440  The CAAA 
was the broadest array of sanctions that any first world country had ever imposed on SA.441 
The passing of the CAAA implied that Crocker would have less authority on foreign policy 
making toward SA for the time being.442  For the first few years of Reagan’s tenure, Crocker 
was given free rein regarding to US foreign policy toward SA as the White House was 
focused on the Cold War in other parts of the world.  Crocker persuaded the White House 
that he had the situation in Southern Africa under control and the White House believed him.  
But the USA Congress had enough of Constructive Engagement and as a result the CAAA 
was passed.443 
The purpose of the CAAA was to ‘set forth a comprehensive and complete framework to 
guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in SA and lead to 
the establishment of a non-racial, democratic form of government.’444  The CAAA contained 
the following provisions: 
• Imports from SA.  American companies were banned from importing any products 
produced by a South African parastatal organisation.  This excluded minerals of strategic 
importance to the USA.  
• Exports to SA.  The Act banned the export of computers, crude oil and petroleum 
products, nuclear materials and military equipment. 
• Individual and business taxation.  South Africans residing in the USA were no longer 
allowed to claim certain tax benefits.  American businesses were also no longer authorised to 
avoid double taxation. 
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• Landing rights for aircraft.  USA aircrafts were no longer permitted to land in SA. 
• Intelligence sharing.  Intelligence sharing between the two countries was no longer 
allowed except in certain circumstances.  Military cooperation was also largely terminated. 
• Sanctions.  The Act motivated the US president and other countries to impose 
sanctions on SA.  The US President was in addition compelled to report which countries 
were in violation of the arms embargo against SA.445 
• Support to the black population in SA.  The Act authorised US$ 40 million to be used 
to better education, housing etc for black South Africans. 
• Fines for violating sanctions against SA. -  The Act prescribed that businesses which 
disregard sanctions against SA could be fined up to US$ 1 million while individuals could be 
fined up to US$ 500 000. 
• Congressional oversight. -  The US President was to report annually to Congress on 
the progress of reform in SA.   
• Ending of sanctions. – The Act prescribed five conditions that had to be met for 
sanctions against SA to be lifted. The government had to release Nelson Mandela and the 
other political prisoners. Pretoria had to end the state of emergency; allow the formation of 
opposition parties, freedom of speech and freedom of association; abandon the Group Areas 
Act and the Population Registration Act; negotiate with the “real” black representatives over 
the future of the country.446 
The CAAA demonstrated the concern of USA Congress regarding SA’s unwillingness to 
abolish apartheid.  Although the CAAA was seen as a strong attack against apartheid and 
the South African government in October 1987 Crocker criticised the Act by noting that no 
significant reform had occurred in SA since the adoption of the CAAA a year before. 447  
Figures in the anti-apartheid movement also criticised the CAAA on the grounds that the Act 
did not force USA business to completely withdraw from SA, the President was not forced to 
persuade other major investors in SA to withdraw and the President was not mandated to 
cooperate with the USSR to enforce an air and naval blockade of SA.448  President Reagan 
confirmed Crocker’s sentiment during a speech on the first anniversary of the implementation 
of the CAAA when he said “I regret I am unable to report significant progress leading to the 
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end of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa”449  The 
CAAA was lifted in 1991 under the Bush administration.450 
On 20 January 1989 George H. Bush was sworn in as President of the USA.  On 2 July 1989 
the Washington Post reported that President Bush had a personal, sympathetic interest in 
ending apartheid in SA and was in consultation with black anti-apartheid activists and 
planned to meet President F.W. De Klerk to find a solution to apartheid.  According to the 
newspaper, “The American interest [was] to see – and to help – South Africans of all races to 
sit down and negotiate a common future.”451  It was under Bush’s administration that the Cold 
War ended and that SA began to make significant reforms to abolish apartheid. 
3.3 AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON SA 
During August 1975 South African Military Intelligence received a letter from the South 
African Ambassador in Washington that described proposed changes to US foreign policy 
towards Southern Africa. The letter was composed by a member of the Black Caucus and 
proposed a number of measures, namely that: the relaxation of the arms embargo to SA 
should be ended, good reasons why USA Military Attachés should not be withdrawn from SA 
and that the USA government stop providing commercial or financial support to SA.  The 
Black Caucus also wanted the US government to end all nuclear cooperation with SA.  The 
group furthermore wanted the USA to support the UN in SWA to ensure a peaceful transfer 
of power and allow elections on a one man one vote basis.452 The letter further stated that 
the Black Caucus had received a sympathetic response from Kissinger, but that Kissinger did 
not comment on the changes proposed by the Black Caucus.  For its part, SA was not overly 
concerned that Kissinger would pay too much attention to the proposal of the Black Caucus 
as Washington was not too alarmed about the American public’s opinion vis-à-vis USA-SA 
relations. 453  However, as time went on the American public began to exert more pressure on 
the US government to change its relations with SA. 
The anti-apartheid movement in the USA consisted mostly of academics, students, 
businessmen, black conscious and church groups – people who had interests in SA.454  The 
Soweto riots in 1976 and the death of Steve Biko in 1977 again reignited the USA anti-
apartheid movement455 and there was an increase in the number of protests in Washington 
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after 1976.456  The resistance movement in SA was also strengthened by these two 
events.457 
The US government was well aware that the foreign policy of a democratic country could not 
be carried out successfully without considering public opinion.  As a result the Public Agenda 
Foundation conducted a comprehensive survey on USA public opinion on SA in 1978.458  
According to Barron and Immerwahr, two researchers who wrote an article on the survey, 
most Americans wanted their government to place great pressure on SA to grant freedom to 
black South Africans.  Broad segments of the US public wanted Washington to end all sales 
of arms to SA and thought that US companies should place pressure on SA.459 
Even though the majority of the American public at the time was against apartheid, it did not 
want the US government to take extreme measures against Pretoria.  The Public Agenda 
Foundation’s survey found that the majority of those canvassed did not want American 
businesses to totally withdraw from SA. Indeed the survey found that the USA public strongly 
supported American business in SA.  An overwhelming majority (73 percent) did not want the 
USA to take military action against SA and did not want black population of SA to revert to 
guerrilla warfare inside SA.460  The findings in the article reflected the Carter administration’s 
foreign policy toward SA. 
An analysis of the findings of the Public Agenda Foundation’s survey reveals that there were 
three principles that shaped US public opinion during the late 1970s, namely 
• The American public did not want its government to become involved in another Vietnam-
type military disaster.  The US public was concerned that the white minority in SA would lose 
the war in Angola and did not want to side with the losing regime as was the case with 
Vietnam. 
• The second principle was what Barron and Immerwahr describe as the Cold War 
psychology.  Even though the US public was wary to support another conflict after Vietnam, it 
remained concerned about communist expansion.  In 1977 sixty percent of the US public still 
regarded the containment of communism as one of the main objectives of US foreign 
policy.461 
• The third principle was morality.   The American public was of the opinion that US foreign 
policy should be guided by the moral values of a democratic country.462 
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On 2  December 1978, Prime Minister P.W. Botha informed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
R.F. Botha, and the Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, that in his meeting with 
President Carter, the US president confirmed that the American people were criticising SA in 
the USA.  However, Carter told Botha that he was not publicising the criticism against SA.463    
 
Illustration 3.1:  Two Strongmen – Botha and Vorster.464 
A poll conducted in the USA during 1979 found that only 18 percent of the American public 
had heard of apartheid.465  According to Davies, the economic, political and strategic debates 
on SA that were taking place in the USA were too complicated for the average American 
citizen to understand.  As a result, the US public did not pay too much attention to SA, 
although the media attention on the failure of Constructive Engagement and the township 
uprisings made the US public more aware about the situation in SA.466 
The election of Reagan as president in 1980 was a blow to the anti-apartheid movement in 
the USA and as the US legislature was under the control of conservatives, anti-apartheid 
activists were sure that federal action against SA would be minimised.  As a result ‘the 
activist leaders concluded that they needed to close ranks and shift attention from the federal 
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to the state and local legislatures.’467  Consequently this led to greater cooperation among 
the various anti-apartheid groups which had previously acted individually. 
In 1984 SA introduced a new Constitution which made provision for a tri-cameral parliament 
which included representative from the Coloured and Indian population.  This led to black 
protests against the Constitution. Within two days, 33 protesters were killed by members of 
the SAP.  In 1985 a state of emergency was declared in SA.468 The township uprisings of 
1985 rejuvenated the anti-apartheid movement against the USA foreign policy towards SA.469  
In particular the anti-apartheid movement was heavily opposed to Constructive Engagement 
and was astounded at the Reagan administration’s willingness to establish close relations 
with SA.  Accordingly, the anti-apartheid movement did everything possible to promote 
disinvestment in SA.  Uprisings continued until 1987 during which an estimated 3000 South 
Africans were killed and about 30 000 detained.  The international media showed pictures of 
unarmed civilians being beaten and killed by members of the SAP and security forces and 
again brought SA to the attention of the US public.470   
Other groups opposed to apartheid emerged and included Transafrica and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.471 The establishment of Transafrica in 
particular was for a concern to the SA government and the SA Ambassador to the USA was 
of the opinion that prior to the establishment of Transafrica there was no organisation that 
could mobilise 25 million African-Americans to influence USA policy towards SA.  After the 
establishment of Transafrica, the SA Ambassador was concerned that African-Americans 
might be able to influence US foreign policy towards SA.472   The American Committee on 
Africa in cooperation with the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility, the American 
Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid 
Committee, the United Methodist Church Office and the Washington Office on Africa 
launched a campaign against American banks that were lending money to SA.473 
As a result of numerous student campaigns on American campuses, twenty American 
universities were persuaded to divest from companies associated with SA.474  As the 
divestment campaign gained popularity, more and more calls were made on the US 
government to implement negative sanctions against SA.475  The movement was particularly 
successful in its disinvestment campaign as “[b]etween 1985 and 1988, 16 states and 56 
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municipal governments divested their public funds from companies that did business with 
South Africa.”476   
3.4    ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
South Africa was viewed by investors as lucrative for foreign investment as labour was cheap 
and the political situation was relatively stable during the early 1970s. 477  During the Ford 
administration (1974 to 1976) USA-SA economic trade experienced a constant growth (see 
tables below) and by 1976 the US investment in SA constituted for 40 percent of all USA 
investments in Africa.  From 1972 to 1976 US investment in SA grew at a rate of 20 percent 
per annum and the USA was South Africa’s second largest investor by 1976.478 
Exports 
1960 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 
288 438 563 602 746 1,160 
Imports 
1960 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 
108 226 290 325 377 609 
Table 3.1: US Trade with SA (in millions of dollars) from 1960 to 1974.479 
USA-SA economic relations flourished under the Carter administration (1977 to 1980) even 
though Carter did not have a good political relationship with SA.480  Direct investment by the 
USA from 1977 – 1980 stood at R1.5 billion.481 Carter believed economic sanctions would 
not convince Pretoria to change its apartheid policies and would also be detrimental to black 
South Africans.  As a result Carter opposed any economic sanctions.  Even though the 
Carter administration was willing to confront SA on human rights, it did not entertain 
economic sanctions against SA.  Officials in the Carter administration frequently threatened 
that should SA not cooperate, economic sanctions would follow, but this never realised.  
Carter was of the opinion that good economic relations between the USA and SA could be 
used to bring about progressive change in SA.482  
Evidence that Carter was adamant not to impose economic sanctions against SA emerged 
during October 1977 when the USA vetoed three successive Security Council resolutions 
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against proposed UN economic sanctions against SA.  According to Thomson, Carter had 
four reasons for not supporting economic sanctions against SA, namely: 
• Sanctions would be ineffective; 
• Isolation would strengthen the nationalist mentality among white South Africans; 
• Economic sanctions would inherently affect the black population; 
•  Sanctions would hamper progress by the SA government towards ending apartheid.483 
The Carter administration was of the opinion that instead of punishing SA, American 
businesses in SA would be examples to South Africans.  As a result, the Sullivan Plan was 
formulated.484  Economic relations between the Carter administration and SA are borne out 
by the following: 
By the end of the Carter term of office, U.S. transnational corporations had US$ 2,350 million   
invested in this market, gaining incredible returns of 28 percent.  Similarly, U.S. exports to the 
Republic grew during Carter’s watch, measuring  US$ 2,463 million by 1980, while imports to 
the United States almost quadrupled in the five years leading up to this point.485 
Ironically some South African politicians were of the opinion that SA was economically too 
dependent on the USA.  During July 1978, the South African Defence Attaché in Washington 
informed the Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, that the USA could use economic 
means to force SA to abolish apartheid.  The Defence Attaché was of the opinion that SA’s 
enemies (blacks, liberalists, churches and communists) could use SA’s economic 
dependence on the USA to achieve their ultimate goal – the destruction of the white man.  
The Defence Attaché recommended that SA start to decrease its trade with the USA and to 
withhold some of the strategic minerals that the USA needed from SA.486 
Reagan’s election as America’s president in January 1981 renewed the economic ties 
between the USA and SA.  His administration demonstrated from the onset that it sought 
good economic ties with SA when in 1982 SA desperately needed a loan of US$ 1.1 billion 
from the IMF.  The UN General Assembly voted whether the IMF should decline to give SA 
the loan, and 121 countries agreed that the IMF should refuse the loan, 23 countries 
abstained from voting and three countries voted that SA should receive the loan.  The three 
countries in favour of the loan to SA were the UK, West Germany and the USA.  As a result, 
the IMF approved the loan, as the USA was able to override the no vote with 20 percent of 
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the vote.  American bank loans to SA increased by 246 percent between 1981 and 1983.487  
From 1981 to 1983 direct American capital investment in SA doubled to be R3.4 billion.488 
Reagan shared Carter’s view that economic sanctions against SA would do more harm than 
good for reform in SA.  The official US policy during the Reagan administration remained that 
‘the US neither encouraged, nor discouraged investment in SA’. As Reagan regarded 
transnational corporations as important tools for change in SA, American businesses 
operating in SA between 1980 and 1984 increased by about 50 bringing the total to about 
400.489  By 1985 American investment in SA was worth US$ 15 billion which included direct 
investments, securities and bank loans.490 
From 1984 profits made by US companies started to decline due to the violent uprisings in 
South African townships which created a public relations dilemma for USA companies 
operating in SA.  Consequently large American corporations like Coca-Cola, IBM, General 
Motors and Kodak withdrew from SA in 1985.  In December 1984, 284 American companies 
were operating in SA, but by July 1988 only 136 remained in SA.  It was clear that the US 
public was exerting sufficient pressure on American companies to disinvest from SA.491  The 
passing of the CAAA in 1986 almost ended the USA-SA economic relationship as it imposed 
several sanctions against SA. 
3.4.1 The Sullivan Principles 
The Carter administration decided to increase pressure on American firms in SA to assist in 
bringing change to the country.  In fact most American companies understood that Carter 
was an advocate for human rights and that it would be in their own best interest to support 
him if they could.492  As a result, representatives of 11 of the largest US companies met the 
USA Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and black church leaders in March 1977 during which 
they agreed on six guidelines that should be followed by American companies operating in 
SA. The guidelines were: 
• “Non-segregation of the races in all eating, work and comfort facilities; 
• Equal pay and fair employment practices for all employees; 
• Equal pay for comparable work; 
• Development training programs to prepare blacks for supervisory, administrative, clerical 
and technical jobs; 
• Increasing the promotion of blacks to supervisory and management positions; 
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• Improving the quality of employees’ lives in non-work environment (housing, transport, 
school, recreation, and health).”493 
Reverend Leon Sullivan was the leader of the black delegation to the meeting and was also 
the first black member of the Board of Directors of General Motors.494  Resultantly the 
guidelines would be referred to as the Sullivan Principles or the Sullivan Plan.  In July 1978, 
Sullivan published an expanded version of the initial six principles which explained in greater 
detail what the Sullivan Principles expected from US companies.495  In short, the Sullivan 
Plan intended to use US multinational corporations to place pressure on SA to change its 
racial policies.   
During March 1978 SA received news that the USA government planned to penalise 
American companies operating in SA that did not abide to fair employment practices.496  This 
further served to motivate US companies to sign the Sullivan Principles and by July 1978, 
103 American companies were signatories to the Sullivan Plan.  The companies included 
American Cyanamid, Burroughs, Caltex, Citicorp, Ford, General Motors, IBM, International 
Harvester, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Otis Elevator and Union Carbide.497  By 
1979, 135 US companies were signatories to the Sullivan Principles.498 
The membership of signatories to the Sullivan Principles increased during the Reagan 
administration as the administration appealed on all companies operating in SA to sign the 
principles in order to help the USA government bring peaceful change to SA. Signatories to 
the Sullivan Principles increased from 105 by the end of 1977 to 146 by 1982. 499  The US 
Congress also requested Reagan to make the Sullivan Principles mandatory to all American 
companies operating in SA.  However, Reagan repeatedly refused to do so.500   
At the end of 1984 the Sullivan Principles were expanded to include: 
• “Companies must influence other companies to follow equal rights; 
• Companies must support the rights of black workers to seek jobs wherever they exist; 
• Companies must support the rights of black businesses to operate in urban areas; 
• Companies must support the rescinding of all apartheid laws.”501 
The Sullivan Plan was not without its critics however, the verification process of the Sullivan 
Principles was one of the main criticisms of the principles and it was further argued that the 
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Sullivan Principles were not a solution to SA’s racial problems.502  It was instead argued that 
the government should press for disinvestment in SA and US universities like Yale and 
Stanford emerged as the main advocates for disinvestment from SA.503  The American 
Committee on Africa was of the opinion that the Sullivan Principles could not make up for all 
the financial and material support that the USA government had already given SA.  The 
committee regarded the plan as hypocritical and a way to make the American public forget 
the USA’s support for the apartheid regime.  Rather, the American Committee on Africa 
called for the total disinvestment from SA.504 
The SA government did not react to the Sullivan Principles publicly.505  The South African 
Consul wrote to Sullivan that he was impressed with the stand that he took against SA.506  
The USA’s decision to rather implement the Sullivan Principles than to support economic 
sanctions against SA further demonstrated that the USA was using the policy of “neither 
encourage, nor discourage” investment in SA as with the previous USA administrations.507 
3.4.2 Strategic Minerals:  The Persian Gulf of minerals - SA508 
South Africa had a myriad of mineral resources which the USA needed to grow its own 
economy.509  During the 1970s and 1980s SA was the fourth largest exporter of non-fuel 
minerals in the world.  The four most important minerals to the USA that were found in SA 
were: chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum.  These were strategic resources 
because they were used in armaments, computers and vehicles.510   As a result, SA has 
been called the Persian Gulf of minerals. Crocker described SA as the Saudi Arabia of 
minerals.511 
By 1974, SA supplied 57 percent of the USA’s vanadium, 36 percent of its ferromanganese, 
35 percent of its ferrochrome, 30 percent of its chrome ore and 19 percent of its platinum.  
Any sudden disruption in the supply of these minerals would have had a disastrous effect on 
the American economy because the USA would have to find new sources to sustain its 
industries.512  Table 3.2 indicates how important SA’s minerals were to the USA. 
 
 
                                                 
502
  The Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, op cit. p. 99. 
503
  Bissel, op cit. p.  89. 
504
  Massie, op cit. p. 409. 
505
  Bissel, op cit. p.  90. 
506
  Massie, op cit. p. 409. 
507
  Thomson, op cit. p. 105. 
508
  Davies, op cit. p. 57. 
509
  Goldstone, op cit. p. 814. 
510
  A.  Seidman and N. Seidman.  1977.  U.S. Multinationals in Southern Africa.  Dar es Salaam: Tanzania 
Publishing House. p. 84.  Davies, op cit. p. 57. 
511
  Polakow-Suransky, op cit. p. 114. 
512
  Thomson, op cit. p.  8. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
 
 
 
Mineral United 
States 
South 
Africa 
Soviet 
Union 
Soviet Union plus 
South Africa 
Chromium: 
    
Production 0 33 24.5 57.5 
Reserves 0 66.4 2.9 69.3 
Manganese: 
    
Production 0 20.9 45.8 66.7 
Reserves 0 37.2 50.7 87.9 
Platinum Groups: 
    
Production 0.1 47.5 47.5 95 
Reserves 0.1 73.2 25.1 98.3 
Vanadium: 
    
Production 17.6 42.3 27.9 70.2 
Reserves 0.7 49.4 45.9 95.3 
Table 3.2: Percentage share of world chromium, manganese, platinum group metals, and 
vanadium production and reserves, by country, 1979.513  
South Africa was aware that the USA relied heavily on its minerals and did not hesitate to 
use this as leverage.  SA distributed a pamphlet through its embassies in Western countries 
to remind readers that “South Africa produced 70 percent of the world’s gold and half of its 
diamonds, held 25 percent of the non-communist world’s uranium reserves, and was the 
largest producer of chromium outside the USSR.”514  In 1977 the Minister of Mines of SA, 
Fanie Botha, warned the USA that if it could not guarantee ongoing capital investment in SA, 
then it could not guarantee that the USA would have ongoing access to SA’s minerals.515   
By 1984 trade between the USA and SA amounted to US$ 4.8 billion. Most commodities 
were minerals of strategic importance to the USA.516 Gold and other minerals accounted for 
60 percent of SA’s mineral export.  In terms of Constructive Engagement it was essential that 
the USA used SA’s minerals in order to deny their usage to the USSR for if the USSR was to 
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gain control of SA’s mineral wealth, it would control as much of 90 percent of several 
important minerals only found in areas controlled by the USSR. 517   
3.5 USA-SA MILITARY RELATIONS 
During the Carter administration, the USA placed its anti-apartheid campaign above its 
strategic interests in SA.  In 1980, a Pentagon official admitted that the US DOD had only 
limited interests in SA because other interests were of a higher priority.  Three issues 
regarding USA-SA military relations became evident during the Carter Presidency: to enforce 
the arms embargo against SA, to prevent SA from acquiring nuclear weapons or the 
capability to build them; to end any reliance on South African military facilities, including its 
harbours and the tracking stations.518 
Carter made it clear that he was not interested in using South African facilities when he 
chose to use bases in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Diego Garcia for the Rapid Deployment 
Force ahead of the planned USA offensive on Afghanistan.  The USA needed bases in the 
Indian Ocean region, but refused SA’s offer of the Simon’s town naval base.519  The USA 
maintained that it will only make use of the offer when SA changed it racial policies.  Thus 
the USA made clear that even though the Cape sea route was of importance to the USA; SA 
would have to stand on its own until it ended apartheid.520 
3.5.1 Arms Embargoes against SA 
In March 1977 the US House of Representatives called on the Carter administration to 
review US policies and practices with regard to arms sales to SA.  An investigation into US 
weapon sales to SA was conducted by the US Committee on International Relations which 
established that “from 1975 through 1976, the US government had permitted the export of 
nearly $500 000 worth of weapons like shotguns, rifles, teargas and other so-called non-
military weapons to South Africa.”521  This practice would not be tolerated by the Carter 
administration if he wanted to keep the trust of anti-apartheid lobbies. 
Carter’s principle that the fight against apartheid was more important than the USA’s 
strategic interests in SA led to the USA to support a UN mandatory arms embargo against 
SA.522  The embargo was officially imposed on 4 November 1977 in terms of UN Security 
Council Resolution 418.  For the first time in the history of the UN a member state was 
subject to Chapter VII sanctions under the UN Charter.523  This entitled that SA was regarded 
as being a threat to international peace and security.  Washington announced that “an arms 
boycott is more effective than a total economic blockade because it makes it uncomfortable 
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for South Africans without forcing them to become completely independent.”524  Although the 
USA believed that the new arms embargo would hamper SA’s capability to produce arms, 
the previous arms embargo against SA in fact motivated SA to develop its own arms 
industry. 
In terms of the new embargo the USA was not allowed to sell any security force-related 
equipment to SA, whether lethal or not.  The USA again placed restrictions on aircraft sales 
to SA.525 The USA in addition placed restrictions on travel visas for South African military 
personnel, especially high ranking officers.   The export of computer equipment that could be 
used by the security services was also banned.  The Carter administration was so adamant 
about the embargo, that by February 1978 there were no loopholes in the embargo as in 
previous sanctions.526  To make the arms embargo inviolable the Carter administration 
ordered ‘the denial of the export or re-export of “any commodity” to South Africa or SWA if 
the exporter “knows or has reason to know” that the item will be “sold to or used by” military 
or police entities in these countries.’527  However, even though the new arms embargo was 
imposed against SA, American companies still found ways to sell equipment to SA in 
violation of Resolution 418.528 
Despite the new arms embargo US companies, entrepreneurs and the CIA provided SA with 
weapons - now illegally. These weapons were shipped to SA via third world countries that 
were not covered by the arms embargo.529 In 1977, Gerald Bull530, the engineer who was 
behind the development of the G5 long range artillery gun, with help from the CIA, Armscor, 
Israel and Taiwan smuggled G5 components and ammunition to SA.  The guns and 
ammunition were smuggled over the USA-Canada border to SA via Antigua.  After the US 
Justice Department and Senate found out about the incident Bull was incarcerated for a short 
period.531   
Other cases of the illegal supplying of arms to SA were uncovered. The Olin Corporation sold 
3200 Winchester rifles to SA via Mozambique, Austria, Greece and the Canary Islands.532  
The Space Research Corporation (SRC) in North Troy, Vermont, shipped tens of thousands 
of 155mm shells to SA. The shells were for the G5 cannon of the SADF. The SRC 
transported the shells via ports in Canada, Spain and Antigua to Cape Town.533  
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Reagan relaxed the arms embargo when he became president in 1980 and USA companies 
were allowed to sell ’grey area’ materials to SA.534  As a result of Constructive Engagement, 
a large number of grey area materials were allowed and from January 1984 to April 1985, 
USA companies sold computers and related equipment worth US$ 100.8 million and weapon 
parts worth US$ 111 000 to SA.535    
After the USA Congress passed the CAAA on 6 October 1986, the sale of arms and 
ammunition to SA was again banned.536  The CAAA also included a clause which declared 
that the USA would break all ties with any country that violated the arms embargo against 
SA.  This resulted in the withdrawal of military support from most of SA’s allies.  Israel was 
the only country that still secretly supported SA after 1986.537  
3.5.2 The 1979 Spy Plane Incident 
During 1979 an incident occurred which almost led to a termination of all ties with the USA.  
Washington received permission from Pretoria to operate a light aircraft from SA Air Force 
Base (AFB) Waterkloof in Pretoria, which also served as a base for SAAF fighter jets. The 
American plane, a Beechcraft C-12, could carry up to eight passengers538 and was intended 
to transport US diplomatic personnel in Southern Africa more easily.539  The aircraft could 
also be used to for emergency and evacuation flights if necessary although the Department 
of Foreign Affairs of SA had to be informed of any crisis before permission could be given to 
use the aircraft.540 
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Illustration 3.2: The Beechcraft C-12541 
South African Military Intelligence was suspicious of the US plane from the start. During a 
meeting of the Defence Staff Committee on 25 April 1978 the Director General of Operations 
tasked a team to determine where else the plane could be based and what measures should 
be implemented to control the movements of the aircraft.542  During a meeting of the Defence 
Staff Committee on 19 May 1978 it was decided that the USA must move the aircraft from 
AFB Waterkloof to the Jan Smuts Airport (now known as O.R. Tambo International Airport) 
before 1 July 1978.543 
Military Intelligence was tasked to covertly search the aircraft at AFB Waterkloof and a 
70mm-air survey camera was found.  The camera contained photos of classified installations 
that were taken by the Americans.  Some of the photos taken by the camera included the 
Pelindaba complex west of Pretoria where SA was developing nuclear material warfare 
capability.544  Photos of strategic installations in neighbouring countries were also discovered 
when the aircraft flew on supposed diplomatic missions.545 
As a result, SA informed the USA that the diplomatic plane was no longer authorised to 
remain in SA.  The USA in turn expelled the SA’s Military Attaché in Washington.546  Pretoria 
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in response expelled all American Attachés from SA.547  According to Bissel, both Pretoria 
and Washington each allowed one attaché in their respective countries.548 
The spy plane incident was widely publicised. There are three possible reasons why the 
incident was blown out of proportion: 
• SA intended to divert public attention from the ‘Muldergate scandal’.    
• The incident provided SA with a reason to break off talks over SWA with the Contact Group 
of which the USA was the leader.549  
• The incident gave SA the opportunity to realign itself to a neutral political position in the 
Cold War.550 
3.5.3   Intelligence Exchange between SA and the USA 
The real relationship between the CIA and the South African intelligence services still 
remains a mystery because of a lack of documentation.  Dr Niel Barnard, who was the head 
of the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) during the 1980s, gives a hint on the 
relationship in his auto biography “South Africa’s intelligence relationship with the Americans 
goes back a long way”.551  According to him some of SA’s best intelligence operators were 
placed in Washington to liaise with the CIA.552 
Talbot is of the opinion that CIA and the BOSS were as “thick as thieves”,553  while Stockwell 
notes that the CIA mainly liaised with the BOSS rather than conducted covert operations 
within SA as BOSS agents were very well trained to uncover covert operations by Foreign 
Intelligence Services and the USA did not want to antagonise Pretoria by conducting covert 
operations in SA. Some BOSS operatives were even trained in the USA.554  However, when 
SA began its nuclear program, the CIA felt compelled to gather intelligence on the project.555  
By early 1975 BOSS uncovered a CIA espionage operation that focused on the nuclear 
project and expelled the CIA agents that were involved from SA.556 
According to El- Khawas and Cohen there are several indirect sources which show 
collaboration between the CIA and the South African security forces.557  During the Ford 
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administration in 1975, the USA Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, proposed at a 
NATO conference that the organisation should consider using Simon’s Town naval base as a 
monitoring facility to gather naval intelligence.558  The USA provided SA with some of the 
best eavesdropping and surveillance equipment to monitor the Southern parts of the Indian 
and Atlantic oceans.559 The listening post at Silvermine near Simon’s Town often provided 
the USA government with intelligence assessments.560   
During the Carter administration there was no official intelligence sharing between the two 
countries.  The CIA lied to the administration about their involvement with SA.  The CIA was 
banned from having an intelligence relationship with SA, but the CIA felt that it would be in 
the best interest of the USA to have a mutually beneficial intelligence relationship with SA.561  
Military Intelligence was pleased when the USA indicated that it was willing to once again 
legally exchange intelligence where possible during the early 1980s.  The USA specified that 
it was willing to again provide covert intelligence to SA.562 
Most intelligence sharing regarded the situation in Angola as the CIA had a presence in 
Angola.563  SA would provide intelligence to the USA on the activities of ANC members in 
Angola while the USA would exchange Cuba’s troop numbers and movements with SA.  The 
Pentagon used electronic collection methods in Angola and constantly updated the SADF 
about the military situation.564  The US DOD also requested the SADF to exchange captured 
Soviet equipment with the USA565 and in exchange for intelligence on Soviet weapons that 
the SADF did not have.566 
An example of intelligence sharing was when a Canadian citizen who worked for the CIA, 
contacted a member of the South African Military Intelligence in Canada during May 1990.  
The Canadian informed the South African agent that he had just returned from Cuba on a 
mission for the CIA.  One of the Canadian’s sources in Cuba informed him that Cuba was 
providing pilot training to 80 ANC members at an air force base in Camaguey.  The 
helicopters that they were using were bought from Brazil.  The CIA agent further told the 
South African that between 250 and 500 ANC guerrillas were being trained by Cuban and 
Libyan instructors at another military base in Cuba.  The CIA agent even volunteered to give 
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the South African photos of the military bases where members of the ANC were being 
trained as well as pictures of individual ANC members undergoing training. The most 
valuable information that the CIA agent provided the Military Intelligence agent was a picture 
of a person with a note that a USA citizen will travel to SA during May or June 1990.  The 
individual should not be given a visa, because he was a spy working for Cuba and Libya and 
he intended to gather intelligence on SA’s nuclear program and weapon stores.  The CIA 
agent said that he provided the information not for financial reasons, but because there are 
very few people in the USA and Canada who wanted to see SA taken over by 
communists.567 
3.6   CONCLUSION  
The situation in Southern Africa changed drastically in 1974 with the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese from Africa.  It was in the same period that Ford took over presidency in the 
USA.  Ford was aware that there was an opportunity for the communist to get a foothold in 
Southern Africa, because SA was now surrounded by black governed states.  In order to 
ensure that the anti-communist apartheid government remain in power, Ford maintained the 
status quo of his predecessors with regards to its relationship with SA. 
Of all the US presidents studied for this research, Carter was the most confrontational 
towards SA.  During his presidency the USA verbally attacked apartheid publicly and took 
symbolic action against SA such as the withdrawal of diplomatic personnel and supported a 
mandatory arms embargo against SA. The arms embargo proved to be relatively ineffectual 
as the USA gained little by denying SA arms. This confrontation policy continued throughout 
Carter’s presidency. Carter’s tone and urgency toward SA on economic matters also differed 
from previous administrations although his actions or intentions remained the same as 
previous administrations. 
A survey on USA public opinion on SA revealed that Carter’s foreign policy towards SA 
reflected the sentiments of the public.  The American public wanted to see human rights 
prevail in SA, but simultaneously did not want to harm USA business opportunities in SA.  
While there was an increase in the awareness of apartheid, most American citizens still did 
not care much about events in SA.  The debates over apartheid, sanctions and Constructive 
Engagement were mostly reserved for politicians and a very small group of concerned 
groups and individuals.   
The verbal and symbolic criticism of the Carter administration changed USA-SA relations but 
did not fundamentally alter apartheid policies.  Even though Carter constantly proposed that 
an end should be brought to apartheid, he was unwilling to implement economic sanctions 
against SA.  Carter did show that he was more serious than previous administrations to 
eradicate apartheid, but he still had to take cognisance of the Cold War.  Carter did not want 
to alienate SA, because its government was regarded as an ally against communism in 
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Southern Africa.  The presence of Cuban and Soviet military personnel in Angola also 
influenced Carter’s foreign policy towards SA as his administration did not want excessive 
criticism to drive away a useful partner against Soviet expansionism in Africa. 
The after-math of Vietnam was the main reason why Carter did not want the USA to become 
militarily involved in the conflict in Southern Africa. Instead of looking for support from its old 
ally, the USA, SA turned to other countries such as France and Israel. Pretoria decided to 
wait out Carter’s term of office with the hope that a more amenable presidential would 
replace him. This indeed happened with the election of Reagan.   
The Reagan administration demonstrated more empathy with white South Africa and his 
administration was of the opinion that peaceful change in SA was only possible with the 
cooperation of white institutions.  As a result, the Reagan administration neglected the black 
population of SA and the political opinions of those without voting rights.   South Africa’s 
importance as an economic and strategic ally thus overshadowed the USA abhorrence of 
apartheid during Reagan’s term. 
There are different opinions on whether Constructive Engagement was successful. Some 
scholars argue that Constructive Engagement failed in the first half of the 1980s, but was 
successful in the latter half of that decade.  When the Reagan administration realised that SA 
was exploiting Constructive Engagement to its own advantage it should have stopped with 
‘positive sanctions’. Instead it continued with ’positive sanctions’ in service of US interests in 
the hope that the political situation in SA would change.  As a result, Constructive 
Engagement gave the SA government even in its modernised form of racial domination, 
some breathing space and thus postponed the dismantling of apartheid for some years. 
By the middle of the 1980s, the USA Congress realised that Constructive Engagement was 
not achieving its expected results and passed the CAAA even though the President tried to 
veto the bill.  Yet while the CAAA was a major political statement against SA and further 
isolated SA, the USA still continued to share intelligence with SA’s security services. 
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CHAPTER 4   
4.1 INTRODUCTION:  USA-SA RELATIONSHIP WITH REGARDS TO THE BORDER 
WAR568 
The Border War refers to the regional conflict that took place from 1966 to 1989 between SA 
and her allies (UNITA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] and the USA) 
on the one side and SWAPO, the MPLA, the ANC, Cuba and the USSR in opposition. 
Geographically the Border War was fought in Namibia and the southern half of Angola.569  
Many researchers use the terms Bush War and Border War interchangeably, but the Bush 
War includes the conflict in Rhodesia.  Cuban and Russian researchers might also refer to it 
as the Angolan War or the first Angolan War (1975/1976) and the second Angolan War 
(1987/1988).570 The Angolan people refer to it as the second war of liberation.571 For the 
purpose of this paper it will be referred to as the Border War. This chapter will firstly research 
the USA-SA relationship with regards to Namibia as a separate issue and then the USA-SA 
relationship with regards to the conflict in Angola as a separate issue. Then the chapter will 
investigate the role that the USA played in the Border War as a whole. 
 
Illustration 4.1: Role players in the Border War.572 
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4.2. THE USA-SA RELATIONSHIP WITH REGARDS TO NAMIBIA 
4.2.1. Background 
Situated at the south western tip of Africa, Namibia (previously known as SWA) is 
surrounded by Angola and Zambia to the north, Botswana to the east, SA to the south and 
the Atlantic Ocean to the west (see map 4.1).  A country rich in natural resources which 
varies from diamonds and gems to fish and game573 Namibia is also renowned for its large 
uranium deposits and base metals such as copper, lead, zinc, tin and manganese.574 
 
 
Map 4.1: Map of Namibia.575 
By 1878 SWA was still largely unexplored by the then colonial superpowers, but within the 
space of five years both Great Britain and Germany became interested in different parts of 
the country with the British annexing  the town of Walvis Bay on behalf of the Crown 
incorporating the town into the Cape of Good Hope Colony in 1884.  Not to be outdone by its 
colonial rival, Germany through purchase from local chiefs secured the remaining part of the 
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coastal area and the rest of the hinterland in 1883 leaving the British in control of Walvis Bay 
only.576 
German occupation was brutal and brief and lasted until July 1915 when the Union of South 
Africa occupied German South West Africa at the request from Britain during the First World 
War.577  The mandate of administration and legislation was given to SA by the League of 
Nations in 1920 under the condition that SA would build up the country socially and 
economically.578  Namibia then became a virtual “province” of SA known as SWA.  With an 
internationally sanctioned obligation to govern the country, Pretoria did not hesitate to 
implement its existing racist legal structure in SWA and in 1922 Pretoria extended its pass 
laws to the inhabitants of SWA which meant that the native people were not allowed to move 
around freely without their permits.579 
4.2.2 South Africa’s Illegal Occupation of Namibia 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, SA expected the UN to allow for the annexation 
of SWA, but the requests was unequivocally rejected.580 It was this new organisation, the UN, 
which replaced its toothless predecessor, the League of Nations, which began putting 
pressure on Pretoria to transfer control of SWA to the UN in order to eventually become an 
independent country.581 South Africa, however, bluntly refused to surrender SWA and to 
grant the country independence, leaving SWA to become the last remnant of Africa’s colonial 
history.582  
On 17 November 1959, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1375 which appealed 
to all UN member states to oppose racial discrimination throughout the world.  The USA 
voted in favour of the resolution.583  On the same day the UN General Assembly also 
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adopted Resolution 1360 which sought to convince SA to place SWA under control of the 
International Trusteeship System.  The USA also voted in favour of Resolution 1360.584 
President Johnson’s first major foreign policy decision in 1964 towards SA concerned the 
SWA issue. During March of the same year, the USA National Security Council was warned 
by its agents in SA that Pretoria has the intention to apply its apartheid laws to the people of 
SWA. 585 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was due to announce in 1965 whether SA 
had breached the terms laid down by the League of Nations over the original mandate for 
SWA.  The USA expected that the ICJ was going to rule that SA had breached the terms, so 
they would have to take the necessary diplomatic measures to convince the UN not to take 
punitive steps against SA until after the ICJ ruling in 1965.  This would give the USA time to 
persuade SA to moderate its apartheid policies and if they did not want to scale down,  the 
USA would still have time to “...make contingencies for its strategic and economic interests...” 
in SA.586  As a result the USA issued NSAM 295.587 
The immediate purpose of NSAM 295 was to stop SA from imposing apartheid legislation to 
SWA before the ICJ’s decision.  Johnson was successful in his attempt to postpone the 
export of apartheid to SWA, because in April 1965 Prime Minister Verwoerd issued a white 
paper which announced that SA was going to delay the export of apartheid to SWA until after 
the decision of the ICJ.588 
The UN voted in favour of revoking SA’s mandate over SWA in 1966 after “the International 
Court of Justice dismissed the rights of Ethiopia and Liberia (two former members of the 
League of Nations) to seek a judgement on SA’s maladministration of the mandate over 
Namibia.”589 Consequently on 27 November 1966, the UN passed Resolution 2145, which 
revoked SA’s mandate over Namibia.590 The UN then placed SWA under the direct 
supervision of the UN and decided that the name of the country would henceforth be 
Namibia.591  As a result, the UN Council for Namibia was created on 19 May 1967 to act as 
the legal authority over Namibia.592 South Africa rejected Resolution 2145 and regarded it as 
unlawful.593 
On 20 March 1969, the UN Security Council announced that according to the new Resolution 
264, SA was to be regarded as occupying Namibia illegally.594  Resolution 264 further 
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demanded that SA withdraw immediately from Namibia. The UN Security Council then 
passed Resolution 2517 on 12 August 1969, which recognised the right of the people of 
Namibia to make war against SA, because SA was occupying their land illegally.  Resolution 
2517 showed that the UN perceived SA as not respecting their authority and that UN was 
ready to implement measures to remove SA from Namibia.  The UK, France, the USA and 
Finland refused to adopt Resolution 2517.595 Pretoria’s rejection of the resolutions was 
probably fuelled by the tacit support to the occupation of Namibia by Western powers such 
as the USA, UK and France.596   
Pretoria was of the opinion that they had invested too much money in Namibia and that 
Namibia was economically dependent on SA so they could not just withdraw from 
Namibia.597  According to a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, SA gained US$ 250 million 
annually from Namibian mineral, fish and agricultural exports.  SA furthermore had about 
US$ 500 million worth of private investments in Namibia.598  It was thus lucrative for SA to 
occupy Namibia for as long as possible.  
Even though the ICJ dismissed the earlier request to condemn SA’s occupation of Namibia, 
the ICJ acknowledged in June 1971 (after a request by the UN Security Council) that SA was 
indeed occupying Namibia illegally and that SA had to withdraw from Namibia 
immediately.599  The ICJ announced that SA was violating international law by occupying 
Namibia and that countries supporting SA in its occupation were also guilty of violating 
international law.600  Pretoria and her allies continued to defy international opinion.601  
Criticism against SA’s occupation of Namibia did inevitably force the USA to raise its voice 
on a subject that they did not really want to discuss; the same as the apartheid topic.602 
After uprisings in Namibia during the early 1970s, SA attempted to hold an election in 
Namibia believing that a collaborator would win and then rule Namibia on behalf of SA.603  
The South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) however boycotted the elections.  
SWAPO’s aim was to liberate Namibia from the oppressive South Africans.604 SWAPO saw 
itself as an organisation that could fight against the exploitative South African government.605 
With a host of countries having just recently achieved independence during this period 
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SWAPO was recognised by the UN and other international agencies as a legitimate 
liberation movement that could possibly bring freedom to the people of Namibia.606   
South Africa then decided that Namibia should be steered towards “independence” and 
subsequently held the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in Windhoek on 1 September 
1975.607 The objective of this conference was to develop a constitution for an independent 
Namibia.608  By 18 March 1977, a constitution was finalised and submitted.609 This 
constitution “called for a governmental structure based upon the existing Bantustans.”610 The 
USA and other Western powers did not approve of the new constitution and SA once again 
took direct control of Namibia. 
In the years which followed SA built a close relationship with Namibia and thought of the 
country as its fifth province.611  When SWAPO commenced hostile activities from bases in 
Southern Angola, Pretoria did not falter to deploy its security forces in Namibia for the 
protection of the country against insurgents.  According to Malan the leaders of the Ovambo 
people requested assistance from SA against the terrorists attacking them.612  Pretoria felt 
obliged to protect the people of Namibia from the “terrorists” because of the mandate given 
to SA by the League of Nations which dictated that SA was responsible to ensure that 
elements such as SWAPO did not use violence to overthrow the government of Namibia.613 
Pretoria however neglected the fact that the UN declared SA’s occupation of Namibia as 
illegal.   Pretoria argued that if SWAPO was to come to power in Namibia the country would 
fall under the influence of a Marxist-Leninist regime which would be a threat to the West.614  
The USA shared this sentiment with SA.615   
The US government was of the opinion that the USSR and her allies were eagerly waiting to 
get a foothold in Southern Africa.  The USA believed that they had to compete with the 
Soviets for Southern Africa.616  Southern Africa with the exception of SA was not significant 
to the USA until 1975.617 The USA was aware that SA had the intention of fighting the 
communists on their own in Southern Africa, because SA was isolated from the West during 
the 60s and early 70s as a result of its apartheid laws.  It remains an open question whether 
or not SA would have been able to fight off the communist threat on its own. An argument for 
the positive can be made on the grounds of SA’s intense investment hugely in arms 
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manufacturing and even nuclear research.  With its capable arsenal and manpower, SA was 
the perfect ally to stop the red tide of communism in Southern Africa.618  The USA now found 
itself in an unenviable position where it supported SA while still publically campaigning for an 
independent Namibia.  
By 1977, the USA had seemingly taken the lead in the diplomatic advocacy of Namibia’s 
independence under the leadership of President Carter.619  The USA was considered as the 
leader of the five Western members on the UN Security Council who called themselves the 
Contact Group “for the specific purpose of negotiating Namibia’s independence with Pretoria 
and the Front Line States (FLS).”620  The Contact Group consisted of the USA, the UK, 
France, West Germany and Canada.621  By February 1978 the Contact Group had its 
proposals ready. Both Pretoria and SWAPO agreed that national elections, supervised by the 
UN, could be held in Namibia.  But when the time came, SA refused a UN Transitional 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) “to enforce the UN’s authority.”622  Instead, Pretoria “prepared 
the way for a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by sponsoring an election for a 
‘National Assembly’ with wide legislative powers.”623 
On 25 April 1978 Pretoria “formally accepted the West’s Proposals for a SWA/Namibian 
settlement.”624  These proposals were to be known as UN Security Council Resolution 435.  
It was endorsed in the UN by September 1978 and is described by Crocker as “an 
impressive and ambitious piece of diplomatic work.”625  The aim of Resolution 435 was to 
change SWAPO’s war for independence to an act of bloodless self-determination that would 
eventually lead to the independence of Namibia.  Resolution 435 entailed that SA would 
systematically give up its administrative control over Namibia whilst being monitored by the 
UNTAG which consisted of civilian and military personnel.626  The Contact Group wanted to 
achieve the following objectives with Resolution 435 and UNTAG: 
to create acceptable conditions for an electoral campaign and organise and supervise ‘free 
and fair’ elections; assure the repeal of discriminatory laws and the release of political 
prisoners (on either side); arrange the return of war refugees; monitor the Namibia-Angola 
border against infiltration; monitor the conduct of the local police, the confinement to base and 
scheduled departure of South African forces from Namibia, and the demobilisation of local, 
South African-controlled territorial forces; and monitor and maintain a cessation of hostilities 
between the various forces.627 
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Policy makers in the USA and in Moscow were cynical that Resolution 435 would succeed in 
resolving the Namibian dispute628 since Pretoria declined to implement the Resolution and 
they also did not want to allow the UNTAG on Namibian soil for the following reasons.629  
Firstly, Resolution 435 only accommodated for the settlement of the Namibian crisis and did 
not take into consideration that Angola was also a problematic area for Pretoria.  Secondly 
Pretoria did not want to lose the natural resources of Namibia.  Thirdly, Namibia served as a 
buffer zone from the perceived communist threat in Angola.  Fourthly, if SA would agree to 
Resolution 435, it would mean that SA acknowledged to wrongfully occupying Namibia and 
lose political face.  Fifthly Pretoria was concerned that SWAPO would use its support from 
the UN, the USSR, Cuba and the MPLA to force its way into power.  Sixth, Pretoria possibly 
felt that they could not abandon their ally, UNITA.  Lastly, if the South Africans were to 
withdraw from Namibia; they would lose valuable military bases that were utilised to project 
SA’s military force to neighbouring states.630 
4.2.3 Namibia: The Protracted Road to Independence631 
In order to win the hearts and minds of the native Namibians the National Assembly issued 
the Abolition of Racial Discrimination Act of 1979 which entailed that racial segregation 
should be ended at Namibian public facilities.   The white population of Namibia did not take 
kindly to this act and the Administrator General of the time, Marthinus Steyn632 was replaced 
by Gerrit Viljoen who was much better at slowing down the pace of political reform in 
Namibia.633 
In June 1985 SA established the Transitional Government of National Unity whose objective 
was to organise “a Constitutional Council that would devise a constitution bringing full 
independence for Namibia within two years.”634  After 23 years of fighting between SWAPO 
and South African forces, peace eventually came to Namibia. The USA served as a 
middleman to broker the peace between the belligerent parties and their supporters. In 
November 1989 after eight months of arduous negotiations all parties agreed to the holding 
of elections in Namibia. The entire political manoeuvring taking place from the 1960s 
onwards did so against the backdrop of the Angolan civil war and the Namibian war for 
independence. If one was to follow Clausewitz’s argument that warfare is a continuation of 
politics, then the link between Namibian independence and the Angolan civil war will become 
transparent.  
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Map 4.2:  Map of Angola635 
4.3 THE USA-SA RELATIONSHIP WITH REGARDS TO ANGOLA 
4.3.1 Background 
Since the early 1960s when Angola was still under the colonial rule of Portugal, regular 
uprisings by the local people took place to demonstrate their discontent with the way that the 
country was run.636  The independence of several African countries in the early sixties 
spurred the people of Angola on to fight against the colonialist Portuguese regime.637 South 
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Africa’s role as military and economic powerhouse of the region made it inevitable that 
involvement in any future conflict was an almost foregone conclusion in order to ensure 
stability in the region.638  The South Africans were dragged into the Angolan conflict as a 
result of the insurgency war that they were fighting in Namibia639 since SWAPO found refuge 
in Angola leading to the SADF frequently launching cross-border raids into Angola.640    
Until 1970 Portugal did well in helping SA to halt insurgent groups from entering Namibia 
from Angola but by the early 1970s various insurgent groups began gaining ground against 
the Portuguese and already controlled several areas of Angola.  In spite of cementing their 
hold over certain areas the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) which was 
SWAPO’s military wing641 was unable to freely build training facilities in Southern Angola due 
to successful Portuguese counter insurgency warfare.642   
Then everything changed in 1974. The Lisbon coup, also known as the Carnation 
Revolution643 necessitated a whole new approach to the situation in Angola and Namibia.644  
The Portuguese government announced that Angola would become independent on 11 
November 1975 as a result of the Alvor Agreement that was “hammered” together in January 
1975.645 Accordingly elections were to be held in Angola during September 1975 with the 
winning party ruling the whole country.646  The Lisbon coup was an indication to the West 
that they were losing their grip over Southern Africa.  The USA wanted to avoid this at all 
costs and consequently welcomed any entity willing to protect Western interest in Southern 
Africa.647  The imminent exit of Portugal from the scene forced SA and the US policies into 
greater alignment regarding Southern Africa.648 
There were three groups fighting for control of Angola.649  These were the MPLA, backed by 
the communist countries, the FNLA and then UNITA with the backing of the USA, Zaire and 
SA.650   All three groups operated in different geographical areas of Angola.  Initially the 
FNLA was the strongest militarily and the MPLA was stronger in the political and 
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administrative spheres.651  The MPLA would in the end prove to be the most successful of 
the three groups.652 
With three factions fighting for power in Angola, the country was soon descended into 
chaos.653  “The three rebel movements, with no one to control them, bloodily jockeyed to 
grab control of the country when independence came.”654  The Portuguese withdrawal 
created an exploitable situation for the Soviets to win more support in Angola.655   The Cuban 
and Soviet interest in Angola created a whole new dimension to the situation with their 
support of MPLA, SWAPO and the ANC.656  Likewise the instability in Angola created 
opportunities for the USA to further its own interests in Africa.  South Africa and the West 
would not allow what they depicted as a communist takeover of Angola without a fight.657  
When considering the above, it should not be surprising that by mid-1975 Angola was 
engulfed in a fully-fledged civil war. 
4.3.2 Role Players 
4.3.2.1 UNITA 
At the head of UNITA was Dr Jonas Savimbi658, a one-time member of the MPLA.659  He then 
joined the FNLA, but in 1964 Savimbi and the leader of the FNLA, Holden Roberto, had an 
argument which led to Savimbi founding UNITA.  UNITA drew the majority of its support from 
the Ovimbundu tribe in Southern Angola. The Ovimbundus were related to the Ovambo’s 
from Namibia.660 Before Angola’s independence from Portugal, UNITA worked in 
collaboration with SWAPO.  UNITA allowed SWAPO to use their territory in Angola to transit 
refugees, supplies and guerrillas between Zambia and Namibia.  The UNITA-SWAPO 
alliance ended after Angola’s independence because SWAPO started leaning more towards 
supporting the MPLA.661 Savimbi claimed that UNITA was going to be an anti-imperialist and 
nationalist movement.662 However, Savimbi reached the conclusion that ruling Angola could 
only be achieved with the assistance from Pretoria and Washington but he maintained that 
the main principle of UNITA’s struggle should be self-reliance.663  SA and the USA did not 
hesitate to support Savimbi in his endeavours, because a UNITA victory would stop the 
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communist expansion in Angola and a collaborator would be in power.  Pretoria also 
reckoned that if UNITA was in power in Angola, then SWAPO would no longer be able to 
utilise southern Angola as springboard for operations into Namibia.664 
4.3.2.2 MPLA 
The MPLA was founded in 1956 when two Angolan liberation movements namely the Party 
for the United Struggle of Angolan Africans and the Angolan Communist Party 
amalgamated.665 The MPLA managed to gain the trust of the intellectuals, as well as the trust 
of the underprivileged people of Angola.666  The MPLA started its armed struggle in February 
1961 under the leadership of Dr Agostinho Neto, an intellectual and a supporter of 
communism.  SWAPO turned to the MPLA for protection and the MPLA readily became 
SWAPO’s main African benefactor.  This eventually made the MPLA a target for the 
SADF.667   
4.3.2.3 FNLA 
During March 1962 the Union of Angolan People combined efforts with the Peoples 
Democratic Party to form the FNLA.  The FNLA operated in the northern and eastern parts of 
Angola under the leadership of Holden Roberto who was the brother in law of Pres Mobuto 
Sese Seko668 from Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo today).  The FNLA differed 
from the MPLA in the sense that they were anti-communist as well as anti-Portuguese.669  
The FNLA received a great deal of support from Zaire for obvious reasons.  The FNLA was 
supported by Zaire, the Peoples Republic of China and a number of Arab states.670 Around 
1961 Roberto became permanently involved with the CIA.671 By the end of 1973, when it 
became clear that the Portuguese were not going to be able to occupy Angola for much 
longer, the CIA funded a recruitment campaign for the FNLA in Kinshasa.672  The CIA wanted 
to ensure that the FNLA would be able to take power once the opportunity came.673  At that 
time the SADF was also involved with the training and arming of the FNLA.674 
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4.3.2.4 Cuba and the USSR 
Cuba’s relationship with the MPLA was formed ten years earlier when Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara travelled to Congo-Brazzaville to meet with African guerrilla leaders.  Agostinho 
Neto was one of the leaders that met with Guevara.675 By late September 1975 the first 
Cuban soldiers arrived in Angola to serve as advisors to the MPLA in order to control the 
country after independence and also to fight side by side with the MPLA.676  The Cuban 
mission in Angola was codenamed Operation Carlota.677  Scholars like Stiff argue that the 
Cubans were used as surrogates or proxies for the USSR, but Fidel Castro denies it. Shubin 
and Gleijeses through their research proved that the Cubans were in fact not a surrogate 
force of the USSR678  and that it was instead the Cuban values of internationalism and anti-
imperialism which motivated Cuba to intervene in Angola.679 Gabriel Garcia Marquez from 
Columbia interviewed many Cuban leaders after the war and confirmed that the Cuban 
decision to intervene in Angola was made by Cuba.  The USSR was only informed about the 
decision after Fidel Castro already made it.680  It can also be argued that Cuba brought the 
USSR into the Angolan conflict, because if the Cubans did not intervene in Angola, then 
maybe the USSR would not have gotten so heavily involved in the Angolan conflict.681  
Piero Gleijeses describes Cuba’s role in international politics during the Cold War as unique.  
Cuba was the only developing country that intervened in conflict far away from its immediate 
area.  The only other country that sent more troops to fight in foreign wars far away from 
home was the USA.  Cuba thus even projected more troops than the USSR during the Cold 
War.  Castro’s decision to send 36 000 Cuban troops to Angola from November 1975 – April 
1976 signalled to Washington that Cuba was determined to move into Africa.682  Castro did 
not only send military personnel to Angola. By the end of 1976 more than 1000 Cuban aid 
workers were also present in Angola.  The Cubans constantly emphasised that they were in 
Angola to fight of foreign attacks against Angola.683  They had no interest in the Angolan civil 
war.  The majority of the Cuban force was deployed in central Angola to protect the region 
against a South African invasion.684  The Cuban soldiers had their first skirmish in Angola in 
the last week of October 1975 at Quifangondo685 
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The MPLA’s communist links “coupled with overt and covert support from the USSR and its 
allies, set the stage for the first major superpower confrontation in Sub-Saharan Africa.”686 It 
was very convenient for the USA and SA to portray the MPLA as an outright communist 
organisation, because it could justify a war against them if viewed through the Cold War lens. 
But Shubin and Tokarev are of the opinion that the MPLA was not an outright Marxist 
organisation.  They argue that the MPLA rather tried to have relationships with the West and 
the East, so their policies could not be outright Marxist if they wanted the support of the 
West.687  Blanch and Liebenberg confirms that the MPLA was “...undecided at the time on its 
stance on either capitalism or socialism but hoping for a national independent state...”688 
The arrival of the Cuban troops was the perfect excuse for SA and the USA to increase their 
support to the newly allied FNLA-UNITA coalition in order to counter the so called communist 
invasion. Pretoria and the American media were grossly exaggerating the role that the 
Cubans and Russians were playing in Angola in order to convince the American public that 
US intervention was needed in Angola.689  Between 1975 and 1991 more than 425 000 
Cuban citizens volunteered to participate in the war in Angola as soldiers and as civilian 
volunteers690 with 2700 of them becoming casualties during the conflict.691     
The first group of 40 Soviet military specialists and advisors arrived in Angola during 
November 1975 to support the MPLA.692  By January 1991, 10 985 Soviet military advisors 
and specialists visited Angola. In addition to the manpower, the USSR provided military 
supplies to the value of 3.7 billion Rubles to Angola during the entire war.  Almost 7 000 
Angolans received training at Russian military educational institutions during the war.693  By 
the end of the war in Angola, more than 30 000 Soviet military personnel partook directly and 
indirectly in the war.694 
The fact that the USSR was providing the MPLA with weapons further strengthened USA-SA 
willingness to get involved in Angola. During September 1975 Fidel Castro announced in a 
speech that the USSR had recently provided the MPLA with the following weapons and 
equipment: 
• “26 armoured vehicles; 
• 32 GRAD-1PS – the granizos (mobile multiple-rocket launchers); 
• 12 76-mm cannons; 
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• 3 216 RPG-7 bazookas; 
• 39 82-mm mortars; 
• 4 antiaircraft batteries with 23-mm cannons; 
• 44 ZCU antiaircraft guns; 
• 298 machine guns; 
• 2 899 AKM rifles; 
• 84 radio transmitters; and 
• 10 000 uniforms, both military and civilian.”695 
South Africa and the USA’s support for UNITA and the Soviet/Cuban support to the MPLA 
and SWAPO changed both the Angolan and Namibian conflicts. Resultantly the Angolan civil 
war became part of the regional Border War.696 
4.4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BORDER WAR AND THE USA’S INVOLVEMENT 
4.4.1 Opening Salvo’s 
In September 1965 the first SWAPO insurgents entered Northern Namibia via the border with 
Angola.  It was a small group of six people.  Their mission was to recruit more members and 
provide them with basic military training.  In February and July of 1966 two more groups 
crossed the border into Namibia.  PLAN’s first military attack was in February 1966 when “a 
gang attacked two Portuguese trading stores in southern Angola, killing two Portuguese 
citizens and three of their  Owambo employees.”697 The first contact between SWAPO and 
the South African security forces took place in August 1966 at Ongulumbashe in 
Owamboland.698 The SAP supported by the SAAF tracked and located a large number of 
SWAPO guerrillas, killing two and capturing nine.  More SWAPO members were arrested 
after the contact as a result of intelligence gathered by the South Africans from locals who 
were sympathetic to SA.699  PLAN gained confidence and soon numerous attacks on 
Owambo’s, South Africans and Portuguese alike became part of everyday life in Northern 
Namibia and Southern Angola.700  
From early 1967 SWAPO decided to focus their attacks on the Caprivi strip (see map 4.1), 
because it was easier to mount attacks on this area from their Zambian bases.  Numerous 
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incidents of armed attacks by PLAN continued in Owamboland and the Caprivi.701 Pretoria 
responded to these attacks by cautioning the liberation movements that SA will take any 
measures necessary to protect Namibia and that the government had the capabilities to do 
so.  The confrontation with the SA security forces slowly escalated until the early 1970s when 
Pretoria decided that the SADF should take over the border security from the SAP.702 
Pretoria was cautious to deploy military forces to the border before 1971, but when the ICJ 
announced that SA was unlawfully occupying Namibia, the South African approach changed.  
Before 1971, SA only deployed the police to suppress riots close to the border areas.  
Pretoria was determined to fight a war inside Namibia to keep the country and its resources 
in SA’s hands.703  In order to achieve this aim the SADF had to replace the police. 
The early 1970s was characterised by low-intensity insurgency into Namibia, but things 
changed when the Portuguese withdrew from neighbouring Angola in 1974 and a civil war for 
the rule of Angola broke out between the three liberation movements.704 South Africa’s 
response to Lisbon’s withdrawal from Africa was to embark on a policy of détente with 
sympathetic African countries like Ivory Coast, Senegal and Zambia.705 Pretoria improved 
relations with these African countries by providing them with aid and “launching a flurry of 
diplomatic activity...”706  SA reckoned that peaceful coexistence with its black neighbours 
would be possible if each state respected the internal system of their neighbours.  This 
meant that if SA’s neighbours would turn a blind eye to its apartheid system then they would 
not have problems with each other.707   
4.4.2 An Escalation in the Fighting 
Initially UNITA and the FNLA achieved dominance over the MPLA and its military wing 
(FAPLA). This changed when the Cuban government began sending troops/military 
equipment and the USSR sent large stockpiles of weapons in support of FAPLA to Angola.708 
Even though the USSR sent equipment to Angola, their soldiers were not heavily involved in 
the actual fighting in Angola. The Soviet soldiers in Angola were applied as advisors or 
interpreters.  Initially Soviet aid to the MPLA remained limited, because the USSR did not 
entirely trust Neto and the Soviets “did not want to jeopardise the strategic arms control 
negotiations with the United States.”709 There were never any regular Soviet military units in 
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Angola, except for a logistical unit that was placed in Angola to support some naval elements 
of the USSR.710 
Once SA realised that the tide was turning in Angola, Pretoria decided to intervene in the 
conflict on the side of UNITA/FNLA.711 Initially the SADF used Angolans that were trained 
and equipped by the SADF, but later on groups of regular SADF soldiers became involved in 
the actual fighting.712  The SAAF also played an important role in providing air support to the 
Angolan and SA troops on the ground.713   
The SADF launched operation Savannah714 in 1975 “which involved sending small numbers 
of troops into Angola – at the instigation, so it is said, of Dr Henry Kissinger himself.”715  The 
USA disputed that they ever told Pretoria to invade Angola.716 The SADF’s main argument 
for launching Operation Savannah was to protect the Calueque hydro-electrical scheme 
situated at Ruacana717 from occupation by their opponents.718  Liebenberg has a valid point 
when he argues that the protection of the Calueque dam was not a good cover story to 
validate the SADF’s actions in Angola. He bases his argument on the fact that by the end of 
Operation Savannah, the SADF forces were hundreds of kilometres north of the dam that 
they were supposed to protect. (See map 4.2)719  The South African thought that they were 
going to fight side by side with UNITA, but the standard of the UNITA forces was so low that 
the South African had to fight most of the battles by themselves.720 
The CIA tried to keep its support to anti-communist Angolan forces as covert as possible.721  
The USA sent weapons and advisors to Angola.722  One technique the CIA used to hide their 
support for the anti-communist forces in Angola was to provide them with obsolete Second 
World War weapons that could be found in numerous countries from all over the world.  So 
the weapons could not be directly traced back to the USA.723  The USA government received 
plenty of international criticism when it came to light that they were supplying UNITA with 
weapons.724  One of the most important contributions from the USA to UNITA was the 
Stinger Missiles that could be used against enemy planes.725  Major General (Ret) Tienie 
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Groenewald (Head of South African Military Intelligence, 1984-1986) confirmed that the CIA 
helped to secure Stinger missiles to be used by the SADF and UNITA in Angola.726   
The USA then found itself in a predicament, because they could not align themselves with 
apartheid SA as it would damage their international status, but they also did not want to allow 
the communist to get a foothold in Southern Africa.727  Kissinger proposed to President Ford 
that the USA should adopt a policy of covert intervention in Angola.728  Kissinger’s plan for 
Angola had the following limited objectives: 
• The USA should prevent the MPLA, the USSR and Cuba from achieving a quick 
military takeover in Angola; 
• The USA should help the FNLA and UNITA to dominate the MPLA politically.729 
According to El-Khawas and Cohen, the USA started covert military operations in Angola 
from January 1975.730  As the war progressed and the USA realised that the FNLA won’t be 
able to overthrow the MPLA on its own, so they also provided UNITA with military weapons, 
training and funds.731   
During mid-1975 President Kaunda of Zambia used a state visit to the USA to urge the 
American government to provide UNITA with covert support to fight the MPLA.  By the end of 
July 1975 USA support in the form of weapons and supplies were given to UNITA under the 
supervision of the CIA. Officials inside the Ford administration warned the CIA and Kissinger 
that the USA should not align itself with the SA foreign policy by supplying UNITA with 
weapons.  Their argument was that a diplomatic solution to the Angolan problem would fit the 
American political image better.732 The American Ambassador to SA of the time, William 
Bowder, denied that the USA was participating in the Border War.733  A telegram from the SA 
embassy in Washington informed the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs that John 
Stockwell, the man who  commanded the CIA’s Angola task force734 in 1975 was going to 
reveal to the American media that the: 
• “CIA had advisers and trainers in Angola in violation of orders of operations advisory 
group; 
• CIA offered bounties  for stolen aircraft, then used them to fly arms to Angola; 
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• CIA recruited and delivered mercenaries to Angola; 
• CIA and US government encouraged South Africa to intervene in Angola and had 
close contact with SA...”735 
During the Ford administration the USA was initially in support of Holden Roberto of the 
FNLA.736  The USA even supported the FNLA in their war against the Portuguese and they 
intended to install Roberto as the leader of an independent Angola.737  From late 1974 
through to mid-1975 the USA support to the FNLA escalated.  In January 1975 the CIA 
covertly provided the FNLA with U$ 300 000 to buy bicycles, desk and paperclips on paper 
but in reality it was used for weapons and military equipment.738  President Ford authorised 
around US$ 14 million of American expenditure to the FNLA during July 1975.739  So at first 
the Ford administration wanted to prevent the MPLA from taking over Angola.740 Between 
July and August 1975, Ford provided anti-MPLA forces with US$ 25 million in aid.741  In total 
from January 1975 to December 1975 the USA spend over US$ 31 million in military 
equipment, transportation and cash payments in Angola.742  It was also at this time that the 
SADF invaded Angola on the side of UNITA.743 
It is important to remember that the USA was still involved with the conflict in Vietnam during 
the early 1970s.  As a result the US congress was not very eager to support Kissinger’s 
endeavour in Angola. It was not a good time for the US government to have a crisis in 
Africa.744 Alden colourfully explains that “[c]oming on the heels of the ignoble experience in 
Vietnam, Congressional doves sought to curtail American ‘adventurism’ in Africa.”745  As a 
result the US Congress passed the Clark Amendment in December 1975 which entailed that 
the USA was no longer allowed to support the SA-UNITA war effort in Angola.746  The Bill did 
not ban the USA from military involvement entirely, but Ford would need permission from the 
Congress before doing anything in Angola.747  This decision greatly affected the relationship 
between SA and the USA.   After hearing about the Clark Amendment, P.W. Botha 
commented that: “If the West does not want to contribute its share for the sake of itself and 
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the free world, it cannot expect South Africa to do it...South Africa is not prepared to fight the 
West’s battle against Communist penetration on its own.”748 
At the same time the first Soviet advisors arrived in Angola, the Ford administration started to 
intensify its campaign against Soviet and Cuban intervention in Southern Africa.  The USA 
Congress was asked to make more money available to the CIA to fund covert operations in 
Angola.  But the American Senate did not want to provide extra funds to the CIA for 
operations in Angola because they were wary after the Vietnam debacle.749  Kissinger 
argued that it was extremely important for the USA to maintain operations in Angola, 
because the Soviets and Cubans were increasing their involvement continuously in Angola.  
He argued that SA was going to fall to Soviet expansionism if the USA did not intervene 
aggressively in Angola. Kissinger’s argument was not accepted and on 27 January 1976 the 
USA House of Representatives voted 323 to 99 that American covert military aid to Angola 
should be stopped.750  
Even though military aid to Angola was banned, Ford felt that he could not allow the Cubans 
and Soviets to take control over Southern Africa.  Ford then ordered Kissinger to look at the 
new situation in Southern Africa and to create a new policy for USA-SA relations which took 
the build-up of Cuban forces in Angola into consideration.  While Kissinger was busy 
formulating a new policy, Ford continuously warned the Soviets and Cubans that they should 
withdraw from Southern Africa if they do not want war with the USA.751 Kissinger’s plan with 
the new policy was to convince Cuba to withdraw its troops from Angola, whilst at the same 
time finding solutions for peaceful transfer of power in Namibia and Rhodesia.  According to 
El-Khawas and Cohen, “[t]he main purpose of the new Ford-Kissinger policy is to find 
solutions to Southern Africa’s chronic racial and colonial problems that can be broadly 
satisfactory to African leaders but that also guarantee continued white rule in South Africa.”  
In order to force Cuba to withdraw from Angola, Kissinger said that the USA would only 
recognise Angola as a diplomatic entity once all Cuban troops withdrew from Angola.  He 
further insisted that the USA would not allow Angola to become part of the UN whilst there 
were still Cuban troops present in Angola.752  
Events were taking place in the USA from December 1975 to January 1976 which had far 
reaching effects on the war in Angola.  President Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate 
scandal caused the American public and some officials to distrust the new US government 
under the leadership of Gerald Ford.  As a consequence, support to anti-communist 
countries in Africa was reduced.753  South African Defence Minister P.W. Botha expressed 
his disgrace with the USA abandonment with the following words:   
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[W]e [intervened in Angola] with the approval and knowledge of the Americans.  But they left 
us in the lurch.  We are going to retell that story:  The story must be told of how we, with their 
knowledge, went in there and  operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged 
us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch by 
an undertaking that was broken...754 
In response, US officials publicly questioned why Botha expected the USA to help him with a 
war in Angola if the US government had been implementing arms embargoes against SA for 
more than a decade.  The officials further denied their involvement in Angola by saying that 
the USA made it clear to Pretoria that they did not want a military relationship with Pretoria 
as long as SA was continuing to implement its apartheid policies.755 The USA denied its 
involvement in Angola until after the war in Angola was finished.756 
During a meeting on the 30th of December 1975 at the holiday home of South African 
Premier, John Vorster a number of senior South African officials came to the conclusion that 
SA should withdraw from Angola as soon as possible.  The decision was based on the fact 
that SA was being severely criticised by the international media and especially the American 
media for its presence in Angola.  General Constand Viljoen personally flew to the residence 
of Savimbi to inform him that SA was finished with the war in Angola and that they were 
going to withdraw as soon as possible.  When the US security advisor to the president heard 
of the decision to withdraw from Angola, he pleaded with the South Africans to stay in Angola 
at least until the next meeting of the OAU. His argument was that the withdrawal of SA forces 
from Angola would allow the communist to take over Southern Angola.757 
SA felt that the USA could no longer be trusted and the increasing movements for sanctions 
against SA did not help much to better the relationship either.758  President Ford was livid 
when he heard off the Congress’ decision to withdraw support to the Angolans after the 
implementation of the Clark Amendment.759  The President wanted to know from the 
Congress how they could allow the communist to operate freely whilst the local people were 
willing to fight communist expansion.760   
Some South African scholars and soldiers like Malan, Breytenbach and Venter are of the 
opinion that the USA stabbed SA in the back during Operation Savannah because the USA 
encouraged SA to get in involved in Angola to stop the spread of communism in Southern 
Africa.761 The South Africans argue that as a result of the withdrawal of USA military and 
diplomatic aid Operation Savannah resulted in a strategic failure.  The Americans on the 
other hand argue that the US aid to the operation was in any case not to going to be much.  
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The USA rather decided to give equipment to Roberto’s troops. Roberto’s advance to 
Luanda ended in chaos when a combination of Cuban and FAPLA forces destroyed them.762  
Stockwell is of the opinion that there were no formal documents signed between Pretoria and 
the USA to prove that the USA encouraged SA to enter Angola.763  Everything was probably 
done covertly via the CIA.764 
The SADF was able to push the MPLA/Cuban forces back to Luanda during Operation 
Savannah.765  It is arguable that the SADF could have seized Luanda if it was not for 
Castro’s decision to send troops to save the MPLA.766  Even though the SADF were able to 
push back their communist enemies, the SADF withdrew its forces from Angola in March 
1976, because of the international condemnation on SA’s participation in Angola.767 So even 
though Operation Savannah was a perceived military success, it was still a political failure as 
a result of the international outcry against SA’s fighting in Angola.  Western media provided 
credible evidence that the USA and SA were working together in Angola, but the USA 
government denied it and rather condemned SA’s interference in Angola.768 
The summit conference of the OAU from 10-13 January 1976 under the leadership of 
Ugandan President Idi Amin concluded that the MPLA would be recognised as the legitimate 
leader of Angola.  A month later the MPLA government of Angola was accepted as a 
member of the OAU.  After the OAU summit, the SA cabinet made their final decision to 
withdraw from Angola except from the Calueque area on the Southern border of Angola.  
They informed the USA of their decision.769  According to Malan the South Africans felt that 
they should respect the decision of the OAU, but that the USA had abandoned SA and her 
allies in a time of need.  Minister Botha felt that the USA motivated SA to act in Angola, but 
when the bullets started to fly the Americans left SA with the mess and withdrew.770  Feeling 
betrayed by the USA and suffering constant chastisement by the international community the 
SADF withdrew from Angola for the time being.771 
During a visit to Lusaka on 26 April 1976 Kissinger outlined his new US policy towards 
Southern Africa. With regards to the situation in Namibia he said the USA would continue to 
call upon SA to give the people of Namibia self-determination.  He indicated that the USA 
would relax restrictions on trade and investment on Namibia once SA decides that Namibia 
can get independence. The USA would also help Namibia financially to become a diplomatic 
entity.772 
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Explaining how the new US policy would influence the USA-SA relationship Kissinger had 
the following to say: 
A peaceful end to institutionalised inequality is in the interest of all South Africans.  The 
United States will continue to encourage and work for peaceful change.  Our policy toward 
South Africa is based upon the premise that within a reasonable time we shall see a clear 
evolution towards equality of opportunity and basic human rights for all South Africans. The 
United States will exercise all its efforts in that direction.773  
From this point onward the South African security forces mostly operated from Namibia 
against SWAPO or in support of UNITA. There were cross-border raids into Angola, but no 
major military operations. According to Malan, when SA operated in Angola, they tried their 
best to avoid fighting with Cuban, Soviet or Angolan soldiers where possible.774 
By early 1976 PLAN had a large number of permanent bases and training camps in the 
Southern parts of Angola.  This was very worrying to SA.  Pretoria was concerned that if 
SWAPO would achieve dominance in Southern Angola it might motivate other African 
countries to support them.  The real concern was that the ANC could see a SWAPO victory 
as motivation to infiltrate SA and overthrow the government.775  The ANC’s partnership with 
the SACP gave the ANC a reputation of being a communist terrorist organisation in SA by 
the USA.776 But in fact the ANC was an umbrella organisation with members from a variety of 
different ideologies, not just communists.  Members from the ANC’s military wing, MK were 
sent to the USSR, other Eastern bloc countries and even in Western countries (UK, West 
Germany, the USA, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries) for training in politics, 
administration and revolutionary studies.  They were also taught how to run an underground 
organisation and how to form an intelligence service.  The ANC had training camps in the 
rest of Africa (e.g. Lusaka and Dar es Salaam) where they received basic military training 
from Soviet and Eastern Bloc instructors.777   
When Jimmy Carter took over the American presidency in January 1977 he announced that 
one of his first objectives was to negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. After 
the MPLA/Cuban victory over the FNLA/UNITA/SA/USA alliance one would expect that 
Carter would have joined the rest of the world in accepting the MPLA as the legitimate 
Angolan ruler, but he did not.778  The Cubans refused to withdraw all their troops since they 
were already slowly withdrawing forces from Angola as from mid-1976.  By March 1977 
almost 12 000 Cuban troops have already been withdrawn back to Cuba.779  In March 1977 
the Katangans invaded southern Zaire.  Mobutu called on the West to help and Moroccan 
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troops (urged by the USA and France) forced the Katangans to retreat into Angola.  This 
incident caused Castro to stop withdrawing troops from Angola, because he saw a new 
threat in the region.780  Castro regarded Angola as the pillar in the struggle against white 
racist rule, so he refused to give up on Angola. The Cuban presence in Angola remained 
Carter’s biggest headache. 781 
During mid-1977 the MPLA claimed that the SADF was acting against the MPLA under the 
auspices of being UNITA forces.782  The SADF was in fact carrying out cross-border raids 
against SWAPO and in support of UNITA since early 1976.  UNITA did however declare that 
they were fighting against SWAPO in Angola.783  By May 1978 the SADF concluded that the 
only way to exterminate SWAPO was to hit its bases deep in Angola.  Pretoria was wary to 
venture into Angola again after Operation Savannah, but proceeded with the execution of 
Operation Reindeer.784    
A number of SWAPO bases in Angola were destroyed and hundreds of SWAPO fighters 
were killed within days.  Probably the most well-known attack of this operation was the 
airborne attack on the SWAPO refugee camp at Cassinga (about 250 km north of the 
Namibian border) in May 1978.785 At least 300 children were killed during the attack on 
Cassinga.786 The attack on Cassinga indicated that SA was determined to maintain power 
over Namibia.787  The USA protested788 after the raid but P.W. Botha responded that “South 
Africa would not be intimidated and would strike again if its security was threatened.”789 The 
USA felt that SA was not really looking for a solution to the security problem. Operation 
Reindeer signalled that the SADF was going to rely on cross-border raids in Angola to hurt 
SWAPO. 
The CIA’s clandestine actions in Angola during this period could not be concealed 
indefinitely. Infighting within the CIA produced whistle-blowers that provided the media with 
information on CIA activities in Angola.  One such an example appeared in the Washington 
Post in May 1978 when it was reported that: 
White House strategists for at least two months have attempted to funnel sophisticated arms 
and funds clandestinely to African guerrilla forces fighting Soviet-backed Cuban troops in 
Angola.790 
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Illustration 4.2: Bodies of women and children at Cassinga791 
Pretoria emphasised that they were not fighting a war against Angola, but a war against the 
insurgents who based themselves in Angola.792  The SADF vowed to attack rebel bases; 
HQ’s and supply routes in Angola for as long as the insurgents pose a threat to SA or 
Namibia.793  Pretoria justified the renewed attacks in Angola on the basis that SWAPO 
rejected the settlement proposals that were laid on the table.  Pretoria also reckoned that the 
UN won’t go further than to implement an arms embargo against SA as punishment and 
since such an embargo was already in effect, Pretoria could not really be bothered.794 The 
USA also did not make any effort to stop South African attacks in Angola.795  Renewed 
attacks by the SADF in Angola caused Castro to reverse his Cuban withdrawal.  Instead 
more Cuban reinforcements were sent to Angola to protect the MPLA and SWAPO from the 
SADF/UNITA forces.796 
In 1978 SA agreed to the implementation of Resolution 435 which entailed granting Namibia 
its independence but “it had found a number of pretexts to avoid living up to its pledge.”797  
The world condemned SA for its refusal to accept the Resolution but its ally the USA (under 
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the leadership of President Reagan) had a plan to ease SA’s isolation – the principle of 
Linkage.798  Linkage refers to the idea that it would be impossible to determine separate 
ways for peace in either Angola or Namibia.799  Instead a parallel solution was to be 
determined, which basically entailed that SA should withdraw from Namibia while Cuba at 
the same time withdraws from Angola.800  The USA’s allies in the Contact Group were not 
sure that the linkage concept was going to work.801  They based their uncertainty on the fact 
that Namibia’s independence was supported and in a way forced by a decision from the ICJ 
whereas the Cuban withdrawal would have to be voluntary.802 Washington’s principle of 
Linkage shows that the USA “viewed Africa as a theatre for East-West conflict rather than as 
a continent with its own dynamics.”803 
By 1981 the Border War was centred on Angola and it became impossible to untangle “the 
Angolan civil war from the SWAPO-SADF conflict and the cross-border SADF-FAPLA 
clashes they spawned.”804 Cuba maintained that they would stay in Angola as long as there 
were external military threats to the country.  Castro was however willing to withdraw his 
troops from Angola if two conditions were met: 
• Firstly Namibia should get independence as it was stipulated in UN Resolution 435.  
Castro argued that as long as SA occupies Namibia, SWAPO would seek refuge in Angola 
and the attacks on Angolan soil would continue. 
• Secondly, SA should stop its support to UNITA.  Castro argued that the Cubans were 
in Angola to protect the country from external threats.  If SA were to stop its aid to UNITA 
then Cuba would also withdraw. FAPLA’s war against UNITA would then be an internal 
conflict in which Cuba had no interest.805 
When President Reagan was elected President in 1981 his administration had to choose one 
of the following 3 options with regards to how they were going to handle the Namibian 
situation: 
• They could carry on with the diplomatic game of buying  time and to keep their allied 
and African partners happy (an option that have been tried but failed ); or 
• They could join SA in full support of UNITA’s military effort against the MPLA and 
“offer at least tacit support to Pretoria’s ‘internal option’ in Namibia”( this option would portray 
the USA as pro-South Africa and would not reflect good on the USA’s political image) ; or 
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• They could “restructure fundamentally the negotiation to incorporate the Angolan 
factor and strengthen Resolution 435, and thereby acquire new leverage while also 
accommodating necessity.”806 
The Reagan administration chose the third option as the other two options either already 
failed or was not feasible.  According to Crocker the USA had to avoid a communist party 
from taking control of Namibia whilst maintaining opposition against the Marxist-Leninist 
MPLA regime in Angola.  Therefore the USA needed to work towards “a strategy that could 
make both Namibia and Angola free.”807  What remained the most important for the USA was 
to curb Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Southern Africa.   According to Johnson and Martin, 
there was a definite increase in South African aggression against Angola after Reagan was 
elected as President of the USA.808 
According to Schultz it was clear to the USA by the early 1980s that peace would not be 
possible in Namibia or Angola if the USA was not going to act as a mediator.  The Cubans 
intensified their war effort in Angola at that time by providing skilled pilots to fly the Angolan 
MIG fighter jets. This was becoming a headache for Pretoria and Washington, because if the 
Angolan/Cubans could maintain air superiority in Angola, SWAPO would be able to operate 
freely in Southern Angola.809   
It was a rather difficult task for the USA to serve as a mediator, because they lost their 
neutrality when they covertly supported UNITA in its effort against the MPLA.810  Schultz 
adequately describes America’s dilemma during the Border war when he wrote:   
The improbable cast of nations and characters presented a unique challenge, requiring the 
classic diplomacy of juggling several balls in the air at once-but these were barbed balls, 
painful to catch and to toss accurately again...Our support for Savimbi’s UNITA was under 
constant domestic political attack.  Our relations with South Africa were severely strained by 
its adherence to a racial policy wholly anathema to us.  Confronting us at every turn was the 
Soviet Union, with the ideological contest of the Cold War at a stage of growing tension.811 
The best strategy that the USA could follow to achieve peace in both Namibia and Angola 
would be to pursue parallel settlements in Namibia and Angola also known as the principle of 
Linkage.812  Crocker proposed that the USA should pursue a commitment from the Cubans to 
withdraw from Angola whilst the SADF withdraw from Namibia at the same time.  This would 
signal to all the parties involved that one settlement would not be possible without the 
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other.813  It can be argued that the USA wanted to use the Namibian settlement as hostage 
against the Angolan settlement and vice versa. 814  
Whilst South African Special Forces were still operating clandestinely in Angola during 1984, 
Pretoria invited the MPLA to have discussions about the conflict in Angola.  The South 
African leaders met with the MPLA in Lusaka during February 1984 with the USA acting as 
mediator.815 The Cubans were not informed by the MPLA that they were going to negotiate 
with SA and the USA.  Fidel Castro was not impressed that the MPLA would consider 
negotiations with the enemy without informing him.  Fidel felt that the MPLA sold out the 
Cuban soldiers who were selflessly giving their lives for the freedom of Angola and 
Namibia.816 
The meeting was thought to be successful because the parties agreed to a 7-point 
withdrawal plan of South African forces from Angola.  In return the MPLA had to assure that 
no Cuban or SWAPO forces were moving into the areas where the SADF was withdrawing 
from.  The Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) was also born during the Lusaka meetings.817  
The aim of the JMC was to monitor how SA was withdrawing from Angola in accordance with 
a predetermined timeline.  The JMC was also to monitor that the Cubans and SWAPO did 
not move into the areas that the SADF was withdrawing from.818  The Angolans signed the 
accord without consulting with either the Cubans or the Soviets.  Fidel Castro found this 
upsetting and felt as if the Angolans did not appreciate the Cuban intervention which saved 
them from failure.819 
The peace treaty of 1984 signed in Lusaka between SA and Angola lasted for almost 18 
months.  Even though SA and the MPLA tried their best to reduce the possibility of conflict 
with each other during this period, their allies (UNITA and SWAPO) found reconciliation more 
difficult.  Thus in effect neither SA nor Angola was totally disconnected from the war.820   
According to Malan, SA was committed to a withdrawal from Angola, but SWAPO did not 
keep to their promises.  Gleijeses agrees that the Lusaka accord was unsuccessful, but he 
place the blame on the fact that SA undertook to withdraw from Namibia but nothing was 
mentioned about their continuing support of UNITA.821  The Americans argued that if Namibia 
were given independence then SA would have no reason to attack Angola anymore, but the 
Cubans were suspicious.  The Cuban suspicion stemmed from the fact that SA might give up 
Namibia, but they would still want to place Savimbi in power in Angola.   So by the 16th of 
May 1984 SA withdrew itself from the JMC after trying several times to convince SWAPO to 
cooperate.  The first SADF withdrawal from Angola was unsuccessful since the JMC was 
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unable to ensure that SWAPO did not use the agreement to its own advantage.822  According 
to Alden several events led to the end of the 1984 Lusaka agreement: 
• In May 1985 group of SADF special forces (which included the famous Capt Wynand 
Du Toit) was captured in the Angolan province of Cabinda while on a mission to attack an oil 
installation which would be accredited to UNITA; 
• The USA  “forfeited its somewhat tarnished position as an ‘honest broker’ with the 
USA Senate’s repeal of the Clark Amendment, thus paving the way for a return to covert 
American support for Jonas Savimbi’s Unita forces”; 
• In September 1985 the Angolan government attacked UNITA’s bases in the south of 
Angola.823 
In 1985 the USSR convinced the Angolans to attack Mavinga824 in the south east of Angola 
which hosted a major UNITA base.  The Cuban’s refused to attack so far from their defensive 
positions because SA had air superiority in that area. So FAPLA continued on a solo 
mission. The offensive started in August 1985 and at first it progressed well.  UNITA was 
unable to stop the FAPLA forces but the situation was altered when SA intervened with air 
and artillery attacks in late September 1985.  The FAPLA offensive ended as a massive 
failure.825 Another factor that possibly helped UNITA to repel the FAPLA offensive was the 
repealing of the Clark Amendment by the USA Congress in July 1985.826 So the CIA could 
once again support UNITA with the blessing of the USA Congress. 
During 1986, the Cubans concluded that SA’s air superiority in Southern Angola needed to 
be put to an end.  This would allow FAPLA to attack UNITA without the fear of being attacked 
from the air and SWAPO would also be able to attack Northern Namibia easier.  A victory in 
Southern Angola would boost the morale and embolden the black people of Southern Africa.  
During January 1986, Savimbi was taken on an all expenses paid tour to Washington to 
meet with President Reagan.  Savimbi was given the same protocol as a visiting head of 
state.  It indicated that the USA regarded Savimbi as being the president of Angola and this 
angered FAPLA so much that they called the respect given to Savimbi an act of war. As a 
result of the meeting, the USA decided to provide UNITA with US$ 15 million worth of covert 
support which included surface to air Stinger missiles.827 
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4.4.3 Nearing the End 
By 1987, SA was not supposed to be actually involved in the fighting in Angola, because 
Pretoria claimed to be focusing on Namibia.  But according to Sithole, “Angola reported over 
75 airspace violations and over 33 ground attacks during the first six months of 1987.828 At 
that time, the SADF’s main objective was to destroy SWAPO insurgents in Namibia; what 
happened between FAPLA and UNITA was only seen as important in so far as it influenced 
SA’s operations against SWAPO or the safety of the Republic.  But SA received intelligence 
that FAPLA, together with Cuba was planning a large scale attack on the South-Eastern 
bases of UNITA.829 It is possible that this intelligence was incorrect, because Cuban sources 
show that Cuba did not participate in the offensive. It was however a FAPLA force which was 
urged on by the Soviets to attack Mavinga.830   
 South Africa deemed the South-Eastern part of Angola as very important to the safety of 
Namibia, because if FAPLA could take control of the area, UNITA would be significantly 
weakened and SWAPO would be able to use the region to launch attacks against Namibia.  
An offensive against Mavinga meant that FAPLA wanted to turn Mavinga into a base area for 
an offensive against UNITA’s Headquarters in Jamba.831  At the time, UNITA was in control 
of the South-Eastern part of Angola, so SWAPO could not infiltrate Namibia through the 
Kavango and Caprivi regions.  This meant that SWAPO could only infiltrate through Ovambo 
land, but if FAPLA was in control of Mavinga, the SADF would have to fight SWAPO there as 
well.832  South Africa was concerned that a FAPLA victory “would also increase the danger of 
Soviet sponsored and perhaps Cuban-backed instability in neighbouring countries.”833 Hence 
the SADF got the order to support UNITA in its efforts to stop the FAPLA offensive in 
Mavinga.834  In June 1987 the USA also decided to provide UNITA with another US$ 15 
million worth of covert aid in the form of Stinger missiles and anti-tank missiles.835 
In July 1987, FAPLA launched a massive offensive on UNITA in the South-Eastern part of 
Angola.  The offensive was codenamed Operation Saluting October.836 The offensive was 
mainly directed against the town of Mavinga which was held by UNITA since 1981.837  The 
SADF saw the push from FAPLA as a threat and decided to intervene.  By November 1987, 
the SADF and UNITA had pushed FAPLA back into the town of Cuito Cuanavale.838  The 
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FAPLA forces were about to be destroyed.839  On the 25th of November the UN Security 
Council called on SA to withdraw its forces from Angola.  The USA voted in favour of the 
decision at the UN where the world’s eyes were on them, but Crocker told the SA 
ambassador to the USA that “the SAG [South African Government] should take note that the 
resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions and did not provide for any 
assistance to Angola.  That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep 
the resolution within bounds.”840 
FAPLA requested for more Cuban troops to be dispatched to Angola.  Castro complied and 
sent his best pilots, planes, anti-aircraft machines and tanks to support FAPLA in Angola 
when it became apparent that FAPLA was in a corner and ready to be dealt a heavy blow by 
the SADF.841  According to Gleijeses, Castro did not just want to defend Cuito Cuanavale, he 
wanted to force the SADF out of Angola.842  According to Pabian, Castro sent another 15 000 
of his best Cuban soldiers to Angola to help in the fight against the SADF, but Mills and 
Williams wrote that it was 25 000 troops.843 
In the beginning of 1988, it seemed as if the Cubans and Angolans were going to lose the 
town of Cuito Cuanavale, because the South Africans succeeded in cutting of the vital Cuito 
River Bridge.844  Even with the destruction of the bridge, the Cubans and Angolans managed 
to keep control of the town.  The SADF launched its last major attack against Cuito 
Cuanavale on 23 March 1988 but the attack was halted by a Cuban/Angolan force.845 The 
issue of whether the SADF intended to take control of Cuito Cuanavale is still a controversial 
topic in military and political debates.  Many ex-members of the SADF and researchers argue 
that it was never the intention of the SADF to capture Cuito Cuanavale.846  The Cubans and 
Soviets maintain that it was the SADF’s objective to capture Cuito, but that they failed to do 
so.847   
With the SADF forces bogged down at Cuito Cuanavale, a large Cuban force (15 000 troops) 
began to advance towards the Namibian border.  The South Africans saw this advance as a 
serious threat to the security of Namibia.  They were not sure whether or not the Cuban’s 
would risk entering Namibia.848  At the same time as the Cuban advance, South African-, 
Angolan-, Cuban- and American officials began negotiations in search of common ground.  
The Cuban advance towards Namibia bothered the American and South African officials 
tremendously. When Crocker asked one of the Cuban officials whether they were going to 
stop their advance at the Namibian border, the official said that he could not answer him.  
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Indirectly this meant that the Cuban advance would only stop if SA gave Namibia its 
independence.849 The Soviets had an agreement with the Cubans that they would not 
venture into Namibia, but they saw no need to inform the USA or SA about the agreement.850 
On 27 June 1988 the Cubans decided to show the SADF that they were in control of the air 
by bombing Calueque, 11km north of the Namibian border.  This served as a wakeup call for 
the USA and SA that the Cubans had air advantage over Southern Angola and even 
Northern Namibia.  The Cubans flew as far south as Ondangwa.  On 22 July 1988 senior 
officials from Cuba, Angola, SA and the USA met once again, this time at Cape Verde.  The 
aim of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of a ceasefire.  The result of the meeting 
was that the South Africans agreed to Cuba’s demand for a ceasefire - SA should withdraw 
all its forces from Angola by 1 September 1988.  By 25 August the last SADF troops 
withdrew from Angola.851 The withdrawal of SADF troops from Angola did not mean that the 
USA was no longer going to support UNITA financially. 
The United States Senate was still concerned about the USSR’s support to the MPLA, 
SWAPO’s mission to take control over Namibia and the Cuban presence in Angola.852  It 
appeared that a communist takeover of Southern Africa was inevitable if the USA was going 
to totally withdraw its support for SA and Savimbi.  As a result the US Senate would only 
allow the American President to continue providing the UN forces in Angola and Namibia 
with funds if he would also continue to finance and support UNITA’s war effort.853 
On 22 December 1988 the New York agreements were signed.854  These agreements 
entailed that the SADF would withdraw (with the exception of 1500 soldiers who would be 
confined to base) from Namibia within three months.855  Furthermore SA would have to give 
Namibia its independence as it was stipulated in Resolution 435.856  SA also had to declare 
that they would no longer provide UNITA with any aid.  The Cubans had to withdraw from 
Angola within 27 months.857  This was the culmination of the Border War.858 
                                                 
849
  Gleijeses, 2006, op cit. pp. 41-42. 
850
  Shubin in Potgieter, T, A. Esterhuyse and I. Liebenberg. (Eds), op cit. p. 40. 
851
  Gleijeses, op cit. p. 43. 
852
  Report from Defence Attachè in Washington to the Chief of Staff Military Intelligence.  1989. File nr MI 
203/2/ 3 Volume 57 (Top Secret). South African Military Archives.  dd 7.4.89 – 5.7. 89.  Insameling van 
Inligting: Eie MA - Washington. 
853
   Ibid. 
854
  F. W. De Klerk.  1993.  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and South Africa’s Nuclear Capability: A 
speech to Parliament.  24 March 1993. p. 4. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116789.  
Walters, op cit. p. 17. 
855
  Coker, op cit. p. 254. 
856
  Gorbunov, op cit. p. 101.  Walters, op cit. p. 10. 
857
  Gleijeses, P.  2006.  Moscow’s Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988.  Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol 8, No 
2.  p. 36.   Gleijeses explains that very little research has been done on this period of the negotiations.  
Chester Crocker’s High Noon in Southern Africa is the major published source that deals with the New York 
agreement.  But Gleijeses is of the opinion that Crocker explains the New York agreements as “a triumph of 
U.S. patience, skill and wisdom”...which according to Gleijeses is different from what his research of Cuban 
documents show.  Gleijeses argues that Crocker leaves out the fact that “U.S. policy strengthened the 
hardliners in Pretoria, who opposed Namibian independence and sought a military solution in Angola that 
could propel UNITA to power.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
 
 
The South African withdrawal of resources from Angola meant that Savimbi would have to 
fight the war on his own. With Namibia no longer under control of SA, Savimbi lost his most 
precious logistical route for supplies. Consequently he started negotiations with the MPLA to 
form a new government where both parties could share power. However, Savimbi did not 
inform the US government about his negotiations, because on 23 August 1989 the 
Chairperson of the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations admitted in a 
letter to Savimbi that he was confused about what was happening in Angola.859  The 
Committee Chairperson wanted to know from Savimbi if the rumours about Savimbi’s 
willingness to share government with the MPLA were true. Evidently the USA was no longer 
able to direct Savimbi on what choices he should make. 
Just a month before the above mentioned letter was written; the USA sent a delegation of 
military officials and government officials to investigate the situation in Namibia.  The South 
African ambassador warned the South African Military Intelligence that the American 
members who were going on the trip to Namibia were pro-SA.   He mentioned that if the 
delegation were to speak to senior members of the South African security forces in Namibia, 
it could help to get more support for SA within the US government circles.860 It was during 
this trip that the Americans became aware of Savimbi’s backdoor negotiations with the 
MPLA. 
Between July 1989 and January 1990 the CIA did not provide Savimbi with any weapons. 
Some analysts were of the opinion that the USA finally stopped its support to Savimbi.  
However the CIA explained that it was not a conscious decision to stop supplying weapons 
to UNITA, but rather a logistical problem.  The CIA blamed Mobotu Sese Seko because he 
closed the Zairian railway to Angola for USA logistical supplies, because Mobotu and 
Savimbi were no longer in an alliance after a misunderstanding during June 1989.  The 
MPLA cleverly claimed that after negations with UNITA in June 1989 Savimbi agreed to go 
into exile and to integrate his forces with the MPLA. Savimbi denied that he ever agreed to 
such an agreement, but he already lost Mobuto’s trust and support. 861   Because of the fact 
that Savimbi could no longer use Namibia as a supply route for weapons, the Zairian railway 
line from Zaire to Angola was Savimbi’s only supply route left. So if the MPLA was lying 
about the alleged agreement with Savimbi, it can be regarded as an excellent example of 
successful propaganda warfare. The USA had to mediate between Mobutu and Savimbi to 
re-establish their relationship.  After a visit by both Mobutu and Savimbi to the USA in 
October 1989 their relationship was restored.862 
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By 1990 there were constant negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA over a possible 
power sharing deal but the MPLA did not stop their attacks on UNITA bases. The USA still 
continued to fund UNITA even though they were aware that Savimbi showed willingness to 
form a coalition government with the MPLA.  The Washington Post reported on 25 February 
1990 that the USA still clandestinely provided Savimbi with about US$50 million annually.863 
Savimbi continued to enjoy support in the US Congress as he was the USA’s only chance to 
have a pro-Western leader in charge of the mineral rich Angola.  
The fall of communism changed the war in Angola from a Cold War battle to a civil war.  By 
June 1990 the MPLA abolished the one party system and Angola became a democratic 
country. Following elections some senior political members and military leaders of UNITA 
defected to democratic politics thereby withdrawing from the civil war. Over years support for 
UNITA dwindled.  However, the civil war in Angola continued until 2002 when the MPLA 
finally achieved victory after the death of Savimbi. 
According to Turner864 the Border War can be divided into 4 phases: 
• Phase 1:  Stretched from 1966 to 1978.  The first phase was when the SADF and its 
allies tried to “contain the war from its origins in 1966 to the development of a new policy of 
intervention by means of cross-border raids...”865 
 
• Phase 2:  Stretched from May 1978 to January 1984.  In this period the SADF mostly 
focused on cross border raids into Angola. 
 
• Phase 3:  This phase was from early 1984 to mid-1988.  This was the time where the 
SADF dominated the fighting with what Turner regards as successful campaigns such as 
Operation Modular, Operation Hooper and Operation Packer.  Ironically most of the fighting 
in this period was not against SWAPO, but against FAPLA and the Cubans.866 
 
• The final phase lasted from mid-1988 through to the independence of Namibia on 20 
February 1990.  This phase consisted of a great deal of political bargaining and also includes 
the last big battle of the war - The battle of Cuito Cuanavale. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
Namibia’s independence was entwined with the situation unfolding in neighbouring Angola.  
The Angolan civil war became part of a regional war in which multiple external actors were 
involved.   The USA and the rest of the West did not want a communist regime in Angola so 
they supported the anti-communist efforts with their ally – South Africa.   
South Africa viewed Angola as a buffer zone for Namibia; therefore they were willing to assist 
the anti-communist forces in Angola.  Pretoria was committed to fight the communist 
supported MPLA in Angola, because the MPLA provided SWAPO with refuge from where 
they could attack the Northern parts of Namibia.  The USA on the other hand intervened in 
the Border War to prevent communism from getting a foothold in Southern Africa.  
The reality was that Namibian independence could only become a possibility if both the 
South African and Cuban forces withdrew from Angola.  The Cuban’s saw it as their 
responsibility to ensure that white minority rule is abdicated in both SA and Namibia and they 
were willing to lay down their lives to achieve it. 
The USA from their perspective had to decide whether they were going to suffer the political 
consequences of intervention in the conflict, or allowing the communist to gain control in 
Southern Africa.  The USA could not allow a communist takeover in Angola, because the 
probability that the communist wave would spread to SA was too high.  The implementation 
of the Clark-amendment is evidence that decisions in US foreign policy is not always made 
by the President. Ford was not in favour of withdrawing the support to UNITA and SA, but 
Congress had the final say. 
The period from 1975-81 saw the USA engaging effectively in a previously neglected region 
– Southern Africa with specific emphasis on Namibia and Angola.  In Southern Africa the 
USA achieved a moral victory in curtailing the USSR’s efforts to discredit the USA’s efforts to 
negotiate independence in Namibia.  The USA appeared to have been successful to some 
extent in slowing down the spread of Soviet influence in Southern Africa. 
South Africa clung onto Namibia for as long as possible for its own political-, economical- and 
security interests and not for the good of the people of Namibia.  Western Powers, especially 
the USA played a big part in slowing down the independence process for Namibia.  By 1981 
it was clear that there was no way to disentangle the Angolan civil war from the Namibian 
war between the SADF and SWAPO.  Angola did not have the capability to disentangle itself 
from the war so the futures of Namibia and Angola were both in the hands of the USSR, the 
Cubans, South Africans and the USA.   
By 1984 it seemed as if peace would soon be achieved with the signing of the Lusaka 
Accord.  But it did not last long.  It seems as if SA was willing to withdraw from Angola, but 
still wanted to support Savimbi.  Pretoria and Washington wanted Savimbi as the Angolan 
president, as Angola could then serve as a buffer for Namibia and SWAPO would not be able 
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to seek refuge in Angola anymore.  So it could be argued that SA would only abide to an 
accord which would ensure Savimbi’s place in a position of power.  
After the 1989 New York accord, Savimbi no longer had the full backing the SADF.  The USA 
however still provided UNITA with weapons and money. The USSR also still provided the 
MPLA with advisors and equipment.    The war in Angola continued until 2002 and cost the 
lives of more than 500 000 people 
The SADF learned that the West, especially the USA, could not be relied upon to come to 
the defence of apartheid SA; not even in the face of a possible communist victory in 
Southern Africa. The USA had to choose the lesser of two evils from their point of view – 
apartheid or communism. But Pretoria had a card up its sleeve just in case the USA was not 
willing to intervene in the case of a communist attack against SA – its nuclear arsenal. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“Although nuclear strategy is no fool-proof formula for survival, it offers a helpful 
method to stabilise international relations in an uncertain world” (N. Barnard)867 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME AND THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE USA 
South Africa’s nuclear ambitions would undoubtedly have been stillborn had it not been for a 
close collaboration between SA and the USA. Fidel Castro was of the opinion that SA would 
have been unable to build nuclear bombs without help from the USA.868 Castro was not 
wrong. Arguably SA would not have been able to build a nuclear arsenal without the 
expertise and equipment provided by the USA.  Many of SA’s nuclear scientists received 
training in the USA and the USA dispatched nuclear scientists and technicians to SA to help 
with training and technical experience.869  The USA-SA nuclear relationship started during 
the final period of the Second World War.  The USA needed uranium to continue its 
Manhattan project which was required for the production of similar bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.870 In 1950, the USA signed a purchasing agreement for uranium 
with SA that would guarantee the USA an ongoing supply of the valuable chemical 
element.871 The USA-SA nuclear relationship was cemented with the signing of the Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 thus enabling the USA to export nuclear material and reactors to 
SA as long as it was used for peaceful purposes.  From the middle of the 1950s to the middle 
of the 1970s the USA-SA nuclear relationship continued without much controversy.872 
By mid-1970 the USA-SA relationship became severely strained. Pretoria’s refusal to sign 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 placed pressure on the USA to break 
nuclear ties with SA or at least create the appearance that that it had done so.873  The NPT 
aimed to maintain the status quo regarding the “nuclear club” by preventing countries without 
nuclear weapons from building their own or acquiring such weapons from those countries 
which did possess a nuclear arsenal.  The nuclear powers were however allowed to assist 
the non-nuclear countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes.874  
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Resultantly SA turned away from the USA and found other allies.  The USA was 
consequently excluded from SA’s nuclear programme but continued pressure on Pretoria to 
sign the NPT.  Even though the USA was no longer accomplice partner in SA’s nuclear 
programme, USA intelligence agencies still kept close watch on SA’s nuclear 
developments.875   
In March 1993, Pretoria shocked the world when it was announced that SA had built six and 
a half nuclear bombs.   The construction of the bombs was the outcome of a top secret 
nuclear program spanning 15 years.876  This surprise revelation left the international 
community asking several uncomfortable questions: 
• How was SA able to build nuclear weapons if the country was on the receiving end of 
severe sanctions aimed at preventing the country from obtaining the very weapons it now 
possessed? 
• Why did SA feel the need to have a nuclear arsenal? 
• Would Pretoria ever consider deploying any or all of its nuclear weapons? 
• To what extend did the USA know that SA had a nuclear arsenal and how did the 
USA contribute to SA achieving its goal? 
5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SA’S NUCLEAR LAAGER877 
“...if any nation wishes to acquire nuclear weapons, it could do no better than to look at how 
South Africa did it.” (Al J. Venter)878 
5.2.1 Early Beginnings 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, Pretoria, in concert with many Western nations 
declared communism an evil and promised the West that they will do what was required to 
halt the spread of communism in Southern Africa.879 Pretoria’s nuclear development 
programme started in 1948 with the establishment of the South African Atomic Energy Board 
(AEB).880 The aim of the AEB was to mine and process uranium, to advise the Minister of 
Mines on matters concerning nuclear energy, to produce nuclear energy and to conduct 
nuclear energy research.881  The birth of SA’s nuclear ambitions occurred against the 
backdrop of the Berlin Airlift where communist Russia prevented supplies from entering 
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Western occupied and controlled West Berlin. In Europe thus the battle lines have been 
drawn. It could be argued that Pretoria’s saw its willingness to oppose communism would 
allow it a free hand in pursuing its own nuclear ambitions.    
As a result of Pretoria’s stern anti-communist stand, SA’s strategic position on the African 
continent, the country’s “...excellent port facilities and experienced military made it an 
important ally in the Cold War.”882  SA’s status as a ‘friendly’ country eased the nuclear 
relationship between the USA and SA in spite of SA’s apartheid policies.883  The relationship 
was mutually beneficial as the USA imported uranium from SA for use in its nuclear 
programme. SA in turn used its mineral deposits as a bargaining chip to secure a research 
reactor and limited amounts of enriched uranium from the US programme.884 
The USA’s dependence on SA’s uranium sources led to a soft approach by various American 
administrations towards SA’s apartheid policies.  In 1950 Pretoria agreed to sell uranium to 
Washington.  It was a time of good relations between the USA and SA, because SA also 
agreed to send a detached air force contingent to Korea to assist the US air force.885  The 
fact that SA was willing to assist the USA in Korea and that SA agreed to provide them with 
uranium was testimony that SA was a reliable ally, one of the “good ones”.  In return 
President Eisenhower assured Pretoria that any arms requests will be considered as 
favourably as possible.  Between 1953 and 1966 the USA purchased more than 40 000 tons 
of uranium oxide from SA.  The value of the uranium was valued at approximately US$ 450 
million.886 
South Africa’s nuclear programme benefited greatly from the country’s willingness to sell 
uranium to the American programme.  One of the benefits that SA received from its dealings 
with the USA was the establishment of the Nuclear Physics Institute by the Council for 
Science and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria.  The Nuclear Physics Institute was 
primarily tasked with producing radioisotopes and to conduct nuclear spectroscopy.  Another 
benefit came in 1952 when the USA and Great Britain collaborated with SA to build facilities 
at South African goldmines that were able to extract uranium from such mines.887  The 
Nuclear Physics Institute and the uranium extraction facilities provided SA with the capability 
to produce key ingredients that could be used for the development of nuclear weapons. 
President Eisenhower was the first American president to sign a bilateral agreement with 
Pretoria on the uses of atomic energy.  In July 1957 Pretoria signed a bilateral agreement on 
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the civil uses of atomic energy in terms of Eisenhower’s Atom-for-Peace initiative.888  The 
Atom-for-Peace Initiative entailed that the USA would offer “nuclear infrastructure, materials, 
and training to other countries in order to further the peaceful use of atomic energy.”889  This 
agreement was prolonged and was renewed in 1962, 1967 and 1974.  The agreement was 
extended to 2007.890   The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was also founded in 
1957, with SA as one of the founding member states.891 
During the early 1960s the USA provided SA with a nuclear research reactor as dictated by 
the above mentioned agreement.  It was named SAFARI-1 and located at Pelindaba which is 
roughly 20km to the west of Pretoria.892  Most of the equipment used at Pelindaba was of 
American origin.893  French and German companies assisted in the building of SAFARI-1.894 
It was designed by an American company, the Allis Chalmers Corporation. 895  The USA also 
supplied the enriched fuel that was needed by SAFARI-1896 to operate. 897  The US State 
Department was of the opinion that the provision of SAFARI-1 to SA would give the USA 
leverage in the future over SA’s nuclear programme.898  The USA provided SA with the 
nuclear reactor on condition that SA sign a safeguard agreement which would allow 
American scientists to inspect the facility whenever they wanted to. Pretoria accepted the 
agreement.899 
During the 1960s the USA had no anxiety that SA would use its nuclear capabilities to 
develop nuclear bombs. South African students were sent to the USA to study nuclear 
technology.900  Washington was confident that SA would use its nuclear capabilities for the 
production of nuclear energy.  American analysts surmised that because there was no 
serious regional threat to SA’s security, Pretoria had no reason to construct nuclear 
weapons.  They also argued that Pretoria only wanted nuclear capabilities for prestigious 
reasons. At the time a small number of countries had nuclear capabilities so it made SA part 
of an elite club of countries.901 
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In 1965 Prime Minister Verwoerd ordered the establishment of a new Nuclear Institute. It was 
the first sign that SA was going to pursue the production of nuclear weapons.  Verwoerd 
thought that SA could not depend on the West for protection from the communists, because 
the West supported sanctions against SA.  Verwoerd wanted to give the white people of SA 
the capability to shield themselves against any communist aggression but he did not publicly 
acknowledge that the new Nuclear Institute was built with the intention of producing nuclear 
bombs.902 
5.2.2 South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme Gains Momentum 
South Africa’s nuclear programme picked up pace from 1970 onwards. During March 1971, 
B.J. Vorster, the then Prime Minister of SA, ordered that scientists should surreptitiously 
research the viability of developing a nuclear weapon.  At the outset the research was merely 
theoretical, but soon progressed to application of the knowledge gained.  By 1973, the USA 
was still under the impression that SA did not want to create a nuclear bomb as an offensive 
weapon.  The USA argued that the only reason why SA would built a nuclear bomb was to 
show the world that SA is capable of doing so in spite of  the 1963 arms embargo.903 It is 
important to remember that even though Kennedy implemented the arms embargo in 1963, 
he still maintained a nuclear relationship with SA. For example, in 1973 the USA sold two 
large computers that SA used to run the Pelindaba plant.904 The US Commerce Department 
allowed the Foxboro Company to provide the South African Energy Board with these two 
computers.905 
The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola in 1974 led to a 
deterioration in the security situation of Southern Africa.906 The Cuban presence in Angola 
and SA’s counter-insurgency war in Northern Namibia was great motivation for SA to build a 
nuclear arsenal which could be used as a last resort.907 Pretoria decided that a deterrent 
against the possible communist attack was necessary.908  Vorster authorised an increase in 
research on the possible development of a nuclear weapon.909 The apartheid government 
still maintained that the reason for the development of nuclear weapons was not to use the 
bombs offensively in war, but rather as a deterrent against an enemy attack.910  The nuclear 
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bombs would serve as a technological laager to protect SA.911 Pretoria wanted to keep its 
nuclear programme a secret as not to alienate the West, because SA still had to buy 
enriched uranium from Western countries.912 
The acceleration of SA’s nuclear weapon programme was prompted by the “... discovery of a 
secret, low-cost uranium enrichment process and the construction of an enrichment pilot 
plant at Valindaba near Pretoria, also called the Y-plant.”913  This new innovation placed SA a 
step closer to being able to construct a nuclear arsenal without assistance from other 
countries.914  Pretoria maintained that SA was still not using its nuclear capabilities to 
produce nuclear weapons, but was rather using it for peaceful purposes.915 Pretoria insisted 
that the work at Valindaba916 will be used for peaceful purposes, they still had tacit 
aspirations to develop their own nuclear weapons.917  During March 1975 senior South 
African and Israeli defence officials had a meeting where Israel offered to sell nuclear 
capable missiles (Jericho missiles) to SA.918  At that time the SADF actively lobbied for and 
advocated nuclear capacity. The Chief of Staff of the SADF at the time provided the Minister 
of Defence with three reasons why the SADF needed a nuclear capability: 
• If the sovereignty of SA should ever be threatened, the West would intervene 
because they would not want SA to use their nuclear weapons; 
• The weapons would serve as a deterrent against a Soviet or Chinese invasion of SA; 
• The West would take SA seriously if they knew that SA had nuclear weapons.919 
The South African Minister of Defence agreed to have a defence relationship with Israel, but 
he held off on immediately purchasing any missiles.  His argument was that SA had no 
aggressive tendencies, so there was no need for the missiles at that stage.  From this 
meeting onwards a focussed defence relationship between SA and Israel was born.  A 
security and secrecy agreement was signed.  The agreement was known as SECMENT and 
neither of the parties was allowed to unilaterally abandon SECMENT.920 
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5.2.3 The Vastrap Incident 
Pretoria needed a testing ground for their possible nuclear weapons, so Vorster authorised 
the funding of an underground testing site in the Kalahari Desert about 100km north of 
Upington in the Vastrap area.  This specific location was chosen because it was far enough 
from international borders to be able to contain the radiological affects to SA only.921 In May 
1974 India test-exploded their first nuclear bomb.  This test created a stir in the international 
arena, because it proved that “... military and peaceful atoms could be created by the same 
dual-use facilities and materials.”922 As a result, Vorster decided to not immediately take the 
next step of nuclear development until the hype over the Indian test passed.923  The USA 
was still told by Pretoria that their nuclear intentions were only for peaceful purposes.  The 
CIA also thought that Pretoria did not yet have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon, 
but they were mistaken.924   
During May 1974, South African scientists conducted a successful test using non-nuclear 
materials.925  Later in 1974 the South African AEB confirmed that they were capable of 
building a nuclear bomb.926 In 1975, Pretoria announced that the Y-plant was operational and 
that they were busy constructing another enrichment plant.927  The Y-plant had not yet 
produced enough enriched uranium, but it was rapidly getting there.  By August 1977 SA’s 
preparations for an underground testing of a nuclear weapon was in full swing.  In an effort to 
divert the attention of foreign intelligence services away from the deep boreholes the SADF 
was drilling at Vastrap, the army tested new artillery weapons at Vastrap.928  This exercise 
was supposed to serve as a ruse. 
In 1977 the SADF finished building the Vastrap nuclear test site.  The site had facilities that 
allowed SA to conduct underground nuclear tests for experimental purposes. Two test shafts 
were built at the facility with depths of 385m and 216m respectively.929  Another possible 
function of the Vastrap test site was to serve as warning to the rest of the world that SA had 
the capabilities to conduct nuclear tests on its own soil.930  Vastrap did indeed alert the 
superpowers that SA might have a nuclear capability when a Soviet spy satellite registered 
the building of the site.  So the SADF’s effort to conceal the real use of Vastrap failed.931    
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Figure 5.1 Vastrap layout932 
The Soviet’s told the USA that they suspect that SA was building a nuclear test site.933  A few 
days after the Soviets informed the USA about Vastrap, an American embassy plane (the 
spy plane discussed in chapter 3) flew over Vastrap and photographed the site.  The 
photographs confirmed the USA’s and the Soviet suspicions so they used an American 
satellite to collect more intelligence on the site.  The South Africans saw that the embassy 
plane was flying low over the site and immediately destroyed documents and equipment 
which could confirm to the USA that Vastrap was a nuclear test site.934  Pretoria denied the 
allegations of a nuclear test site and the South African media published articles to suggest 
that it was a worldwide campaign by the communist to prevent France from selling two 
nuclear power plants to SA.935 
Carter warned Vorster that if SA should test a nuclear weapon, the USA would see it as a 
threat to world peace and will have to intervene by cutting all nuclear ties with SA.936 By 21 
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August 1977 President Vorster promised President Carter that SA would stop the 
preparations for a nuclear test at Vastrap.937  Vorster later denied making such promises to 
Carter, but Carter released Vorster’s written pledge to the media to prove it.  In the media 
Vorster maintained that the USA and USSR satellites did not pick up a nuclear test site. 
Vorster’s story to the media was that SA was building a new military airport at Vastrap.938  A 
few days after Vorster’s promise to Carter, Vorster gave the order that Vastrap should be 
closed down and that SA’s nuclear weapon programme was to be ended.939  This was all just 
a smoke screen, because Vorster at the same time approved that SA should clandestinely 
continue with the construction of nuclear weapons.940   
The rumours which emerged that SA might have nuclear bombs led to more international 
pressure on SA to declare what its nuclear capability was. Some American analysts were of 
the opinion that SA never intended to test a nuclear weapon at the facility.  Their opinion was 
that SA wanted the USA to think that SA had a nuclear weapon for political purposes.941 If 
these analysts were correct then SA succeeded in its plan to make the world aware that SA 
might be a possible nuclear power. 
The USA urged SA to halt its nuclear development and testing and further insisted that SA 
should sign the NPT.  If SA were to sign the NPT then Pretoria would be forced to declare all 
its nuclear activities to the IAEA942 and allow officials from the IAEA to inspect its nuclear 
facilities at any time.943  The South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha, maintained 
that SA did not have any nuclear weapons to test.944 
Pretoria did not want to sign the NPT because it would have strategic implications.  If they 
would allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities, then the world would know whether SA 
had the capability to build nuclear warheads or not. South Africa was not ready to play that 
card yet. They would only use the nuclear weapons if there were really no other options open 
to pursue.945  Pretoria’s reluctance to sign the NPT came with consequences.  
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5.2.4 In Search of New Allies 
The USA was no longer prepared to provide SA with the necessary nuclear fuel to run its 
SAFARI-1 reactor by 1976.946  The Ford administration decided to halt all deliveries of 
enriched uranium to SA because Pretoria decided that they wanted to be able to create and 
export enriched uranium on their own. The USA furthermore cancelled the provision of 
nuclear fuel for SA’s civilian power plant at Koeberg near Cape Town.   Pretoria had already 
paid the USA for the provision of the nuclear fuel, but the USA refused to reimburse 
Pretoria.947   
The US State Department was concerned that the USA-SA nuclear relationship gave the 
impression that Carter was supporting SA’s apartheid policies.  So the State Department 
recommended that the nuclear relationship be ended as soon as possible.948  Washington 
strongly objected to the idea of breaking the USA-SA nuclear relationship.  Washington 
rather wanted more time to convince SA to sign the NPT so that its nuclear programme could 
be regulated.949 
France was the only country willing to provide SA with the fuel, but the USA convinced 
France to also discontinue.  France then insisted that SA must first sign the NPT before they 
would receive any further assistance from France.  As a consequence of not signing the 
NPT, SA was dismissed from the IAEA’s board of governors. This was a slap in the face of 
Pretoria.950   
In 1977 the Valindaba plant was completed.  Valindaba had the capacity to produce 10 tons 
of enriched uranium per year.951  The first enriched uranium was produced in SA by 1978.952  
The USA’s strategy to stop SA from obtaining nuclear weapons backfired.  The South 
Africans were of the opinion that the USA did not want SA to be able to enrich their own 
uranium because of economic reasons.  At that time the USA had the monopoly on uranium 
enrichment in the West, so SA would take away some of the USA’s business.  Pretoria 
argued that the USA just wanted SA to sign the NPT to protect its own monopoly in the 
uranium enrichment business.953 
To isolate SA even further, the US Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 
March 1978.  According to this act no nuclear exports were allowed to any countries which 
were not signatories of the NPT. 954 The Study Commission on US foreign policy toward SA, 
a project paid for by the Rockefeller foundation recommended that the Nuclear Non-
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Proliferation Act of 1978 should be a broad ban of nuclear technology.  The Commission 
recommended that it should be treated equivalent to a total arms embargo.955  SA then had 
no other choice than to become self-sufficient in providing its own nuclear fuel and to enrich 
its own uranium.  In attempting to starve SA from any nuclear resources and materials, those 
opposed to SA’s nuclear programme actually achieved the opposite result by forcing Pretoria 
to turn inwards and develop its own processes without having to rely on support from the 
West.  
The South Africans created the Witvlei Committee in 1978 under the leadership of P.W. 
Botha.  The aim of this committee was to show the world that SA had a body which were 
responsible to regulate and control SA’s nuclear weapons.  The Witvlei Committee approved 
that SA should have nuclear weapons on condition that the weapons should only be used as 
a last resort.  If the nuclear bombs were ever to be used, the president and his most senior 
minister had to take the responsibility of deciding whether or not to use the bombs.  The 
nuclear bombs were thus actually just to be used as a show of force and to show the world 
that a small isolated country like SA was skilled enough to build weapons of mass 
destruction.  The weapons were to be used as leverage when diplomats negotiated with 
other countries, especially with the superpowers.956  In 1979 SA was entirely expelled from 
the IAEA because of its unwillingness to sign the NPT.957 
5.2.5 The 1979 Nuclear blip:  Did SA test “The Bomb”? 
Pressure from the USA to sign the NPT increased dramatically from September 1979.  On 
the night of 22 September an American satellite (the Vela type) registered evidence of a 
nuclear flash in the South Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of the Prince Edward and Marion 
islands.958  The Vela satellites were specifically designed to pick up evidence of nuclear 
testing and nuclear explosions (the double flash)959 in space and the atmosphere.960 The 
USA accused SA of testing a nuclear weapon.961 The US Defence Intelligence Agency sent 
planes to the area where the flash was observed to take air samples.  The aircraft studied 
the seismic records of the area for any disturbances.  The planes returned with no evidence 
of radiation and there was no suspicious seismic activity recorded.962  
It bothered the White House that they were not able to pinpoint the origins of the apparent 
nuclear flash.  Consequently a group of experts from around the USA were assembled to 
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investigate to the issue.963  After investigation by the group of experts a number of alternative 
explanations were given to what could have caused the blip: 
• It was possible that a Soviet submarine might have had an accident in the vicinity.  
This explanation seemed possible, because South African intelligence spotted a Soviet sub 
in the region at that time; 
• The second alternative was that the flash was caused during an electrical storm.  
Some experts were of the opinion that a “super bolt” would be able to simulate the flash of a 
nuclear test; 
• Another possibility was that SA and Israel jointly tested a low-yield nuclear artillery 
shell; 964 
The answer which was accepted by most of the experts in the group was that the satellite 
which picked up the blip was hit by a meteor.  As a result of the collision some of the 
satellite’s paint chips broke off and the sensor picked it up. It then reflected on the system as 
a nuclear flash.965 
The group of experts were almost convinced that the flash was not evidence of a South 
African nuclear test, but the US Defence Intelligence Agency, the CIA and the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was not convinced.966 They 
maintained that the blip could have been nothing else than a nuclear test. It was speculated 
that SA tested a nuclear weapon in the area with the help of Israel and possibly Taiwan.967  
This was a great concern to the USA and the rest of the world. The CIA reached the 
conclusion that it was not Pretoria who tested a nuclear weapon, but rather Israel. The CIA 
was of the opinion that Pretoria was just hinting that they might be responsible for the blip to 
give the impression that SA had already built a nuclear bomb.968  Even though the CIA did 
not think that SA had nuclear weapons at the time, they still tried to infiltrate SA’s nuclear 
programme.  A second flash in 1980 once again raised the question of whether SA was 
testing nuclear weapons.969 
Walters is of the opinion that there was a cover up in the White House with regards to the 
nuclear flash.  According to him the White House received evidence from other sources 
which showed that a nuclear weapon was tested: 
• The CIA – They provided the White House with acoustic sounding which indicated a 
nuclear explosion; 
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• The New Zealand Institute  of Nuclear Science – They alerted the White House of  
increases in radioactive fallout; 
• The Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory in Puerto Rico – This observatory picked up an 
ionospheric South to North wave which indicated a nuclear explosion. 
All the evidence pointed out that SA or another country tested a nuclear weapon, but all the 
sources of the evidence were re-questioned and they all eventually withdrew their claims that 
a nuclear weapon was tested.970  P.W. Botha raised the USA’s suspicions even more when 
he told a provincial congress three days after the blip was observed that SA’s enemies were 
soon to realise that SA had military weapons which the Republic’s enemies did not know 
about.  Even the South African media started to speculate that Botha was talking about 
nuclear weapons.971 
Walters provides even more evidence of a possible White House cover up when he asks the 
following questions:  
• “Why did the White House put together a panel under its control and not request 
scientific studies by government in the first place? 
• Why did the White House hold up its panel’s report and then issue it one day after the 
Defence Intelligence Agency statement supporting the Vela sighting as a nuclear burst? 
• Why was there an apparent pattern of re-evaluating the initial data supporting the 
Vela event, resulting in subsequent negative findings? 
• Why did the panel come to such an implausible conclusion when a body of evidence 
still remains unrefuted that points equally to the possibility of a nuclear explosion?... 
• Why has there never been a congressional investigation of this case?”972 
There are several possible reasons why the Carter administration did not want to announce 
that SA or a SA-Israel nuclear weapon was tested.  The first reason is that the American 
election was taking place 1980.  Carter’s popularity was waning and he could not afford such 
a foreign policy disaster in view of the potential flux in US voter preferences.  Secondly, the 
USA provided SA with nuclear equipment and knowledge for supposedly peaceful purposes. 
It would not reflect well on the White House if the American public found out that SA was 
able to build a nuclear bomb with American equipment and support, even if indirect. The third 
reason revolves around the Rhodesian issue.  At that time the USA needed SA’s assistance 
to end white minority rule in Rhodesia.  So the USA did not want to alienate SA just yet.  The 
fourth reason is that if the USA admitted that SA tested a nuclear bomb and the USA did not 
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take any concrete disciplinary action against Pretoria, other countries developing nuclear 
bombs might feel encouraged to also test their weapons.  Lastly, American relations with 
Israel would also have been jeopardised.  Israel was as it still is a crucial ally to the USA at 
the time and Washington did not want to alienate Israel. 973 
Many researchers and think tanks from all over the world have studied the case of the 
nuclear flash, but there is still no conclusion on whether SA tested a nuclear weapon or 
not.974  Even though scientists and researchers could not decide whether or not SA tested a 
nuclear bomb, a retired CIA operative, Tyler Drumheller975, is of the opinion that SA definitely 
tested a nuclear bomb.  In his book Drumheller mentions that his operatives gathered 
indisputable intelligence which proved that SA was behind the nuclear test in the South 
Atlantic.  In 1997 Aziz Pahad, the South African Deputy Foreign Minister of the time 
confirmed that SA tested a nuclear device during 1979.  According to Venter, Pahad later 
withdrew his statement that SA tested the nuclear device which was picked up by the Vela 
satellite.976  
Hersch is of the opinion that SA in fact tested 3 bombs on that day. His research shows that 
SA wanted to test the bombs whilst clouds obstructed the view of satellites. According to him 
the first two bombs were tested without being spotted, but with the third bomb the clouds 
opened and the satellite could capture the evidence.977 Van Wyk argues that it would not 
have been possible for SA to test a nuclear weapon at sea by 1979.  Her argument is based 
on the facts that even though SA had two nuclear weapons by 1979, neither of the weapons 
could be delivered by an aircraft.  Her second point is that one of the bombs was dismantled 
for parts and the other bomb was earmarked to be tested underground.978  F.W. De Klerk 
admitted during a speech on 24 March 1994 that SA had completed its first nuclear weapon 
in 1979, but he did not mention anything about the fact that the weapon was tested in 
1979.979 
During September 1979, the task of producing nuclear weapons was transferred from the 
AEB to Armscor, which is the South African state-owned armaments firm.980  A high-level 
cabinet committee on nuclear weapons suggested that SA should have at least seven 
nuclear weapons in the near future.981  This would make SA a formidable nuclear power in 
the eyes of the world and would serve as a deterrent to any potential invader of SA.982 
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5.2.6. South Africa’s Nuclear Programme During the 1980s 
During the early 1980s SA’s nuclear weapon building programme was centred at the facility 
known as Kentron Circle.983  The name of the facility was later changed to Advena.984    The 
facility was situated about 15 kilometres east of the Pelindaba site.985 It was here that SA 
produced its first Hiroshima-style nuclear bomb.986   The USSR’s increasing support to the 
MPLA in Angola motivated the South Africans to obtain nuclear weapons as swiftly as 
possible.987 
In 1981 with the election of Reagan as president, the USA attempted to revive the USA-SA 
nuclear relationship under the auspices of the Constructive Engagement Policy.988  The 
Reagan administration provided SA with gray-area materials that were banned during the 
Carter administration.  Reagan only banned equipment that could obviously and clearly only 
be used to produce nuclear weapons.989  An example of nuclear related equipment that was 
authorised by Reagan to be sold to SA was vibration test equipment.  The vibration test 
equipment is used to test the reliability of nuclear warheads.990 A South African journalist, 
Diana Streak claimed that SA and the USA made a secret arrangement in 1981 where the 
USA would provide SA with low-enriched uranium that could keep SA’s nuclear programme 
running.   In exchange, for the uranium, SA had to allow American inspectors to access 
Valindaba and Pretoria had to open negotiations for the independence of Namibia.991 
As discussed in chapter 3, Reagan maintained a soft foreign policy towards SA.  This was 
also reflected in the Reagan administration’s nuclear relationship with SA.   Reagan 
defended his policy of nuclear cooperation with SA by arguing that isolating SA in the nuclear 
sphere would not work, because SA would only improvise ways to create its own nuclear 
capabilities.992 
During April 1982 Armscor produced SA’s first nuclear bomb that could be delivered by 
aircraft.993  The increasing Cuban threat in Angola and the USSR’s constant advancement in 
nuclear weapons brought Pretoria to the conclusion that they can’t just rely on nuclear 
bombs which can be delivered by plane.  They needed more advanced methods of delivering 
the bombs.  Consequently Pretoria came to a decision that its scientists should develop 
medium range ballistic missiles. These missiles were built with assistance from Israel.994  At 
the time the USA attempted to broker peace in Angola so they were very unhappy with 
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Israel’s involvement in SA’s nuclear programme.  The USA was concerned that if SA has a 
nuclear arsenal, a nuclear standoff might ensue in Southern Africa and all their hard 
diplomatic work would have been a waste of time.995 
In the latter half of 1983, the Reagan administration gave permission to the Westinghouse 
Corporation of the USA to provide technical equipment and contribute to the maintenance of 
the Koeberg nuclear power station.996  It is not clear whether Reagan was aware at the time 
that SA had already produced a nuclear bomb or not.  This event was the last of Reagan’s 
nuclear co-operation with SA, because of the CAAA that was adopted by the House of 
Representatives on 9 September 1985.  The CAAA was passed by Congress in 1986 and 
came into effect on 1 January 1987.997  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the American 
government no longer allowed any nuclear exports to SA after the CAAA was passed.998  
The USA would only reconsider nuclear co-operation with SA once Pretoria signed the NPT. 
In 1988, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, announced that SA was 
able to build nuclear missiles should the need arise.  Mr Botha would not confirm at the time 
that SA already had some nuclear weapons; he rather just warned the world that it was a 
possibility.999 Pretoria used deliberate ambiguity to make the world aware that SA could 
defend itself with a nuclear weapon if the need arose. At the same time the South African 
forces were withdrawing from Angola (see chapter 4) and Pretoria feared that a communist 
takeover might be imminent.  So the announcement by Botha served as a warning that even 
if SA is withdrawing, they still had one last card to play. 
Early in 1989 Soviet and American spy satellites picked up evidence that an Israeli Jericho 
type missile1000 was fired from the South African coast.  According to the US Defence 
Intelligence Agency, the missile gave SA the capability to attack Angola with a nuclear 
warhead.1001 The missiles could go up to 350km high into the air.1002 This was of great 
concern to the USA, USSR and Angola.  Israel imposed sanctions against SA two years 
earlier which entailed that Israel would break all military ties with SA.  In the media it seemed 
as if Israel was keeping to the sanctions, but the firing of the missile was proof that Israel was 
still working with SA.  The White House condemned Israel for lying to the world.1003   
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Figure 5.2:  Jericho missile1004  
 
The South Africans tried to protect their Israeli friends by claiming that it was not a missile, 
but rather a satellite launch vehicle which formed part of SA’s space programme.  The CIA 
was by this time aware that SA had nuclear weapons and the fact that SA now possessed a 
long range delivery system was worrisome.1005  The USA demanded that SA and Israel 
should stop their nuclear cooperation, because there was no real threat to SA anymore 
seeing that the Border was coming to an end.1006   
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5.3 THE TERMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
“South Africa is still the only country in the world to have voluntarily agreed to dismantle its 
nuclear weapons programme.”1007 
The combination of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the end of communism 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 left SA with no reason to have nuclear bombs.1008  The 
USA was concerned that SA’s nuclear bombs might fall in the hands of an international 
terrorist organisation or a “black African” state.  As a result the USA placed even more 
pressure on Pretoria to sign the NPT and to dismantle its nuclear weapons.  In August 1989 
F.W. De Klerk replaced P.W. Botha as president which gave the USA hope that SA might 
finally end its nuclear weapon programme.1009  De Klerk was of the opinion that SA’s nuclear 
programme was not just redundant, but it also hampered SA’s development of international 
relations after years of isolation.1010 
As the political landscape was changing in Pretoria, SA’s nuclear arsenal remained a 
headache for the USA.  Pretoria knew that they won’t be accepted back in the international 
political scene whilst still being busy with a covert nuclear research.  Due to the pressure 
from the USA and the rest of the world Pretoria opened talks by 1990 to end its nuclear 
weapons programme.  Pretoria also decided that they could now sign the NPT.  Even though 
the military threats against SA started to wither, they still wanted to use the bombs to their 
advantage for as long as possible.  The nuclear weapons were still to be used as leverage 
when negotiating on an international level.1011     
On 10 July 1991 Pretoria signed the NPT, but they did not announce it publicly.1012 The order 
to dismantle the nuclear weapons had already been given in February 1990 by President De 
Klerk. Over a period of 18 months, Pretoria dismantled and destroyed its nuclear weapons 
and the facilities before signing the NPT. 1013  All the documents that accompanied the SA 
nuclear weapon programme were also destroyed.1014  In 1994 the USA gave Pretoria 
approximately US$ 500 000 to destroy the last remaining nuclear equipment.  This signalled 
the end of SA’s nuclear programme.1015 
When SA’s nuclear weapon programme was abandoned SA had one bomb that was ready to 
be tested at an underground facility, five completed nuclear bombs and the seventh bomb 
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was almost half way to completion.1016  According to President de Klerk SA’s nuclear weapon 
objective was to produce seven nuclear bombs.1017 
There are numerous sceptics who are of the opinion that SA did not only build six and a half 
bombs.  According to these conspiracy theorists SA had at least 20 bombs.  The conspiracy 
theorist thinks that the remaining bombs are in the hands of right wing Afrikaners or that the 
bombs were clandestinely given to Israel.1018 There are no official documents to confirm 
these conspiracy theories, so until solid evidence are found, these theories will remain 
conspiracies.   
5.4 THE USA-SA NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP 
5.4.1 The USA’s Role in the Development of SA’s Nuclear Capability 
“With a plentiful supply of natural uranium and its own separation plant, South Africa can 
produce all the weapons grade uranium it wants.  This capability strengthens South Africa’s 
position militarily, diplomatically and economically.  When the inevitable showdown comes in 
southern Africa, Pretoria can threaten ultimate disaster unless it gets its way.”  (US 
Congressman Les Aspin)1019 
SA’s large reserve of uranium ore made it an essential partner to have a nuclear relationship 
with.  The USA required large amounts of uranium for the development of their own nuclear 
weapons programme.  A nuclear relationship with the USA was beneficial for SA not only 
because they would receive technological advancements, but SA would also reap financial 
benefits.1020  According to Bissel “the United States bought over 43 000 tons of uranium for 
about US$ 1 billion.”1021 
The mutually beneficial relationship led to the signing of the 1957 Agreement for Cooperation 
Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between SA and the USA.  This agreement was 
centred on cooperation with regards to nuclear research.  It entailed an exchange 
programme of students and scientists between the USA and SA. The agreement was signed 
to be binding for an initial period of 20 years.  Due to the building of the Koeberg nuclear 
reactor and an increasing need for exported enriched uranium from the USA, the agreement 
was extended towards the end of 2007. 1022    
Most of SA’s nuclear scientists of the time were educated in American universities or funded 
to do nuclear research by the USA government as a result of the agreement. For example, in 
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1961 the USA “awarded a grant of $100 000 to the Bernhard Price Institute of Geophysical 
Research at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.”1023  This 
grant would allow South African nuclear scientist to improve methods of monitoring nuclear 
testing.1024 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter the USA helped SA to build its first nuclear reactor, 
SAFARI-1, in 1962.  American companies also supplied the fuel that was needed to run the 
reactor. These companies included U.S. Nuclear, Gulf Oil, United States Steel, Texas 
Nuclear and Gulf General Atomic.1025   During 1964 the USA-SA nuclear relationship came 
under scrutiny. It was time for the USA to provide SA with the fuel rods that would enable the 
SAFARI-1 reactor to go active.  The Johnson administration felt that they could not be seen 
providing SA with the fuel rods as it would give the impression that the USA was enabling SA 
to build nuclear bombs.  Johnson decided to delay the delivery of the fuel rods probably until 
after the American elections.  Eventually the fuel rods were delivered on 10 February 1965 
without any media attention drawn to the event.  The USA continued to provide SA with the 
necessary nuclear fuel until 1975.1026 
During the early 1970s an agreement was reached between the US Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and South Africa’s electricity utility ESCOM.  The agreement entailed that 
the AEC would provide ESCOM with nuclear enrichment services for its nuclear power 
station at Duipefontein.  This agreement also guaranteed that the USA would continue to 
receive uranium oxide from SA needed to run American nuclear plants.1027 This agreement 
was worth US$ 120 million at the time.1028 
Once the USA cut its nuclear ties with SA in 1978 because of SA’s refusal to sign the NPT, 
Pretoria looked for new allies to supply them with the necessary expertise and equipment to 
continue their nuclear weapon programme.  The only option open to the USA was to try to 
convince SA to sign the NPT and to keep an eye on the development of SA’s nuclear 
weapons programme. 
5.4.2 Getting SA to Sign the NPT 
The USA tried for many years to convince the South Africans to sign the NPT of 1968.  To 
get SA to adhere to the safeguards of the IAEA was one of the USA’s biggest priorities.  It 
frustrated the USA that the rest of the West was not as adamant as them that SA should sign 
the NPT.  It led to tensions between the USA and its European allies, especially France.1029  
Pretoria knew that Washington saw the signing of the NPT as a very important issue. 
Resultantly Pretoria “steadily raised the ‘price’ to the United States for adherence, to a level 
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unacceptable to overall U.S. policies.”1030  SA’s unwillingness to sign the NPT indicated to 
American analysts and the rest of the world that Pretoria might be busy with a covert nuclear 
weapon programme.1031  But Washington could not think of reasons why SA would want to 
build nuclear weapons. 
During Carter’s administration the only viable reason why SA needed nuclear weapons was 
because SA wanted to use the weapons as a bargaining chip to get support from the USA.  
The USA consequently based their nuclear policies toward SA on the presumption that SA 
was not going to use nuclear weapons aggressively - if they were ever able to build such 
weapons.  During June 1977 the American Sub-committee on Africa of the House of 
International Relations Committee held hearings about SA nuclear development.  The sub-
committee heard that South African government officials illegally entered the USA to 
purchase the most advanced nuclear enrichment technology. Even with the information that 
SA now had the most advanced enrichment technology available, there was still no urgency 
in the US policy to prevent SA from building nuclear weapons.1032 The Carter administration 
decided to use its nuclear relationship with SA as leverage to bring about political change in 
SA. In 1980 the Carter administration placed an embargo on all nuclear fuel deliveries until 
Pretoria would agree to sign the NPT.1033  This plan failed dismally, SA was not really 
concerned about the USA’s withdrawal of support in the nuclear field.1034   
5.4.3 Keeping an Eye on SA’s Nuclear Programme 
SA quickly found new nuclear allies in countries such as France, Israel, Switzerland, Belgium 
and Taiwan.1035  The French was criticised by the USA for selling nuclear reactors for the 
Koeberg plant.  SA also sent more than a hundred nuclear technicians to France to receive 
training on how to operate the Koeberg reactor.  When confronted by the USA, France 
reacted by arguing that SA already had a nuclear military capability at the time and that the 
French reactors did not add anything to SA capability.  The USA was adamant to determine 
the extent of SA’s nuclear capability.1036 
The American government tried its best to stop SA from building or obtaining nuclear 
weapons, but was unsuccessful.  None of the American administrations were able to stop 
Israel from helping SA to build a nuclear arsenal.  Israel helped SA develop advanced 
nuclear missile technology, whilst SA presented Israel with the necessary raw materials and 
testing space to increase their nuclear arsenal as well.1037  There was nothing that the USA 
could do to stop this alliance between Israel and SA.1038   All that the USA could do was to 
gather intelligence to stay in touch with how SA’s nuclear capability was developing. It is 
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possible that Washington was not too concerned about Israel’s help to Pretoria, because SA 
still received the help that was needed for its nuclear programme, but no fingers could be 
pointed to the USA. 
 
Illustration 5.3: The South African version of the Jericho missile1039 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, SA Military Intelligence during April 1979 covertly searched the 
American diplomatic plane that was stationed at Waterkloof Air Force base and found photos 
that the Americans took of the Pelindaba site.1040  This could be interpreted that the USA did 
not know what the South African nuclear capability was at the time, hence the photos.  It is 
possible that the photos could have helped to determine how much uranium was being 
enriched at the plant.  In early 1980 the South African government claimed that a group of 
American spies entered SA in order to learn SA’s nuclear secrets.1041   So it is arguable that 
the USA had no idea whether Pretoria had the capability to build weapons of mass 
destruction.  Both Venter and Albright confirm that the South African government was very 
good with keeping secrets from the international world as well as from the South African 
public.1042  Venter also writes that the CIA did not have any intelligence about the activities 
happening at the Kentron circle where the bombs were built and stored.1043 
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During the late 1970s the CIA managed to recruit a South African scientist that studied in the 
USA to work for the CIA in return for American citizenship.  But the USA lost interest in SA’s 
nuclear programme by the early 1980s as there were more important nuclear related 
concerns in the forms of India and Pakistan according to Bissel.  This gave SA the room to 
continue building and upgrading its nuclear weapon capabilities.1044   
Polakow-Suransky confirms that the CIA was clueless about the details of SA’s nuclear 
capability.  The CIA knew that SA had a good nuclear relationship with Israel, but they were 
not able to confirm that Israel was helping SA with the bombs, or whether SA was helping 
Israel with building nuclear bombs.1045  Van Wyk argues that the CIA might have intentionally 
turned a blind eye to SA’s nuclear programme, because the CIA was supporting SA with its 
fighting in Angola.1046  In 1981 a Study Commission on US policy toward SA reported that it 
was difficult to determine and define the relationship between SA and Israel.1047 It was in fact 
a mutual relationship where both countries received benefits from the relationship.  It is also 
rumoured that China might have helped SA with its nuclear weapon programme.  According 
to Venter, there “...is some evidence that Pretoria bought roughly 60 tons of lightly enriched 
uranium (LEU) from Beijing in the early 1980’s...”1048  Venter is of the opinion that Beijing 
might have shipped some missile propulsion units and fuel with the batch of LEU.1049 
5.4.4 The Revival of the US-SA Nuclear Relationship 
With the election of Reagan as the American president during late 1980, it could be expected 
that there would be a revival of the USA-SA nuclear relationship.  It was discussed in chapter 
3 and 4 how Reagan was much more sympathetic to SA than his predecessors.  His 
supportive stance to SA was also applicable to the nuclear relationship between the two 
countries.  Reagan was of the opinion that to isolate SA in the nuclear arena would be just as 
inefficient as the arms embargoes proved to be.1050  
 In 1981 the Reagan administration declared in a State Department document that “[t]he 
United States place a high priority on the resumption of nuclear cooperation with South Africa 
and the provision of fuel for the Koeberg reactors.”1051  After a meeting in May 1981 between 
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig and the South African Foreign Minister (Pik Botha) it 
became clear that the USA was serious about reviving the USA-SA nuclear relations.  The 
USA showed willingness to assist South African scientists with research on low enriched 
uranium fuel fabrication and to further assist with training South African scientists in the 
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USA.1052  Reagan’s lenient nuclear policy towards SA made sense from the perspective of 
his Constructive Engagement policy. 
The USA Congress started to question the White House’s increasing exports of nuclear 
material, computers and high-technology to SA during 1982.  The Reagan administration 
defended the exports by explaining that all the equipment that was exported to SA was to be 
used for peaceful nuclear research and application.  This was not entirely true, because 
some of the material e.g. Helium-3, could be used to build nuclear explosives.  The Cyber 
170/750 computers that were sold to SA could be used in nuclear weapon research, 
especially with regards to the modelling of nuclear explosions.1053  It was clear that the 
Reagan administration was much more flexible on the export of grey-area materials than the 
Carter administration.1054 
By December 1982 the US Congress and several anti-apartheid movements were very 
suspicious about SA’s nuclear programme.  The US Congress was worried that SA were 
able to build nuclear weapons with the equipment that the Reagan administration was selling 
to SA.  Consequently the Congress proposed legislation that would prohibit the export of any 
nuclear material, equipment or technology to SA.  Reagan dismissed the proposed 
legislation by arguing that: 
• “the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act effectively precluded significant nuclear 
commerce with South Africa; 
• that the approved exports were readily available to South Africa from other nuclear 
suppliers, which would probably not require the stringent safeguards requirements of the US; 
• that the exports did not involve the transfer of classified or sensitive information and 
therefore represented no proliferation risk; 
• and that the proposed legislation would eliminate any chance of influencing Pretoria 
to accept full-scope nuclear safeguards.”1055 
By January 1984 there was a slight shift in SA’s attitude towards signing the NPT.  This was 
probably to divert suspicion about the true nature of Pretoria’s nuclear programme.  Pretoria 
assured the USA that they would in the future abide to the rules and regulations of the NPT 
as to not contribute to the nuclear proliferation problem.  Even though Pretoria made this 
assurance, they still refused to sign the NPT because the USA and the rest of the world 
would then have discovered that SA already possessed nuclear weapons.1056 
In 1985 the USA-SA nuclear relationship once again made international headlines when it 
came to the light that around forty American citizens were illegally working as nuclear reactor 
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operators in SA.1057  Lulat describes the US citizens working on the South African nuclear 
programme as nuclear mercenaries.1058  The Americans working on the South African 
nuclear programme were violating the Atomic Act of 1954 which entailed that American 
assistance to foreign nuclear programmes may only take place once the Secretary of Energy 
authorised such assistance.  In this instance the US Secretary of Energy claims that he had 
no idea that American citizens were working in SA.1059 
During July 1985 the US Senate voted that all nuclear related trade between the USA and 
SA should be stopped and banned for the future.1060  Consequently on 9 September 1985, 
Reagan issued an Executive Order which prohibited the export of any nuclear goods or 
services to SA.1061  It can be argued that the newly implemented ban on nuclear trade with 
SA was effective, because by early 1986 Pretoria indicated that they might be willing to sign 
the NPT.  There were also other reasons that could have led to the mounting willingness of 
Pretoria to sign the NPT.  Firstly, Pretoria was still fighting an ongoing war in Angola and did 
not want to alienate the USA any further. Secondly, Pretoria was fighting an internal war with 
the liberation movements that fought against the apartheid regime.  During the mid-1980s 
attacks on South African soil by these liberation movements were becoming a regular 
phenomenon.  Lastly, Pretoria was under sanctions in almost every possible sphere. All the 
combined sanctions could have played a role in Pretoria’s decision making of the time.   
Even though Botha showed willingness to sign the NPT, he could not convince the rest of his 
administration to allow him to sign the NPT.  Washington would not accept anything less than 
the signing of the NPT and the signing of an IAEA safeguard agreement.1062  By October 
1986, the noose around Pretoria’s neck became even tighter when the USA Senate instituted 
the CAAA as was discussed in Chapter 3. During September 1987, Pretoria announced that 
they were willing to have formal negotiations to possibly sign the NPT. Once again nothing 
came from the announcement.  By July 1988 Pretoria requested talks with the USA, Great 
Britain and the USSR to inform them that Pretoria would allow IAEA inspectors to visit SA’s 
nuclear institutions. Pretoria admitted that the Valindaba plants were able to produce 
enriched uranium, but denied that the plants were ever used for the purpose of building 
nuclear weapons. If Pretoria were to sign the NPT then they would have to allow inspectors 
from the IAEA to investigate the facilities and most probably discover that SA had nuclear 
weapons.1063 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Foreign Minister Pik Botha announced during August 
1988 that SA had the capability to build nuclear weapons if they wanted to.1064  But he never 
admitted that Pretoria had any nuclear weapons at the time.  It is important to remember that 
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this announcement was made almost at the same time when SA was withdrawing its forces 
from Angola. 
By December 1988 it was clear that the war in Southern Africa would soon come to an end.  
South Africa, Cuba and Angola signed the tri-partite agreement, so the main threat according 
to Pretoria existed no longer.1065 High level officials of the ruling National Party realised that 
they could soon be forced to hand over the government to the ANC and they did not want the 
new ANC government to inherit the nuclear weapons.1066  The USA now even placed more 
pressure on Pretoria to sign the NPT. This was because Washington also did not want the 
ANC to get their hands on nuclear weapons seeing that the ANC had close links with Libya 
and Cuba.1067   
On February 26, 1990 newly elected President F.W. De Klerk wrote an official instruction to 
inform all the agencies involved that SA must terminate the production of nuclear weapons.  
The instruction also ordered that all the finished nuclear devices should be dismantled.1068 By 
1992, the nuclear dismantlement process was completed.1069 When Fidel Castro asked 
Nelson Mandela what happened to South Africa’s nuclear weapons, the ex-president told 
him that he had no idea because the military leaders of the SADF never told him.1070 It is 
believed that that all the material used in SA’s nuclear programme was melted down and 
sent to the AEC.1071   
5.5 CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s rich uranium deposits allowed Pretoria to bargain for a research reactor and 
enriched uranium from the USA and Britain.  This was SA’s first move into the nuclear world.  
The USA-SA nuclear relationship did not draw much attention until the mid-1970s when SA 
refused to sign the NPT.  The Vastrap incident and the nuclear flash in the Indian Ocean 
caused some American agencies to believe that SA might have had nuclear weapons.  
There is still no consensus on whether or not SA tested a nuclear weapon, but it is not 
implausible.  The USA might have covered up that SA tested a nuclear weapon.  It is 
possible that the White House covered up the incident, because it pointed out how ineffective 
the USA’s nuclear test detection capability was.   
The USA tried to prevent SA from having a nuclear arsenal.  They failed dismally.  It would 
have been impossible for SA to build their six and a half nuclear bombs without the help of 
the foreign governments like Israel and France and possibly China.  The USA’s efforts to 
isolate SA from the rest of the world backfired when SA build its own military industrial 
complex that was able to produce nuclear bombs with very little help.  The French also 
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helped SA to enhance their nuclear capability by helping Pretoria to build the Koeberg 
nuclear reactor.  Pretoria showed the USA that they could build nuclear weapons without 
help from the Americans.  This must have been a headache to Washington. As a result, the 
South Africans were able to use their nuclear weapons to blackmail the USA in providing 
them with assistance where needed. 
SA felt compelled to build its own nuclear capability as a result of international sanctions 
against the country.  The Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola was a good enough reason 
for SA to argue that they needed nuclear weapons to protect the country if things went 
haywire in neighbouring Angola.  SA was also aware that the USSR might use a nuclear 
attack in Angola, so SA needed the necessary arsenal to enable them to retaliate.  In the end 
SA’s nuclear weapons was most effectively used in the diplomatic war.  The weapons also 
gave the South African government a sense of accomplishment, because they attained the 
status of being part of the global nuclear club which was reserved for only a few countries. 
The USA was involved in South Africa’s nuclear programme from the beginning to the end. 
Initially it was the USA who helped SA to be able to start a nuclear programme.  As the 
political landscape changed in Southern Africa between the 1950s and the 1990s so did the 
USA’s position towards South Africa’s nuclear programme changed.  It can be argued that 
Washington in many instances turned a blind eye when it came to Pretoria’s nuclear 
weapons, because Pretoria was preventing the communist from over running Southern 
Africa.   
Had the Border War not came to a conclusion when it did and if South Africa’s military 
operations in Namibia and Angola failed, the history of Southern Africa might possibly have 
included some nuclear attacks. The South African government would probably have targeted 
cities like Luanda and Dar es Salaam.  But in the end SA’s nuclear weapons were not used 
(or at least not used in areas where humans reside).  South Africa remains until today the 
only country in history to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon 
programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
6.1  SUMMARY 
The USA has enjoyed diplomatic relations with SA since 1799 and it remained cordial 
throughout the nineteenth century.  During the Second World War (1939 – 1945), forces from 
the Union of South Africa fought alongside their American counter-parts against Fascism.  
During the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) SA again assisted the USA and its Western allies where 
South African aircrews delivered 8 333 tons of humanitarian aid to the people of West Berlin.  
In 1950, Washington once again called upon its South African ally for help.  This time the 
request was that SA should join the USA and the West in the fight against communism in 
Korea (1950-1953).  
By 1960 the Cold War was a reality and the communist influence was rapidly gaining ground 
in Africa.  South Africa with its apartheid government was the anti-communist bastion in 
Southern Africa.  The newly independent African states raised their concerns in the 
international arena about SA’s human rights abuses and the inequality of black people in SA.  
This created a problem for the USA, because the USA was jockeying for the support of the 
newly independent African states, but Washington did not want to alienate their strategic 
partner - SA. The American foreign policy during the Cold War was based on the promotion 
of democracy and human rights but the most prevalent issue in USA foreign policy during the 
Cold War was the containment of communism. South Africa was a staunch anti-communist 
force, but its apartheid laws violated the human rights of the majority of the country’s 
inhabitants. The USA professed its commitment to democracy as a moral value and the 
advocacy of this approach formed an integral part of US attitudes as early as its involvement 
in the Second World War, perhaps even earlier.  Yet frequently moral standpoints were 
overridden by interest - and even when morality and interest intersect in foreign policy, the 
weight of national interest surpasses morality. 
The USA-SA relationship had to be balanced between promoting the notion of a free and a 
democratic world and the reality of the Cold War where it was a fight between the West and 
the communists. Through its Cold War rhetoric of being anti-communist, the apartheid 
government were able to convince the USA that the fight against communism in SA is more 
important than the human rights of people.  The banning of the ANC and its ally the SACP in 
1960 showed the USA that Pretoria was not going to tolerate any socialist or communist 
ideas in the country.  The ANC and the SACP turned to the USSR and its communist allies 
for support.  In the Cold War context, this gave the USA even more reason to support the 
apartheid government.  Although the USA relied on SA to defend Southern Africa from a 
perceived communist invasion, the USA still proclaimed that apartheid was wrong.  South 
Africa’s mineral wealth was another important motivation of American support to the 
apartheid government.  If the USA did not buy SA’s strategic minerals and Pretoria sold it to 
the USSR instead, then the USSR would have controlled 90% of the strategic minerals that 
were needed by the USA. 
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The Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960 focused the eyes of the world on the hard-
handed modus operandi of the apartheid government. It was expected that president 
Eisenhower would follow the rest of the world and break ties with SA or at least criticise 
Pretoria.  Instead Eisenhower was upset that an American official criticised Pretoria on behalf 
of the American government.  Eisenhower even called the SA Ambassador in Washington to 
apologise for the article that criticised the Sharpeville massacre. To save face with the 
international world, the USA continued to voice their abhorrence for apartheid.  Many 
countries withdrew their investments from SA after Sharpeville.  It seemed as if the South 
African economy was going to crumble and that Pretoria would have to abolish apartheid in 
order to bring back foreign investment to SA for survival.  Instead of also withdrawing its 
business from SA, American businesses increased their investment in SA during this period 
and helped the apartheid government to save the economy. 
In 1961, J.F. Kennedy was voted in as president of the USA.  It was a time of hope for the 
liberals and black people of SA, because Kennedy promoted himself as a leader that would 
unwaveringly fight against racism and oppression.  Unfortunately for them Kennedy was kept 
busy with other theatres of the Cold War where the USA was more heavily involved than in 
SA.  Apartheid did not get as much attention as was hoped for.  Kennedy was not in favour of 
long term investments in SA, but American businessmen saw excellent investment 
opportunities in SA and helped the South African economy to flourish. Kennedy felt that 
economic sanctions would hurt American economic interest and would hurt the black people 
of SA much more. Thus, sanctions were staved off for the moment. The Kennedy 
administration vetoed two applications for an arms embargo against SA before eventually 
caving in to international pressure. By 1963 Kennedy could no longer ignore the demands 
from the American public and other African countries when he eventually supported an arms 
embargo against SA.  This was a facade to convince the world and especially African 
countries that the USA was serious about bringing an end to apartheid. 
When President Johnson came into power in late 1963 after Kennedy’s assassination, 
apartheid was once again on the agenda. Once more, much was said about the abhorrence 
of apartheid, but not much was done to end it. Johnson was aware that economic sanctions 
against SA would damage American business interests. He further argued that economic 
sanctions would not only hurt the white people of SA, but the black people would also suffer 
the consequences of economic sanctions.  As a result he also tried to block sanctions 
against SA as far as possible.  Johnson maintained a neutral economic policy towards SA, 
just like his predecessor, Kennedy.  Johnson did however stall the process of apartheid 
being exported to Namibia when he issued NSAM 295.  The issuing of NSAM 295 even 
under criticism from American businessmen and politicians showed that Johnson did want to 
make an effort to oppose apartheid but he did not have the full backing of the American 
governmental system. 
When President Nixon was voted in, the hopes of black South Africans and liberals once 
again flared up. This was because Nixon constantly mentioned the abhorrence of apartheid 
during his election speeches and that it should be ended in order to satisfy the needs of the 
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liberals.  Nixon however was aware that white minority rule was good for American economic 
and strategic interests in SA. Where Kennedy and Johnson at least made it look as if they 
cared about the wrong doings of apartheid, Nixon openly supported the apartheid 
government in many instances.   Nixon’s foreign policy towards SA was guided by Option 2 
of NSSM 39 which entailed that American business and strategic interests were paramount 
in SA.  All decisions made on SA during his presidency firstly considered what the 
consequences for USA interests would be. This was good news for the apartheid 
government, because white rule in SA was beneficial to the USA from a business 
perspective and from the USA’s Cold War perspective of the containment of communism. 
The Nixon administration defended its aggressive investment in SA by saying that an 
increase in American businesses in SA would allow the USA to undermine apartheid. The 
rationale behind this thinking was clear – American businesses could make huge profits from 
the cheap black labour in SA.  Even though Nixon supported the apartheid government 
economically, he was opposed to SA’s occupation of Namibia and even requested American 
investors to refrain from investing in Namibia. The Nixon administration was especially willing 
to slacken the terms of the arms embargo against SA and to find ways to bypass the arms 
embargo. 
The strong USA-SA relationship was maintained when President Ford took control of the 
White House in 1974 after the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s subsequent resignation. The 
situation in Southern Africa took on a new dynamic with the withdrawal of the Portuguese in 
1974.  The White House had to adjust its foreign policy toward SA accordingly, because SA 
was now surrounded by black-ruled states which could become valuable assets to the 
communist forces in the ideological East-West Cold War battle. The Ford administration also 
vetoed arms embargoes and economic sanctions against SA in order to preserve the last 
bastion of white rule and anti-communism in Southern Africa.  
President Carter’s victory in the American electoral race in late 1976 worried the apartheid 
government.  They had reasons to believe that Carter was going to show his support to the 
black majority in SA if he would keep the promises that he made during his presidential 
election campaign.  Pretoria felt that Carter was not going to continue the struggle against 
communism like his predecessors.  Consequently Pretoria started to make new friends who 
they regarded to be anti-communist.  Carter laid down certain requirements that SA had to 
meet if they wanted a continuation of the good relationship they had with the USA.  The 
apartheid government found these requirements outside the scope of its own national 
interest and therefore turned to their new allies such as France, Argentina and Israel. 
Carter’s cold stance toward SA gave Pretoria reason to embark on a clandestine propaganda 
operation to change the world and the American public’s opinion about SA in order to change 
Carter’s foreign policy toward SA. This operation was exposed and became known as the 
Information Scandal or Muldergate.  USA-SA economic relations flourished under Carter 
despite the dire political relationship between the two countries.  Carter argued that American 
businesses in SA should show SA how to treat workers of all races hence the Sullivan 
Principles were introduced to American businesses operating in SA.  Carter refused to have 
a military relationship with apartheid SA.  He voted in favour of the most comprehensive 
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arms embargo that was ever imposed on SA.   The spy plane incident of 1979 further soured 
the USA-SA relationship. 
The apartheid government was very optimistic when Ronald Reagan won the USA 
presidential race in 1980. They hoped that the mutually beneficial USA-SA relationship could 
be renewed.  Pretoria was not disappointed and within a short period the USA-SA 
relationship was stronger than ever.  Reagan, despite the views of the UN General 
Assembly, openly sided with the white government of SA.  By implementing his policy of 
Constructive Engagement he allowed the apartheid government to maintain its hold over 
Namibia and the black people of SA.  Economic relations between the USA and SA also 
flourished under the Reagan administration.  When the USA Congress realised that 
Constructive Engagement did not enforce any real reform by the apartheid government, they 
implemented the CAAA. The opinion and pressure of the American public influenced the 
USA Congress to implement the CAAA. Reagan tried to veto the CAAA, but the Congress 
outvoted him. The CAAA led to an almost absolute discontinuation of the USA-SA 
relationship and paved the way for actual reforms in SA.   
The election of President Bush in 1989 was the last nail in the coffin for the relationship 
between apartheid SA and the USA.  Bush made it known that he genuinely wanted to end 
apartheid. It was under his reign that the Border War ended, Pretoria started to make actual 
reforms towards a one man one vote policy, Namibia got independence and the Cold War 
also ended. 
South Africa’s strategic position on the world map made it a compulsory ally to have from the 
USA’s point of view.  The sea lanes around SA were crucial when the USA was denied 
access to the Suez Canal.  The deep ports of SA were also beneficial to the USA Navy to 
replenish or repair their naval ships that were operating far from American soil.  South Africa 
was further perfectly situated for an American long-range missile testing site.  South Africa’s 
strategic position gave them the upper hand when it came to negotiations on USA support to 
SA.   
Pretoria never hesitated to remind Washington that they would lose a very valuable strategic 
and military ally if they do not provide SA with the goods that they needed.  The USA 
bypassed the arms embargoes by classifying the equipment as civilian equipment rather 
than military equipment.  During the Carter administration the export of all equipment – 
civilian or military – were banned.  American weapons and equipment then had to find its 
way to SA illegally through, American businessmen and the CIA without Carter’s knowledge. 
The South African intelligence agencies and the CIA had a good working relationship 
throughout the Cold War period.  The CIA was especially helpful when it came to providing 
reports on the situation in Angola. 
South Africa’s occupation of Namibia was another headache to the USA, because the whole 
world condemned SA’s illegal occupation of Namibia.  The USA was wary of criticising SA 
too much on the Namibia issue, because the USA had too much to lose in terms of an 
economic and strategic ally in SA.  It was only under the Carter administration that the USA 
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started to acknowledge that SA had to grant Namibia its independence.  The USA, as part of 
the Contact Group, took the lead in negotiating Namibia’s independence from SA.  Namibia’s 
struggle for independence against SA and the civil war in Angolan were inextricably linked. 
The SADF executed regular attacks on Angolan soil as a result of SWAPO soldiers seeking 
refuge in Angola. SA and the USA also supported anti-communist forces in Angola in their 
fight to take away the governance of Angola from the Cuban and Soviet backed MPLA. The 
CIA tried to keep its support to anti-communist Angolan forces as covert as possible.   
The USA was involved in the Angolan conflict even before Portugal withdrew from Angola 
and maintained its support to the anti-communist forces and SA in Angola for the rest of the 
Cold War.  Even when the US Congress implemented the Clarke amendment that banned 
USA support to Angola, the CIA continued to be covertly involved in Angola because of their 
fear of a communist takeover in Southern Africa.  Cuba showed willingness to withdraw from 
Angola if SA would give independence to Namibia and also stop their support to UNITA in 
Angola.  This prompted the USA to act as a mediator in the conflict in Southern Africa, 
because there was an opportunity to get communist Cuba out of Southern Africa.  After years 
of negotiations between all the parties involved in what was known as the Border War, an 
end was brought to the conflict with the signing of the New York agreements on 22 
December 1988 when SA and Cuba both agreed to withdraw from the conflict in Angola and 
SA complied with giving independence to Namibia.  Even though SA and Cuba withdrew 
from Angola, the USA still continued to support UNITA’s effort in Angola until the end of the 
Cold War. 
The apartheid government felt threatened by the communist presence of Cuba in Angola.  
Pretoria was not sure if they were going to be able to withstand the perceived communist 
onslaught from within SA and from its neighbouring countries hence they embarked on a 
programme to build nuclear weapons following in the footsteps of the major Cold War actors 
such as the USA and France.  The build up of a nuclear capability by the USSR and the fear 
of international Communism contributed to this choice. The South African nuclear weapons 
were to be used as bargaining chips in negotiations and as a last resort if Pretoria saw that 
SA might fall to the communist backed forces.  The USA and SA had nuclear relationship 
since 1950. As with all the other elements of the USA-SA relationship, the nuclear element 
was also a see-saw affair.  The USA in conjunction with other Western countries provided SA 
with the necessary equipment and expertise to start a nuclear weapon programme.  Pretoria 
did however never admit that they were going to use the American technology and 
equipment to build nuclear weapons.  When the USA realised that SA possibly had a nuclear 
weapon programme, they tried to force SA to declare all its nuclear assets by signing the 
NPT.  Pretoria refused to sign the NPT on numerous occasions and this led to a break down 
in the USA-SA nuclear relationship.  Pretoria then found new nuclear friends like France, 
Israel, Belgium and Taiwan.  Pretoria was very good at keeping its nuclear weapon 
programme a secret to those that were not involved.  However, from time to time the 
apartheid government would create an event to keep the USA and the rest of the world 
guessing whether or not SA had nuclear weapons, e.g. the Vastrap incident and the possible 
testing of a nuclear bomb in 1979. When Reagan came into power the USA-SA nuclear 
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relationship was renewed and American equipment and personnel was once again used to 
help develop SA’s nuclear bombs.  By 1990 when Pretoria started to dismantle its nuclear 
weapons, SA had already built 6 and half nuclear bombs with help from the USA and other 
nuclear allies.  
The Cold War was essentially an ideological battle between the East and the West.  The 
apartheid government of SA sided with the West under the leadership of the USA.  Pretoria 
adjusted its foreign policy to fit in with the anti-communism foreign policy of the USA.  This 
enabled SA to be an invaluable ally to the USA in one of the most strategic positions of the 
world.  This leads to the answer to the research question posed in chapter 1: Were the 
relationships between the USA and SA ambiguous for public consumption or were these 
realistic strains that could not be resolved because of the Cold War mythology? 
The USA-SA relationship during the Cold War was a love/hate relationship which was 
dictated by personalities and world events.  Most American presidents were against 
apartheid, but they had to consider American national interest, their foreign policies and also 
the American public’s opinion when they made decisions on SA.  South Africa was able to 
play in on the USA’s foreign policy of containment of communism as well as providing the 
USA with an excellent business and military/strategic partner during the Cold War.  As a 
result the USA-SA relationship sometimes had to continue without the knowledge of the 
American public in order to protect American national interests and to withhold the 
communist USSR from world domination as perceived by the USA during the Cold War.  In 
the end the US moral advocacy of democracy was compromised by the continued overt and 
covert support of the minority state in Pretoria. 
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